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“They are living monuments to war, disorder, long-term social collapse, governmental failure, 
prejudice and sheer malice. They pay directly for the militaristic swaggering of their leaders, 
for the intolerance of political and religious orthodoxy and for the short-term successes of 
mindless power-seekers.” 
(Gordenker, 1987, p. 6).
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Abstract 
 
Ethnic conflict is the most common type of internal armed conflict in the world. It often 
involves systematic attacks on civilian populations and is therefore also the major source 
of most of the world’s 9.2 million external refugees and 25 million internal refugees. In 
2003, Asia-Pacific was the region second most affected by conflict-induced displacement 
and in 2004 it had the second largest global number of internal refugees following Africa. 
Given the likelihood that this trend will continue, it is perhaps surprising that a relative 
lack of research has been conducted concerning the relationship between ethnic conflict 
and refugee movements within this region compared to other areas. It is therefore 
imperative that a comprehensive study be undertaken to fill this void of knowledge. The 
fundamental question posed by my thesis is “why do some ethnic conflicts produce 
external refugees and others do not in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region? To answer this 
question, this thesis develops a theoretical model from which to analyse variations in both 
external and internal refugee numbers as a result of ethnic conflict in the region. It applies 
the model to specific ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands during the period 1995 – 2005 and identifies a common set of factors conducive 
to creating internal and external refugees. The findings emphasise the interlinked nature 
of the variables and demonstrate that no single-factor explanation exists that can explain 
how refugees are created. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The majority of conflicts in the world are no longer between states, they are within them. 
Since the post-Cold War period (1990 – 2003), 55 of the 59 different major armed 
conflicts in 48 different locations registered were internal (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 
2004, p. 132). Many of these internal conflicts also possess an ethnic dimension. From 
the early 1950s only a few countries had experienced ethnic conflict, but by the early 
1990s, 31 countries had been affected by them (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p.1). The rate of 
new ethnic conflicts peaked at the end of the Cold War when the Soviet Union was 
collapsing (figure 1). In 1991 alone, eight new conflicts broke out; more than double the 
number from any other year since 1955. Furthermore, 20 ethnic conflicts erupted within 
seven years (1988 – 1994), composing nearly one-third of the total number of conflicts 
that had arisen since 1955. Although the rate of new ethnic conflicts declined in the late 
1990s, ethnic conflict remains the most common type of internal armed conflict in the 
world (Goldstone et al, 2000, pp. 33 - 34).  
  
 
Figure 1: Global Incidence of Ethnic War, 1955 - 98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goldstone et al, September 30, 2000, p. 7.  
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These ethnic conflicts mostly originate in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia 
and the post-Communist states, and can largely be attributed to the geographical 
distribution of politically active ethnic groups (Gurr and Harff, 2004, pp. 13-15). As the 
figure below shows, in 2001, Africa had the largest number of politically active ethnic 
groups in the world, followed by the post-Communist states and states in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 4). These findings seem to support Ganguly’s (2002, p. 
3) argument that ethnic conflicts in Central/West Africa and South/South East Asia are 
increasing, whereas elsewhere they have been declining.  
 
 
Figure 2: Politically Active Groups by Region, 2001 
 
 
Source: Gurr and Harff, c2004, p. 4. 
 
 
Ethnic conflicts are also the source of most of the world’s refugees because they usually 
involve systematic attacks on civilian populations (Brown, 1993, p. 17; Weiner, 1996, p. 
21). In 2002, about two-thirds of the world’s 15 million refugees were fleeing from 
ethnopolitical conflict and repression (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 1). Furthermore, almost 
38 million people have been displaced and seven million killed during ethnic conflicts, 
making them the greatest cause of human suffering (Brown, 1996, pp.4-7, Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998, p. 339).  
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Despite these facts, the salience of both ethnic conflict and refugee movements in 
international relations has previously been overlooked; both being relegated to peripheral 
areas in international relations theory and either marginalised, or disregarded altogether. 
However, contemporary developments have meant that ethnicity has assumed a greater 
degree of importance, as most of the almost two hundred member states of the United 
Nations are ethnically heterogenous, with groups increasingly asserting their ethnic 
distinctiveness and making it known that their ethnic bonds are stronger than their 
national allegiances. Kuran (1998, p. 35) acknowledges that: “Subnational groups that 
had appeared to be assimilating into geographically defined populations are now 
demanding ethnically based economic rights, political power, and social respect. 
Moreover, elections, development strategies, coups, and international treaties 
increasingly involve ethnic dimensions.”  
 
This, combined with the comparative lack of research conducted on ethnic conflict and 
refugee trends within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, compared to other areas, such as 
Africa and Eastern Europe, have limited our understanding of the relationship between 
these phenomena and the processes by which they become diffused. It is therefore 
important that a comprehensive study be undertaken to fill this void of knowledge, to 
explain what factors have made the Southeast Asia/Pacific region the second most 
affected by conflict-induced displacement in the world (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Definition of an “Ethnic Conflict”  
Although many authors mention or allude to the concept of an “ethnic conflict” in their 
work, most do not define the term and seem to assume that its meaning is generally 
understood. To understand the term “ethnic conflict,” one must first define “ethnicity.” 
The word “ethnicity” derives from the Greek “ethnikos,” (the adjective of “ethnos”), 
which refers to a people or nation (Cashmore, 2004, p. 142). In his influential work on 
ethnic conflict, Horowitz (1985, pp. 17-18) explained that: “Ethnic groups are defined by 
ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some 
other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof….This is an inclusive 
concept of ethnicity [that facilitates] comparison,” and, “Ethnicity is close to Max 
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Weber’s conception of a ‘subjective belief’ in ‘common descent’…ethnicity embraces 
groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ 
‘nationalities,’ and ‘casts.’” (p. 53).  
 
In contemporary usage, the word “ethnic” also retains this basic meaning because it 
describes a group of people who share some level of solidarity and coherence and who 
are aware of having a common plight and historical experience. These shared experiences 
are often founded on feelings of relative deprivation. Once these similarities are realised, 
the group can then construct boundaries, inside which their own beliefs, customs and 
cultures are developed (Cashmore, 2004, p. 142). Ethnicity therefore becomes a cultural 
phenomenon in response to material conditions (Ibid, p. 145). An “ethnic conflict” may 
arise when one or more of these defined boundaries are threatened by another ethnic 
community (Brown, 1993, p. 5) and involves: “Episodes of violent conflict between 
governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic 
challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status” (State Failure 
Project, 1997).  
 
Drawing on these preceding ideas, an “ethnic conflict” is defined as “war among 
communities (ethnicities) that are in conflict over the power relationship that exists 
between those communities and the state” (Sambanis, 2001, p. 261; Kaufman, 1996, p. 
138). However, it is important to realise that not all conflicts involving different 
ethnicities are necessarily “ethnic conflicts.” The issues at the centre of the conflict must 
be integral to the concept of ethnicity as described above (Sambanis, 2001, p. 261). 
 
Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict 
In order to better recognise ethnic conflicts and to understand their nature, it is helpful to 
determine the similar characteristics they possess. Ethnic conflicts often involve violence 
and bloodshed due to their seemingly intractable and highly intense nature (Cooper and 
Berdal, 1993, p. 203; Stack, 1997, p.17). This recourse to violence may be related to 
evidence which shows that ethnic conflicts are more likely to: “have violent triggers; 
induce a resort to violence and to higher levels of violence; and involve the use of 
violence as the primary means” (Moore and Davis, 1998, p. 91).  
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Brown (1993, p. 24) argues that this intensity occurs because groups involved in ethnic 
conflicts are highly motivated, often believing that their very existence is at risk and 
involving higher perceived threats to basic values. This means that such conflicts are 
likely to have a higher incidence of stalemate or compromise outcomes and to be 
terminated by less formal agreements (Moore and Davis, 1998, p. 91).  Carment and 
James (1997, p. 259) liken this situation to a “zero-sum” outcome, in that ethnic conflicts 
begin from within an environment of fear, which “will be resolved through the 
destruction or assimilation of a group.” They argue that this is especially probable if the 
political system is organised along ethnic lines and one group becomes dominant. 
 
Ethnic conflicts are often based on non-negotiable traits and values and therefore tend to 
be of a longer duration than other conflicts, as the tension between parties is likely to be 
deeply entrenched creating the conditions for protracted conflicts (Cooper and Berdal, 
1993, p. 196). Due to this, “many ethnic conflicts have proven largely resistant to lasting, 
peaceful resolutions because the groups involved believe they are fighting for their 
nation’s survival; powerful ethnocentric emotions tend to overwhelm calls by outside 
mediators for power sharing and rational dialogue” (Wood, 1994, p. 613). These non-
negotiable traits or values may involve questions of identity, effective participation, 
security and other basic needs or social goals (Carment and James, 1997, p. 260). Gurr 
and Harff (2004, p. 35) agree, arguing that a common underlying trait in all ethnic 
conflicts is that people become more acutely aware of their common identity. This 
awareness can be heightened by attacks from other groups, by appeals from their leaders, 
or by dramatic examples of political action undertaken by similar groups elsewhere. The 
divergence of this fundamental identity manifests itself into an “us-them” syndrome and 
is at the basis of all ethnic conflicts.  
 
A recent history of ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination are other 
indicators that are most strongly associated with the outbreak of ethnic conflict. The State 
Failure Task Force Report (2000) found that countries which had previously experienced 
a major ethnic conflict were three times more likely to suffer from a new ethnic conflict. 
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Furthermore, the probability of an ethnic conflict occurring was four times as high for 
those countries with very diverse populations. The most significant factor the Task Force 
discovered was that in countries where certain ethnic minorities are subjected to 
substantial political or economic discrimination, the odds of a new ethnic war starting 
were more than ten times as high (Goldstone et al, 2000, p. 33). This is because when an 
ethnic group’s identity is coupled with feelings of resentment and discrimination or it 
feels aggrieved in response to an unequal status in comparison with other groups, and it is 
perceived as impossible to redress these grievances through legal or political channels, 
violent ethnic conflict can ensue (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 35; de Nevers, 1993, p. 62).  
These feelings of resentment are therefore often directed at the state, and so as well as 
ethnic conflicts involving a mixed ethnic community within a single state (de Nevers, 
1993, p. 62), they are generally also between governments and ethnic movements; that is, 
between a legally recognised authority and a rather ill defined and possibly illegal 
movements (Cooper and Berdal, 1993, p. 196).  
 
Like other conflicts, lower levels of economic development and integration in the global 
political system may also be associated with greater risks of ethnic conflict (Sambanis, 
2001, p. 266). Goldstone et al (2000, p. 33) found that countries with worse-than-average 
infant mortality rates were twice as likely to experience ethnic conflict and that countries 
with relatively few memberships in regional organizations were three times more likely 
to face ethnic conflict than countries with many regional memberships. 
 
Costs of Ethnic Conflict  
Ethnic conflicts often involve serious costs and consequences. Many analysts fear that 
ethnic conflict is contagious under certain circumstances; meaning that a “bandwagon” 
can produce ethnic dissimilation within one country by drawing in neighbours and 
outside opportunists, which in turn can create a “super bandwagon” that heightens the 
role of ethnicity in successive others, inevitably destabilising whole regions (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998, pp. 3, 36-37, 341). Indeed, almost half of the 61 ethnic conflicts that 
began between 1955 and 1998 either preceded or coincided with some other state-failure 
episode. Some ethnic conflicts instigate a surge of additional ethnic conflicts, others 
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cause governments to collapse; and still others prompt governments to initiate large-
scale, indiscriminate killings (genocides or politicides) (Goldstone et al, 2000, p. 34).  
 
However, ethnic conflict only seems to be contagious under certain circumstances. 
Unless local conditions are ripe for its transmission (for example where states are weak 
and have not developed effective solutions to their strategic dilemmas, the balance of 
ethnic power is precarious or the demands made by each side are large and the costs of 
conflict are small), the spread of ethnic conflict is unlikely (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 
pp. 24, 28). These conditions seem to apply to much of Africa and in the newly 
independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Lake and Rothchild, 
1998, p. 341). Additionally, they also apply to the Asia/Pacific region, which has suffered 
from the largest number of “major armed conflicts” of any region in every year between 
1989 and 1997 (Reilly and Graham, 2004, p. 10). Such conflicts can have devastating 
consequences (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 26). 
 
Reasons for attempting to prevent the diffusion and escalation of ethnic conflicts include 
humanitarian objectives, (such as the value of preventing slaughter), economic objectives 
(including the value of trade with prosperous states in the region), and to some extent 
ideological objectives (in the sense that the success of exclusivist ethnic programmes in 
Eastern Europe “might contribute to the undermining the legitimacy of liberal democratic 
‘civic’ notions of citizenship in the West” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p.108). It is not 
necessary to simply observe ethnic conflict spreading to conclude that it is a potential 
problem. Even the forestalling of the diffusion of ethnic conflict is important, as any 
alteration in the current actors involved may lead to greater escalation or diffusion in the 
future (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 25). Moreover, once internal conflicts involve 
neighbouring states, violence becomes far more difficult to control and resolve (Brown, 
1996, p. 26). The effects of ethnic conflicts on neighbouring states are also important 
because these problems often activate minor conflicts and bloodshed (Brown, 1996, p. 
594).  
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The table below shows conflict trends in ten Southeast Asian/Pacific countries from 1946 
– 2004. The conflicts are assessed based on the International Peace Research Institute’s 
(PRIO) “Armed Conflict” database. This database measures the intensity level of a 
conflict according to the number of deaths it created. Gleditsch et al (2002, p. 10) define a 
“minor” conflict as “at least 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the 
period.” An “intermediate” conflict has “more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a 
total conflict history of more than 1,000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per 
year,” and a “war” has “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year” (Gleditsch et al, 
2002, p. 10). Unfortunately, the dataset does not include all the conflicts that have 
occurred in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and notably omits those ethnic conflicts 
which occurred in Fiji and the Solomon Islands because they have less than the minimum 
threshold of deaths required to be termed as a “minor” conflict.  
 
It also does not provide an overall total of refugees created from the conflicts from 1946 
– 2004, as a reliable individual breakdown of refugee numbers is unavailable for each of 
the conflicts. However, the UNHCR’s “2004 Global Refugee Trends” provides an 
estimate of the total population of concern to the UNHCR within each country as at the 
end of 2004. This is perhaps the best reliable indicator for refugee numbers available, 
although it unfortunately includes all types of refugees and not just those induced by 
conflict. Despite this, it provides an idea of the number of refugees emerging from each 
country. 
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Table 1: Conflict and Refugee Trends in the Southeast Asia/Pacific Region, 1946 – 
2004  
 
 
Location Conflict Duration Intensity Level Total 
People of 
Concern 
 <10 
yrs 
10-24 
yrs 
25-39
yrs 
40+ 
yrs 
Minor Intermediate War end-2004 
 
Brunei 
 
? 
 
    
? 
   
N/A 
 
Burma/Myanmar 
 
    
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
210 
 
Cambodia 
 
    
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
698 
 
Indonesia 
 
    
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
16,625 
 
Laos 
 
    
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
- 
 
Malaysia 
 
  
? 
   
? 
  
 
 
97,538 
 
Papua New 
Guinea 
 
 
? 
    
? 
  
 
 
7,960 
 
Philippines 
 
    
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
1,980 
 
Thailand 
 
 
? 
    
? 
 
? 
 
 
 
122,188 
 
Vietnam 
 
   
? 
    
? 
 
 
2,373 
 
Sources: International Peace Research Institute; UNHCR, 17 June 2005, p. 10.  
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the majority of conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region 
from 1946 – 2004 have lasted 40 or more years and have all created at least 25 battle-
related deaths.  Some conflicts have suffered from minor wars, intermediate wars, and 
wars during the period 1946 – 2004, which indicates that they are highly intractable. 
Thailand had the largest total population of concern to the UNHCR at the end of 2004, 
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whereas Laos had no population of concern to the UNHCR, perhaps because of its more 
authoritarian government.  
 
 
The Diffusion of Ethnic Conflict 
The process by which ethnic conflicts spread is a subject of considerable debate. The 
concepts of “contagion,” “escalation,” “diffusion,” and “internationalisation,” are used 
interchangeably in the literature to describe this process, but are not usually clearly 
defined.1 Although the term “diffusion” has varying definitions in the literature (Gurr and 
Harff, 2004, p. 221; Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4), for the purposes of this thesis it is 
defined as “the spillover processes by which conflicts in one country directly affect 
neighboring countries” (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3). This definition best 
encapsulates the means through which ethnic conflicts become diffused by refugee 
movements, as it is through these “spillover processes” that a conflict in one country can 
directly affect political organisation and action in adjacent states (Gurr, 1993, p.133).  
 
Lake and Rothchild (1998, pp. 25-27) argue that ethnic conflict can be diffused through 
one of four closely interrelated processes: 
 
1. Events abroad may directly alter the domestic ethnic balance of power, which in turn 
disrupts the existing ethnic contract and precipitates violence. This can occur, for 
example, through refugee flows from neighbouring states that might substantially 
alter the ethnic composition of the receiving state, or through armed insurgents from 
one state seeking refuge in another, provoking local conflicts. 
2. Ethnic conflict in one state may encourage groups in another to make more extreme 
demands. If groups in one state witness ethnic mobilisation or political success by 
ethnic groups in another, they may increase their own political agitation to obtain a 
larger proportion of the country’s resources, increasing the likelihood of conflict. 
Likewise, ethnic conflict overseas may lead groups to revise their beliefs about the 
possible demands of other groups in their own country, even if no action has actually 
 
1 Exceptions to this include: Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3; Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4; and, Gurr, 
1993, p.134. 
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occurred, and may encourage them to strike pre-emptively to secure their own 
interests.     
3.  Ethnic conflict abroad may cause groups to update their beliefs about the efficacy of 
the political safeguards contained in their existing ethnic contracts. For instance, if 
events overseas suggest that the economic leverage wielded by wealthy minority 
groups is less effective than originally thought, the poorer majority may become 
emboldened and the minority threatened, again creating conflict without any obvious 
changes in the domestic conditions. 
4.  Ethnic conflict abroad may also encourage groups to revise their beliefs about the 
costs of protest or, eventually, violence and their probability of success. If protest and 
violence is effective overseas this may lead groups at home to believe that they too 
can obtain their goals through coercion. Furthermore, if groups predict that the 
international community will punish violent acts, but it becomes likely this will not 
occur; groups will lower their estimated costs of using violence and are increasingly 
likely to use force.  
 
Although the above explanations are detailed, they do not consider other common 
important means of diffusion, including international terrorism or partisan intervention. 
Both Brown (1993, p. 16) and Ganguly (2002, pp. 70-71) provide a broader analysis of 
the process by which ethnic conflict can be diffused. Brown (1993, p. 16) suggests 
diffusion can occur through: civilian slaughter; weapons of mass destruction; chain 
reaction effects; neighbouring powers; distant interests; international organisations; and, 
refugee flows. Whereas, Ganguly (2002, pp. 70-71) argues that diffusion can occur 
through one of four processes:  
 
- international diplomatic activity of ethnonationalists and states confronted with 
ethnic conflict; or, 
- partisan intervention by outside states in a domestic ethnic conflict; or 
- international terrorism used by ethnonationalists or secessionists; or 
- refugee flows from domestic ethnic conflicts. 
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The diffusion of ethnic conflict through refugee movements is a commonality that exists 
within Lake and Rothchild, Brown, and Gangulys’ methods of diffusion. While it is 
important to acknowledge that not all ethnic conflicts produce refugees (Suhrke, 1993, p. 
230; Newland, 1993, p. 143), this commonality demonstrates that refugee movements are 
a salient means by which ethnic conflict is diffused and is therefore the subject of this 
thesis.  
 
Definition of a “Refugee”  
The term “refugee” was apparently first used by the French Huguenots who sought 
sanctuary in England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It is derived from the 
French réfugié (which in turn derived from the word réfugier), which means to flee 
(Stein, 2004, p. 363). In a colloquial sense, a “refugee” is commonly distinguished from 
an “economic migrant,” as someone who is forced to migrate, rather than someone who 
has moved more or less voluntarily (Black, 2001, p. 63). It is therefore important to 
mention that this study separates and excludes patterns of migration which are solely or 
largely generated by voluntary and self-determined decisions. Refugees can broadly be 
divided into two major categories – external and internal refugees. Although both types 
flee for similar reasons, they are not classified as the same under international law and 
therefore do not qualify for the same international protection. 
 
The concept of an “external refugee” 
Unlike the colloquial definition, international law defines an “external refugee” more 
specifically. The most internationally accepted definition of an “external refugee” is the 
United Nations concept, which was formulated in the immediate post-World War Two 
period, mainly in response to European refugee movements. This definition was codified 
in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
Convention), which defines an external refugee as a person who: “owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country” (1951).  
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As the Convention expressly addressed external refugees in Europe who claimed asylum 
before 1951, the UNHCR had no legal authority to help such refugees outside Europe or 
involved in World War Two and its aftermath. This was because despite its appearance, 
the regime was designed to be of regional and provisional use, rather than as a model of 
universal application (Coles, 1989, p. 374). In order to broaden its application, the 1967 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol) was adopted. 
This widened the definition of an “external refugee” to include all others who were 
outside their country of nationality as a consequence of a well-founded fear of 
persecution, irrespective of whether their flight was caused by events in Europe prior to 
1951 (Gordenker, 1987, p. 38).2 Furthermore, the UN has passed numerous covenants on 
human rights again extending these protections, including “liberty of movement,” 
“freedom to choose his residence,” and the right “to leave any country, including his 
own” (Wood, 1994, p. 622).   
 
Additionally, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) implemented the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), due to the 
irrelevance of the Convention and Protocol in many external refugee situations in 
developing countries due to decolonisation. While the 1969 Convention generally follows 
the 1951 Convention of an “external refugee,” it widened the definition by including 
those persons who: “…owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge 
in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (OAU, 1969).  
 
This broader concept emphasises that victims of foreign domination and “events seriously 
disturbing public order” are equally worthy of special consideration to those who are 
escaping persecution. It therefore captures the problems of instability, natural and man-
 
2 The 1967 Protocol’s definition of an “external refugee” is: “any person who is outside the country of his 
nationality…because he has or had [a] well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality” 
(Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 4).  
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made disasters which primarily cause external refugees within Africa (Zolberg, 1989, p. 
29).  
 
As a further response to the mass outflows of external refugees in developing countries, 
the Central American governments approved the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
(1984). Like the 1969 Convention, it again widened the definition of an “external 
refugee,” to render it more applicable to the actual causes of external refugees in 
developing countries to include: “persons who have fled their country because their lives, 
safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, 
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order” (1984).  
 
Incorporating the above definitions, this thesis defines an “external refugee” as someone 
who has fled their country by crossing an internationally recognized state border, because 
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign 
aggression or occupation, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order. 
 
This broad definition reflects the changing nature of international relations since the Cold 
War and emphasises that generalised violence rather than individualised threats are most 
significant in creating external refugees. It also encapsulates the idea that people flee 
from many different types of danger and that the state is often not the only or main 
terrorizing agent. However, it is important to stress that the above definition does not 
include:  
a)   economic migrants (who are not fleeing from any danger);  
b) internal refugees (who have not crossed an international border);  
c) environmental refugees (who are fleeing for environmental reasons); or,  
d) forced ecomigration (which is propelled by economic decline and environmental 
degradation).  
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The concept of an “internal refugee” 
As previously mentioned, “internal refugees” (often known as “internally displaced 
persons” or “IDPs”) flee from similar dangers as “external refugees,” but are 
distinguishable from the latter because they have not crossed an international border to 
seek refuge in another country. Internal refugees therefore remain, for whatever reason, in 
their own states. This means that they do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 
Convention or 1967 Protocol definitions. Furthermore, unlike external refugees, no 
Convention exists which is specifically designated to address internal refugees. However, 
the UN has formulated the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
which allows it to take responsibility for internal refugees under certain general 
circumstances (UNHCR, 1997, p. 117). While these Principles provide greater protection 
to internal refugees, they do not allow the UNHCR to universally aid all internal 
refugees, with each involvement being decided on a case-by-case basis (Schmeidl, 1998, 
p. 25). Occasionally the UN has designated the UNHCR or its other agencies to organise 
assistance for internal refugees, and on rare occasions, the international community has 
intervened militarily or politically in civil wars on their behalf (Newman, 2003, p. 6; 
UNHCR, 1997, pp. 117-118).  
 
Although the UNHCR defines internal refugees as “people [who] are forced to flee…but 
they either cannot or do not wish to cross an international border,” the most widely used 
working definition is contained in a 1992 report of the secretary-general of the United 
Nations, which identifies internal refugees as: “persons who have been forced to flee their 
homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal 
strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who 
are within the territory of their own country” (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 16).  
 
However, in practice, the above definition excludes many cases of internal displacement 
as it overlooks three important factors: time, the numbers involved, and the instigator for 
flight. Internal refugees do not necessarily flee “suddenly or unexpectedly,” nor do they 
always flee “in large numbers.” Furthermore, internal refugees are not always “forced to 
flee.” Sometimes they are expelled from their homes or forcibly moved by their 
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governments for political or ethnic reasons (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 17). Therefore, the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and a group of 
international lawyers have widened the above definition to rectify these discrepancies and 
define an “internal refugee” as persons or groups of persons: “who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a 
result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 18). 
 
An “internal refugee” is defined in this thesis using the above definition, with the 
omittance of the words “natural disasters.” This is because this thesis does not address 
environmental factors as a cause of refugee flight.  
 
 
Refugee Movements as a Consequence of Ethnic Conflict 
Refugee movements are not a new phenomenon; the concept of people fleeing to seek 
sanctuary is as old as the development of international borders and the nation-state 
system itself (Helton, 2002, p. 8). Throughout history refugees have been caused by 
political and ethnic violence, persecution and pogroms, war, famine, environmental 
degradation and impoverishment (Loescher, 1992, p. 9). Most refugee movements occur 
in the developing world where war, famine and political repression primarily contribute 
to their growth, causing an additional burden upon the poorer and less secure states 
(Loescher, 1992, p. 10). Furthermore, since the Cold War, the number of countries with 
major ethnic conflicts and refugee movements has steadily increased (Gurr and Harff, 
2004, p. 1).  
 
The magnitude of refugee flows has caused increasing global concern, because in 1951, 
when the UNHCR was first established, there were approximately 1.5 million external 
refugees; by 1980 there were 8.4 million; and in 1992 there were 17.8 million  (table two) 
(Loescher, 1992, p. 9; UNHCR, 2005, p. 2 ). Although the global number of external 
refugees decreased to 9.2 million in 2004, the total external refugee population of Asia 
and the Pacific has increased by 1.6 percent during 2004 to 836, 700. This is the highest 
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rate of annual change of all the geographical regions listed under the “UNHCR Bureau,” 
and demonstrates the severity of the refugee problem in the Asia-Pacific region 
(UNHCR, 20 June 2005).  
 
Table 2: Number of External Refugees and Total Persons of Concern to UNHCR *  
 
Year Global number of external 
refugees 
Total population of concern 
1980 8, 446, 000 - 
1981 9, 706, 000 - 
1982 10, 310, 000 - 
1983 10, 610, 000 - 
1984 10, 717, 000 - 
1985 11, 851, 000 - 
1986 12, 620, 000 - 
1987 13, 114, 000 - 
1988 14, 331, 000 - 
1989 14, 716, 000 - 
1990 17, 378, 000 - 
1991 16, 837, 000 - 
1992 17, 818, 000 - 
1993 16, 306, 000 - 
1994 15, 754, 000 - 
1995 14, 896, 000 - 
1996 13, 357, 000 - 
1997 12, 015, 000 19, 795, 000 
1998 11, 481, 000 19, 895, 000 
1999 11, 687, 000 20, 628, 000 
2000 12, 130, 000 21, 871, 000 
2001 12, 117, 000 19, 922, 000 
2002 10, 594, 000 20, 779, 000 
2003 9, 680, 000 17, 009, 000 
2004 9, 237, 000 19, 197, 000 
 
* Includes revised year-end figures.   
Source: UNHCR, September 2005, p. 2. 
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Despite a general trend indicating that the global number of external refugees is 
decreasing, internal refugee figures have grown dramatically in recent years. The global 
number of internal refugees has reached an unprecedented level of 25 million, and 
continues to be caused by the growing saliency of ethnicity (table 3) (UNHCR, 20 June 
2005, p. 2; Ludlam-Taylor, 1998, p. 34; Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 4). In 2003, Asia-
Pacific was the region second most affected by conflict-induced displacement in the 
world, and had the second largest global number of internal refugees (3.6 million), 
following Africa (12.7 million) (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Table 3: Number of internal refugees (estimates; as of end-2004) 
Region Countries Internal refugees (in millions) 
Africa 19 13.2 
Asia-Pacific 11 3.3 
Americas 4 3.7 
Europe 10 3.0 
Middle East 5 2.1 
Global 49 25.3 
 
Source: Global IDP Project, March 2005.  
 
What is most alarming about this, is that international public attention continues to focus 
on external refugees, despite internal refugee numbers being at least twice as high, 
consequently internal refugees receive less international protection and assistance, and 
that their plight is often far worse than that of external refugees (Global IDP Project, 
2004, p. 4; UNHCR, 2004, pp. 4-5). What is particularly significant about this is that 
internal displacement may be an instigator in the diffusion of ethnic conflict through 
external refugee flows (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 11; Hein, 1993, p. 49). However, 
Schmeidl (1998, p. 28) argues the opposite, and contends that external refugee 
movements typically precede internal refugee movements, with the latter lagging behind 
for a minimum of one, but usually several years. Schmeidl discovered that external 
refugee flows preceded internal refugee flows in 45 of the 55 countries with concurrent 
internal and external refugees in her study from 1964 – 1996. In each of the exceptions, 
there were either real or perceived obstacles to exit; fighting in neighbouring countries; or 
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targeted violence that initially deterred external refugee flight (Schmeidl, 1998, p. 28). 
Furthermore, internal refugee populations seem to be increasing in size and in duration. 
For example, Schmeidl notes that prior to 1990, 25 percent of internal displacement 
lasted only one or two years and only eight populations were displaced for ten or more 
years. This trend changed markedly during the 1990s; with about 61 percent of internal 
displacement lasting five years or less and 21 percent of these existing for ten or more 
years. The comparative figures for external displacement are 53 percent and 27 percent 
respectively (1998, p. 29). Possible reasons for the extended duration of internal refugee 
movements may include “lack of assistance and self-reliance opportunities, land and 
property disputes, continued hostility from local populations, and continued fighting,” 
meaning that many internal refugees prefer to wait before returning or instead choose to 
resettle elsewhere (Global IDP Project, 2005).   
 
Main Aim of the Research  
The principal aim of this thesis is to answer the fundamental question:  
- Why do some ethnic conflicts produce external refugees and others do not in the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region? 
 
To answer this question, this thesis analyses variations in both external and internal 
refugee numbers as a result of ethnic conflict in the region. To supplement the findings of 
this question, the following additional questions are also answered: 
  
- What factors within ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region are most 
conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees? 
- Which ethnic conflicts produce more refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific 
region and why? 
- Are external or internal refugee movements more likely to occur first in the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region and does one encourage the other? 
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Thesis Outline 
This chapter provided a contextual overview of the costs and consequences of ethnic 
conflict, specifically addressing refugee flows as a means through which ethnic conflict 
may be diffused. It also defined the terms used in this thesis and the complexities 
involved at reaching these definitions. Chapter Two summarises the nature of the 
literature concerning refugees and previous models which have attempted to explain the 
factors conducive to creating refugees. It concludes that these explanations have serious 
shortcomings and that a more comprehensive theoretical model is required. Based on the 
existing common trends in the literature, Chapter Three develops an original theoretical 
model from which to analyse the factors conducive to creating refugees. It highlights four 
major independent variables and some possible intervening variables that may explain 
why some ethnic conflicts create refugees and others do not. These variables are then 
applied to the countries of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands in 
Chapters Four and Five to determine which factors are most significant in the creation of 
external and internal refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. Chapter Six assesses 
which factors are the most important in creating external and internal refugees in the 
region and evaluates the usefulness of the model in determining these. The thesis 
concludes by providing recommendations for governments and regional organisations for 
reducing refugee numbers within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Overview of the Literature Regarding Ethnic Conflict and Refugees 
Little effort has been made to specify the theoretical connections between ethnic conflict 
and how it may become diffused through refugee movements. Instead Davis, Jaggers and 
Moore (1997, pp. 148-149) argue that studies have either concentrated on: the impact of 
ethnic conflicts on the behaviour of other states (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Shiels, 1984; 
Boucher et al, 1987; Chazan, 1991); how ethnic conflicts become diffused through third 
party intervention or mediation (Halpern, 1964; Modelski, 1964; Luard, 1972; Suhrke 
and Noble, 1977; Touval and Zartman, 1989; Stedman, 1992; Licklider, 1993; McGarry 
and O’Leary, 1993; Haglund and Pentland, 1996; James, 1996; Kaufman, 1996; Ryan, 
1990); the relationship between ethnic conflict and foreign policy behaviour (Heraclides, 
1990; Midlarsky, 1992; Carment, 1993; Carment et al, 1993; Carment and James, 1994; 
Moore and Davis, 1994); and, ethnic groups and their conflicts with nation-states (Young, 
1982; Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Posen, 1993). However, only a few studies address 
the impact of the international system on ethnic conflict within states (Nagel and 
Whorton, 1992; Rasler, 1992). This is alarming because some of the most dangerous 
ethnic conflicts are those which spill over into the international arena as crises and 
become part of the existing rivalries among international actors (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 
1997, p. 166). 
 
The absence of literature regarding the relationship between the diffusion of ethnic 
conflict through refugee flows may be explained by the fact that both areas of research 
have largely existed on the periphery rather than in the mainstream of academic research. 
Since the demise of the Cold War and the increase in refugee movements and ethnic 
conflicts, this trend is changing. For example, the Social Science Index listed an annual 
average of fifteen journal articles on refugees from 1970-1974, forty from 1975-1979, 
and over 80 during the 1980s (Hein, 1993, p. 43). During the same period, the numbers of 
publications on ethnic conflicts also markedly increased; from two books and 38 articles 
published from 1970-1990 to a total of 35 articles and books published in 2002 alone 
(figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Trends in Publications on Ethnic Conflicts, 1969 – 2004 
 
 
Source: Wimmer et al, 2004, p. 11. 
 
 
Despite this, the majority of scholarly literature regarding refugee studies remains in 
broad disciplinary or policy studies journals, rather than in more specialist journals. For 
example, Black (2001, p. 61) acknowledges that over the last decade, articles concerning 
refugee studies have appeared in various social science disciplines, including geography 
(Black, 1991; Wood, 1994), sociology (Hein, 1993), and anthropology (Malkii, 1995), 
and that these have not always been cross-referenced to provide an overview of the field. 
While the diversity of sites for publication makes it difficult to provide a fully 
comprehensive literature review of this area of studies, it also demonstrates the 
interdisciplinary nature of refugee studies and its relevance to a wide range of fields. This 
enables it to draw on a much wider base of theories and methods from the mainstream of 
academic disciplines (Zetter, 1988, p. 4; Black, 2001, p. 62).  
 
Black (2001, p. 71) emphasises that the area of refugee studies is unique from other more 
traditionally inward-looking academic disciplines, in that it has developed “in relation to 
a crucial area of policy that directly affects the lives of millions of people.” While this 
high level of policy relevance does not obviate the need for critical theoretical reflection, 
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it does mean that the existence of pioneering theoretical work in this field is less common 
than in other social science disciplines.  
 
The growth of interest in ethnic conflict and in refugee movements since the end of the 
Cold War may be because both became major factors in national and international 
instability. In many countries refugees have also been instrumental in continuing such 
conflict and instability (Newman, 2003, p. 5). The permeable nature of refugees 
challenges the traditional realist perception that the state is the fundamental unit of 
analysis in international relations and fails to acknowledge that while states may be 
secure according to the orthodox philosophy, they may be insecure regarding human 
security (Troeller, 2003, p. 51; Newman, 2003, p. 11). Indeed, major new security threats 
are emerging from political and social instability in the developing world due to religious, 
inter-community or ethnic tensions or because of economic upheaval. A consequence of 
this instability is a growth in the number of refugee and migration movements (Loescher, 
1992, p. 57). Due to this, Newman (2003, pp. 5, 8) argues that the management of refugee 
movements and the protection of displaced people should be an integral, rather than a 
peripheral, issue of regional security, conflict settlement and peace-building initiatives 
and that the whole concept of “security” needs to be reviewed.  
 
Previous Models Used to Explain the Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees  
Refugee movements have predominantly been considered a political phenomenon and 
have accordingly been omitted from most migration literature and theory, which tends to 
focus exclusively on the nature of voluntary migration (Lee, 1966), thus providing little 
guidance for the analysis of refugee movements (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 285). In most 
instances, economic factors are assumed to be predominant, in both determining the 
outflow and in interpreting the experience following migration. It is also often assumed 
that some regularity exists in detecting the flows of economic migrants but that refugee 
movements are, by contrast, spontaneous and thus unpredictable (Richmond, 1988, p. 9). 
It is therefore generally believed that while immigrants constitute an economic form of 
migration, refugees are considered a political form (Hein, 1993, p. 44). For example, 
Bascom (1998) takes this argument so far as to argue that a “theory of refugees” does not 
 24
exist and never will. He therefore implies that the search for theoretical grounding of 
refugee studies, “might be better achieved by situating studies of particular refugee (and 
other forced migrant) groups in the theories of cognate areas (and major disciplines),” 
thus participating in the development of social science, “rather than leading refugee 
studies into an intellectual cul-de-sac” (Black, 2001, p. 66). Other, more distinguished 
scholars have argued against such beliefs, contending that refugee movements “do not 
constitute a collection of random events” but form distinct patterns which are related to 
political transformations (Zolberg, 1986).   
 
The literature concerning forced migration largely consists of descriptive case studies and 
some comparative case studies (Zolberg et al, 1989; Weiner, 1996; Cohen and Deng, 
1998), rather than theoretically informed quantitative work (Davenport et al, 2003, p. 47; 
Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 3). For example, much has been written on the policies of 
receiving and sending countries, the economic and social adaptation in receiving 
countries, or global trends in population movement (Richmond, 1988, p. 7). This means 
that the majority of refugee theory does not specifically address the factors that are 
conducive to creating refugees; although exceptions exist (Clark, 1989; Zolberg et al, 
1989; Edmonston, 1992; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997, 2003; Gibney et al, 1996; Weiner, 1996; 
Wallensteen and Öberg, 1998; Davenport et al, 2003). Other studies only examine 
countries which have produced external refugees and therefore have problems with 
selection bias (Hakovirta, 1986; Edmonston, 1992; Gibney et al, 1996; Zolberg et al, 
1989; Apodaca, 1997, 1998), or only focus on bivariate relationships (Hakovirta 1986; 
Edmonston, 1992; Gibney et al, 1996; Wallensteen and Öberg, 1998; Apodaca, 1998; 
Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 3), which limits their capacity to rank the importance of 
causes and examine their effects on refugee movements (Schmeidl, 1997, pp. 285-286). 
Although studies concerning the relationship between violence and refugee flows have 
been undertaken, only five published studies examine the relationship between violent 
political conflict and refugee flows using a global database (Hakovirta, 1986; Schmeidl, 
1995, 1997; Gibney et al, 1996; Davenport et al, 2003, p. 29; Moore and Shellman, 
2004). This chapter evaluates eight influential theoretical models that analyse the factors 
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conducive to creating refugees, but only Zolberg et al (1989) analyse this specifically 
within the context of an ethnic conflict.  
 
Richmond’s 1988 and 1993 Models  
Richmond (1988, 1993) emphasises that a multivariate approach is needed to explain the 
complex relationship that exists between the various interlinked factors that cause refugee 
flows. He suggests that there is a continuum between the rational choice behaviour of 
“proactive” migrants trying to maximise net advantage (economic migrants) and the 
“reactive” migrant whose degree of freedom is severely constrained (political migrants) 
(Richmond, 1993, p. 10). The majority of international migrants (including refugees) fall 
between these two extremes. “Figure 4” illustrates this idea and “Figure 5” applies it to a 
variety of international population movements. 
 
Figure 4: Structuration of Migration 
 
 
Source: Richmond, 1993, p. 11.  
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Figure 5: Paradigm of International Population Movements 
 
 
Source: Richmond, 1988, p. 21. 
 
The vertical axis in each model depicts decision-making on a continuum from maximum 
to minimum autonomy, while the horizontal axis illustrates the interaction between 
economic and socio-political factors. The nearer the category falls to the vertical axis the 
more important the economic factors are, while those closer to the horizontal axis are 
more political in nature (Richmond, 1988, p. 20).  Therefore, the structural constraints are 
greater for “reactive” migrants whose scope for rational choice behaviour is more limited 
than the “proactive” migrants.  
 
Richmond (1993, pp. 12-3) analyses the factors conducive to “reactive” migration more 
comprehensively in his later models. These models depict the importance of economic, 
political, social, environmental and bio-psychological variables in generating refugees.  
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Figure 6: Reactive Migration: Multivariate Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
Source: Richmond, 1993, p. 13. 
 
Figure 7: Reactive Migration: Typology 
 
 
 
Source: Richmond, 1993, p.18. 
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“Figure 6” is more complex than “Figure 7” because it includes a series of additional 
factors which also facilitates refugee movements: predisposing factors, structural 
constraints, precipitating events, enabling circumstances and feedback effects. However 
“Figure 7” is more quantitatively oriented because it enables the primary and secondary 
determinants of reactive migration to be characterised into a possible 25 options. Under 
this model, the political determinants (categories one - nine) are usually more identifiable 
with refugee movements than the others (Richmond, 1993, pp. 18-19). 
 
While Richmond (1988, pp. 22-23) acknowledges that a comprehensive theory which 
accounts for all aspects of international migration does not exist, it can be stated that:  
M = P + R. Where M is the total number of international migrants, P indicates the 
number of “proactive” migrants and R, the number of “reactive migrants.” This equation 
can be further summarised as: Pabt or Rabt, where P and R are the number of “proactive” 
or “reactive” migrants respectively from place a seeking entry into place b in time period 
t. These equations are, as Richmond admits, a “gross over-simplification,” which fails to 
explain the factors leading to the different forms of migration, which are fundamental in 
understanding their unique nature.   
 
Clark’s 1989 Model 
Clark’s 1989 model expands on research undertaken in 1981 by Prince Sadruddin Aga 
Khan, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and distinguishes 
between underlying causes (root causes) and proximate conditions, intervening factors 
and triggering events. This provides a model for early warning research and the 
classification of indicators (Schmeidl, 1993, p.133).  
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Figure 8: Clark’s 1989 Model 
 
Source: Clark, 1989.  
 
 
Unlike Richmond’s models, Clark importantly describes the characteristics of the 
intervening factors, which contribute to either accelerating or decelerating refugee 
movements. Clark identifies five groups of intervening factors: 
 
1. Alternatives (coping strategies) to international flight (e.g. the possibility of 
resistance or internal displacement; 
2. Obstacles to international flight (e.g. knowledge of flight route, geographic 
obstacles, proper transportation, health and food factors, security problems and 
controlled borders, the controlling of borders, denial of entry, and the restrictions 
on immigration laws). Obstacles, however, are not necessarily actual difficulties 
encountered, but could merely be perceived as such; 
3. Expected reception in the asylum country (e.g. its economic situation, asylum 
policies, the existence of cross-border ethnic groups). For example, it could be 
argued that camps providing international assistance are a potential “pull 
factor” for refugees; 
4. Patterns in decision-making (e.g. tribal leadership, the “bandwagon effect,” the 
demography of the refugees); 
5. Seasonal factors (e.g. weather patterns, agricultural cycles). This can be linked to 
either labour migration or the fact that in conflict situations warring parties tend 
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to fight less during the cold winter months, potentially briefly halting mass 
migration (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 139). 
 
 
No distinction is made between those intervening variables which may be more likely to 
cause external as opposed to internal refugees within the above categories.  The detailed 
nature of the above intervening factors also means that several other possibly important 
intervening factors are overlooked, such as whether governmental or non-governmental 
assistance is provided within the refugee-producing state and whether this acts as a 
facilitator or deterrent to refugee flows. Furthermore, Clark incorrectly classifies a 
number of independent variables as intervening variables. For example, it is argued that 
“geographic obstacles” are actually structural variables, as they do not interpose 
themselves spontaneously within a situation. Furthermore, “proper transportation” could 
also be viewed as independent variable, as again transportation systems do not suddenly 
appear as a facilitator of refugee flows.  
  
 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aquayos’ 1989 Model 
Zolberg et al (1989, p. 236) construct a typology by identifying four major types of ethnic 
conflict, each associated with distinct refugee problems. These include: 
1. the explosion of ethnic hierarchies;  
2. target minorities; 
3. communal conflict; and,  
4. separatism. 
 
1. The explosion of ethnic hierarchies 
This occurs when a social ruling class and an ethnic affiliation coincide either as a ruling 
minority or a trading minority. Such conflicts are often revolutionary and violent in 
nature and involve the elimination of the dominant minority group through massacre, 
forced expulsion or coerced flight.  A ruling minority could use its privilege to exploit the 
majority; and a trading minority acts as either an exploitative bourgeoisie or as an 
unpopular intermediator between rulers and peasants (Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 236-7).  
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2. Target Minorities 
This category gives rise to the classic type of refugee who is persecuted by the state for 
reasons of religion or nationality. It involves the targeting of certain minorities who are 
perceived as an obstacle to nation building and who therefore are unable to be part of the 
new unitary national identity. However, despite the ethnic heterogeneity of many of the 
new states in Africa and Asia and aside from the trading groups previously mentioned, 
Zolberg et al (1989, p. 238) acknowledge that this type of refugee is now relatively rare. 
They contend that the scarcity of refugees generated by such conflict may partly be 
attributed to the majority of the new states accepting the existence of a multinational or 
multiethnic political community from the beginning. However, this thesis disagrees and 
argues that many states within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region do not have a sense of 
unitary national identity. Therefore, in this region many refugees have been generated 
due to state persecution.  
 
3. Communal conflict 
Zolberg et al (1989, p. 239) emphasise that communal conflict is not always hierarchical 
and that groups which are not hierarchically related are often regionally concentrated and 
spatially interspersed within a state. Each group is associated with a distinct pattern of 
conflict. Where groups are regionally concentrated, they have their own area, and 
competition occurs through the centre. When this escalates into conflict it usually 
becomes separatism, which can generate large numbers of external refugees (Zolberg et 
al, 1989, p. 245). Conversely, groups which are spatially interspersed surround each other 
and are therefore more likely to engage in periodic confrontations amongst themselves. 
Those spatially interspersed groups with clashes involving some or all of the local 
community cause much violence and high death tolls, but are “inherently circumscribed 
and generate few refugees,” as outsiders are reluctant to interfere in the state’s domestic 
politics. This non-action by external states renders it more likely that unavailability of 
asylum will be a deterrent to flight (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 239).   
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4. Separatism  
As previously mentioned, secessionist movements occur when large ethnic groups are 
regionally concentrated and central power is perceived to be working against their 
interests. Those protracted or recurring conflicts tend to generate large and cumulative 
numbers of external refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 245). Secessionist movements are 
especially prevalent in regions that have become “backward” due to the uneven impact of 
social change during the colonial period. Comparatively advanced groups in advanced 
regions are less likely to instigate secessionist movements, as they usually control the 
centre (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 243). However, despite the numerous secessionist 
movements within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, only those in Bangladesh and East 
Timor were successful.  
 
Zolberg et al (1989, p. 245) argue that successful separatist movements might be 
associated with a distinctive pattern of short-lived refugee flows, temporarily involving 
flight from violence and a subsequent unmixing with settlement in the host state. 
However, the more common unsuccessful separatist challenges tend to create more 
problematic refugees. Initially only a few activist exiles who possess little difficulty in 
finding sanctuary may emerge, but if the ethnic conflict moves into the military phase, 
then actions by the antagonists are likely to generate much larger refugee flows. It is also 
likely that refugees fleeing the violence of secessionist wars or the aftermath of a failed 
secessionist movement may become “target minorities.” 
 
Wood’s 1994 Model 
Wood (1994) attempts to encapsulate some of the complexity and variety of the 
interrelated factors that previous theorists tried to demonstrate in their models to explain 
how refugee flows are generated.  
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Figure 9: Model of Forced Migration 
 
Source: Wood, December 1994, p. 614. 
 
 
He correctly recognises several “push” factors that drive forced migration within three 
overlapping domains: 
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1. Political instability, war, and persecution – the conditions usually blamed for 
creating refugees; 
2. Life-threatening economic decline and ecological crisis – the conditions usually 
attributed to causing international economic migrants; and, 
3. Ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts – the conditions that create intense territorial 
and nationalistic emotions, intolerance of “foreigners” and “ethnic cleansing” 
(Wood, 1994, p. 615). 
 
The overlapping domains emphasise that neat analytical distinctions between “push” 
factors are obscured during a forced migration, as dilemmas in one area often spill over 
into another. Wood’s model therefore suggests that such distinctions among causal 
factors are less important than the cumulative effects of two or more causal factors.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that unlike most models, Wood makes a visible distinction 
between the “subnational” (internal refugees) and “international” (external refugees) 
components of forced migration and treats each differently. Wood claims that internal 
refugees are at a greater risk than external refugees, despite sharing similar fears and 
needs. This is because internal refugees are at risk from further oppression and lack the 
institutional support provided to external refugees. He argues that the survival of internal 
refugees often depends on their capacity to cope with “political instability, ethnic 
discrimination, and economic and ecological degradation,” whereas for external refugees, 
survival often depends on host governments and international relief agencies (Wood, 
1994, p. 615). While it is commendable that Wood differentiates between internal and 
external refugees, his distinction between them is often obscured and therefore his 
argument difficult to follow. Wood (1994, p. 615) himself acknowledges that his model 
may convey “too static an image of these adaptations,” but believes that it is a starting 
point provided one realises that forced migration movements are highly dynamic.  
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Schmeidl’s 1997 and 2003 Models  
In her 1997 study, Schmeidl found that political violence is the most important cause of 
refugee movements, but that ethnic conflict only significantly predicted refugee migration 
once six large refugee populations were excluded. This suggests that ethnic conflict is 
important in creating small and medium-sized refugee movements, but not necessarily 
large refugee flows, which are more likely to be caused by higher forms of political 
violence, such as genocide/politicide/civil war (Schmeidl, 1997, pp. 302-303).  
 
Schmeidl’s (1997, p. 286) theory distinguishes between three general types of factors that 
cause refugees: root causes, proximate conditions and intervening factors. She argues that 
there is a clear distinction in the literature between “root causes,” which are generally 
viewed as economically-related and “proximate causes,” which are generally seen as 
politically-related (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 287). Schmeidl (2003, p. 136) argues that “root” 
causes are underlying events which by themselves do not lead to refugee flows. They are 
therefore a necessary, but not sufficient cause of refugee movements and interact with 
other more proximate factors to create refugees. Proximate conditions are often 
associated with inter- and intra-state wars or are connected to a government’s inability or 
unwillingness to cope with root causes or unfavourable political, economic, or social 
conditions. Inter-state wars are more likely to generate internal refugees, because exits 
may be blocked due to fighting on border areas, whereas intra-state wars (especially if 
combined with external military intervention), are extremely likely to create external 
refugees (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 138).  
 
Like Clark (1989), Schmeidl (1997, 2003) emphasises the importance of intervening 
factors, which may either prevent or facilitate the occurrence of a refugee movement. 
Intervening factors will also influence the timing, size and duration of the displacement 
and perhaps whether internal or external refugees are created (2003, p. 138).  Like Clark 
(1989), Schmeidl (1997, pp. 295 – 296; 2003, p. 139) acknowledges the significance of 
improved transportation facilities, geographical proximity and migration networks as 
intervening factors, although these are actually independent variables because they do not 
occur spontaneously. She also adds to Clark’s five categories of intervening factors, by 
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suggesting that the best predictor of large migration streams are small trickles in the years 
before and that the stakeholders in refugee-producing conflicts may also act as an 
intervening factor in deciding whether forced expulsion may be used as a political 
strategy (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 140). 
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Figure 20: Examples of Indicators for the Early Warning of Forced Migration 
 
Source: Schmeidl, 2003, p. 137. 
PROXIMATE CAUSES 
 
Political Governance 
• Level of democracy 
• Legitimacy of government 
• Institutional mechanisms 
able to deal with diversity 
• Level of human rights 
violations 
• Strength of social 
infrastructure 
• Level of corruption 
 
Security 
• Localized or regional 
tensions or small struggles 
• Presence of warlordism or 
paramilitary forces 
• Independence/professionali
sm of police force/military 
• Presence of small arms 
 
Societal/Socio-
Demographic 
• Strength of civil society as 
“counter-weight” to bad 
governance 
• Level of unemployment, 
especially among youth 
(youth bulge) 
 
Economic 
• Strength of economy (e.g. 
dependency on one export 
crop) 
• Financial dependency on 
drug or arms trade (war 
economy) 
• Balance between public and 
military expenditures 
 
International 
• Abundance of arms trade 
into country 
• Intervention (political, 
military) from outsiders 
• Border disputes 
DECREASING THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF EXODUS 
 
• Efforts by civil society to stop 
conflict and war (war weariness 
of non-state actors) 
• External conflict resolution or 
peace-building efforts (and 
support of local efforts) 
• Incentives (economic, political) 
from the outside to put down 
arms 
• Obstacles to flight (difficult 
territory, security in border 
areas) 
• Alternatives to fight/coping 
strategies (joining of opposition) 
• Cost of flight (not wanting to 
leave land behind, not being able 
to afford to leave) 
• Expected reception in 
neighbouring countries 
(difficult asylum 
INCREASING THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF EXODUS 
 
• Clear government strategy of 
ethnic cleansing and forced 
expulsion 
• Scapegoating and isolation from 
the outside 
• Existing migration routes 
• Existing migration networks 
abroad 
• Expected reception in 
neighbouring countries 
(favourable political 
environment, existing refugee 
camp, ability to seek refuge with 
ethnic kin) 
• Past tradition of seasonal or 
labour migration 
• Patterns of decision-making 
(“leaders” decision to leave or 
stay) 
F
O
R
C
E
D
 
E
X
O
D
U
S
ROOT (SYSTEMIC) 
CAUSES 
 
Historic 
• Past history of conflicts 
and wars 
• Important historical 
event that influenced 
country’s perception (e.g. 
partition of 
India/Pakistan) 
 
Political / Institutional 
• Level of democratic 
experience 
• Amount of experience in 
non-violent conflict 
resolution 
 
Economic Equality 
• Scarce resources or existing 
resource competition 
• Abundance of natural 
resources that could be 
looted or exploited for war 
• Level of economic 
development 
• Important regional 
difference in access to 
resources 
 
Societal/Socio-
Demographic 
• Ethnic diversity in country 
• Ethnic grievances 
• Population distribution in 
country (which could 
encourage competition) 
• Regional diversity 
 
International 
• Historical meddling of 
neighbouring (or other) 
states 
 
Geographic 
• Geographic location, such 
as potential trade route 
(Afghanistan) important to 
outsiders 
• Arbitrarily drawn borders of 
disputes over territory 
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Shortcomings of these explanations 
Some previous theoretical models have attempted to explain the relationship between the 
various factors that cause refugee movements. However, as the variations between the 
models suggest, a comprehensive theory is difficult to formulate because involuntary 
migrations are based on complex decision-making processes and diverse causal factors 
(Wood, 1994, p. 608). The literature is particularly strong in identifying the underlying 
domestic factors within specific case studies that give rise to refugee movements. 
However, it pays less attention in identifying the specific catalytic causes of such 
movements, and the importance that governmental policies can play in instigating 
violence and in encouraging refugee flows. 
 
Both Richmond’s and Wood’s models do not specifically identify the factors that give 
rise to refugees. Instead, they simply mention vaguely defined factors as possible causes 
of refugees (Richmond, 1988, p. 2; 1993, pp. 11, 13, 18; Wood, p. 614). The broad nature 
of these factors is largely unhelpful in determining the specific characteristics within each 
situation that may create refugees, as few (if any) clear examples of each are provided in 
the explanation of their models. This makes them more difficult to apply in practice.  
 
A number of important factors and distinctions are also omitted from their models. Wood 
does not include any structural factors within his analysis and neither Wood nor 
Richmond recognises the importance that cultural/perceptual and intervening factors can 
play in influencing refugee movements. They also make little (if any) distinction between 
how internal and external refugees are created or between the various stages involved in 
this process, and instead group the factors together as if they all occur concurrently. 
Although Richmond’s later model (1993, pp. 12-13) analyses the factors conducive to 
creating refugees in more detail, he again oversimplifies these by stating that they must 
“fit” into one of a possible 25 categories based on a combination of political, economic, 
environmental, social, and bio-psychological characteristics. These categories exclude the 
importance of ethnicity and intervening factors as possible instigators of refugee flows.  
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Although the models by Clark (1989), Zolberg et al (1989, p. 236), and Schmeidl (1997; 
2003, p.137) are an improvement on Richmond and Woods’ models, they also have their 
limitations. Zolberg et al’s model (1989) is different from the others in that it only applies 
to refugees created from four specific types of ethnic conflict. While this provides a 
useful theoretical insight for the purposes of this thesis, it is not so easy to apply in 
practice. This is because it assumes that refugees are only created from one cause, ethnic 
conflict, and does not acknowledge the variety of other possible structural, political, 
economic, and social factors that may be involved in producing refugees. The typology is 
also not formulated into a model, making the process through which refugees are created 
less clear to visualise.  
 
Clark (1989) and Schmeidl’s (2003, p. 137) models recognise that a host of factors may 
influence the creation of refugees and clearly outline the process through which refugees 
are created by distinguishing between root causes, proximate causes, intervening factors, 
and triggers. Although Schmeidl improves on Clark’s model by making hers more 
comprehensive and differentiating between those intervening variables which are more 
predisposed to creating external and internal refugees, she still incorrectly classifies some 
independent variables as intervening factors (improved transportation facilities, 
geographical proximity and migration networks). Schmeidl also omits some important 
variables, including exclusionary national ideologies and the role that external parties can 
play in facilitating refugee flows. There is also the danger that Schmeidl’s model is too 
detailed, with too many variables, making it difficult for the reader to identify the ones 
that are most important. This has the potential to make any application of the model 
unnecessarily time-consuming. 
 
Given the above shortcomings within the existing refugee literature, this thesis develops a 
theoretical model that more concisely and specifically explains the causes conducive to 
generating refugee flows within the context of an ethnic conflict. The model has three 
different sets of variables: independent variables, intervening variables, and dependent 
variables. These variables provide a combination of interrelated factors which may 
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generate refugee movements during ethnic conflicts. A simplified version of the model is 
outlined below and is explained in further detail in the following chapter. 
 
Figure 11: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees 
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Chapter 3: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees 
 
Much interest has been expressed concerning the prevention of refugee flows, but it is 
often argued that in order to understand how to better prevent refugee flows, one must 
understand the causes which generate them. Therefore, an objective study of the causes 
and dynamics of modern refugee movements would provide a pragmatic basis from 
which to determine modern approaches to address the refugee problem (Coles, 1989, p. 
393).  
 
As stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, it has been established that ethnic conflict is the 
greatest cause of most of the world’s refugees, but that not all ethnic conflicts produce 
refugees (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 1; UNHCR, 20 June 2005, p. 7; Suhrke, 1993, p. 230; 
Newland, 1993, p. 143).  Newland (1993, p. 145) argues that ethnicity should be seen as a 
political and economic resource and as a major factor in the distribution of wealth and 
power, when examining the relationship between ethnic conflict and refugee flows. This 
is because ethnicity can be an important determinant of entitlement and privilege. 
Loescher (1992, pp. 30-1) also acknowledges the importance of ethnicity and argues that 
the catalyst for many conflicts in the developing world involve multiethnic groups 
fighting for political power. 
 
Given this knowledge, it is now important that substantial research is undertaken to 
address what factors, aside from ethnic conflict, make some states more likely to produce 
refugees than others. Many of the previous pioneering studies (outlined in Chapter 2), 
which attempt to explain the factors conducive to creating refugees are out-dated and 
require supplementing to reflect the contemporary situation in which the majority of 
refugees are generated by ethnic conflict. This chapter seeks to enhance these earlier 
models by developing a theoretical model from which to answer the fundamental 
question: why do some ethnic conflicts produce refugees?  
  
In identifying the mechanisms that may create refugee flows, this thesis draws on the 
structure of Brown’s (1996) typology, which cites conditions within internal conflicts that 
may make some places more predisposed to violence than others. Many of the factors that 
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Brown mentions regarding conflict also seem relevant in discussing how refugee flows 
emerge, as the relationship between the two is so interrelated. Brown categorises these 
conditions into four main groups: structural factors; political factors; economic/social 
factors; and cultural/perceptual factors.  
 
Structural Variables 
Brown (1996, p. 13) has identified three main structural factors which he argues make 
some situations more predisposed to violence than others. These are: weak states; intra-
state security concerns; and ethnic geography. Using Brown’s categorisation of structural 
factors in the context of ethnic conflict, three major factors are influential in producing 
refugees: weak states, ethnic heterogeneity and composition, and land access. Each of 
these factors is examined below: 
 
Weak States 
A “state” is defined as “the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a 
recognized territory” (Zartman, 1995, p. 5). If a state is not fulfilling its functions in the 
three capability areas below, it is deemed a “failed state.” However, if a state is deficient 
in only one or two of the capability areas it is defined as a “weak state” (Weinstein et al, 
2005, pp. 13-14).  
 
Capability Areas: 
1. “protecting people from internal and external threats (the security gap); 
2. delivering basic health services and education (the capacity gap); and, 
3. providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the 
population (the legitimacy gap)” (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 1, 13-16). 
 
It is important to realise that states which are “weak” in one area may be perceived by 
some as “strong” in another area. Therefore, a dynamic view of state strength and 
weakness is essential in recognising that state capability fluctuates across time and 
sectors (Dauvergne, 1998, p. 8). When a state is “weak,” property may be seized, 
personal and political rebuffs repaid, families disrupted and secessionist movements may 
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develop particularly where visible ethnic or national differences exist within society. 
Furthermore, the instability that weak states cause also invites dissidents, exiled political 
movements, incursions from irredentist movements and advantage-seeking neighbouring 
states, making it more probable that refugees are created (Gordenker, 1987, pp. 76-7).  
 
- The Security Gap 
When a state can not fulfil its most basic function in ensuring security through protecting 
people from internal and external threats, maintaining a monopoly over the use of force, 
and preserving effective sovereignty and order within its territory, a “security gap” 
emerges. This gap may entice other states, non-state actors, and criminals to fill it through 
violent, hostile, or illicit acts (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 14).  The “security gap” is 
measured by dividing states into three categories: major war, intermediate war, and minor 
war (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 47), according to the following definitions: 
 
- A “major war” is defined as any conflict with at least 1000 battle-related deaths in 
any given year over 1995-2005.  
- An “intermediate war” is defined as any conflict with at least 25, but fewer than 
1000 battle-related deaths in any given year and an accumulated total of at least 
1000 deaths over 1995-2005. 
- A “minor war” is defined as any conflict with less than 25 battle-related deaths in 
any given year and fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths over 1995-2005. 
 
In states where a security gap exists, ethnic security dilemmas may also arise, whereby 
individual groups feel obliged to provide for their own defence and become concerned 
over whether other groups pose security threats to their existence. The weaker the state, 
the stronger the defensive measures undertaken and the possibility that refugees will be 
generated (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 8; Posen, 1993; Brown, 1996, p. 576). This lack, 
or weakening of state structure, often encourages violent conflict to ensue, as groups fight 
to gain control and power over the central authorities. Minority ethnic groups, which 
were once protected under the state apparatus, now become more vulnerable to human 
rights violations and can be more easily victimised in racially motivated attacks. Such 
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attacks can encourage large refugee flows, as when the state’s structure weakens, borders 
are controlled less effectively, and become more permeable, generating cross border 
movements of arms, drugs, militia, smuggled goods, migrants and refugees (Brown, 
1996, p. 14).  
 
- The Capacity Gap 
If a government is unwilling or unable to play a fundamental role in meeting the basic 
needs of all of its citizens through providing physical infrastructure, such as roads and 
schools, and by investing in skills and structures that empower citizens and make 
progress possible, a gap in capacity results. This “capacity gap” may create the conditions 
for suffering, humanitarian crisis, epidemics, loss of public confidence, potential political 
upheaval, and refugees. Such a situation will impel people to leave in order to escape the 
predictable decline in the quality of life, and in poor countries, famine (Gordenker, 1987, 
p. 76).  The “capacity gap” is often closely associated with gaps in security, as it is 
difficult to provide basic services when security can also not be guaranteed (Weinstein et 
al, 2005, pp. 14-15). “Basic needs” are measured by the UNDP’s measles immunisation 
rate in the Human Development Index (2005). Using this rate, states are placed into 
quintiles. The immunisation rate is not only a good indicator of broader health policies 
and strategies, but also has a strong relationship with lower infant mortality rates and 
increased literacy rates and a reasonably positive association with economic growth 
(Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 48).  
 
- The Legitimacy Gap 
When a state can not foster legitimacy, maintain institutions that protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms, enforce laws and contracts equally, hold individuals accountable for 
their actions, and enable broad-based citizen participation in the political process, a 
legitimacy gap exists. Such a gap provides an opportunity for political upheaval and 
crisis, including widespread corruption (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 15-16). Some states 
have inherent legitimacy gaps, due to the historical process in which they were created. 
For example, many states in Africa and Asia were artificially created from the remnants 
of colonialism, and lacked the political institutions, political legitimacy, and politically 
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sensible borders required to exert meaningful control over their territory (Brown, 1996, p. 
13).  The degree of legitimacy that a state has is measured according to its government’s 
commitment to a transparent and democratic government. The Index of Political Freedom 
measure of “voice and accountability,” which combines data from Freedom House, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and Political Risk Services, is used to place states into 
quintiles based on their performance, from best (top 20 percent) to worst (bottom 20 
percent) (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 49).  
   
Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity  
It is popularly assumed that minority groups within a state are more likely than dominant 
groups to be targeted for persecution for reasons of race or nationality (Zolberg et al, 
1989, p. 238). Therefore, states with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity should suffer 
from more refugee flows than more homogenous states (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 235). 
However, given that less than twenty of the 189 states in the world remain ethnically 
homogeneous, in which ethnic minorities account for less than five percent of the 
population (Brown, 1996, p. 15); it is surprising that more ethnic conflicts and refugees 
have not been produced. Instead, it may be that the mere existence of high levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity within a state is not by itself a sufficient precondition for the 
creation of conflict and refugees. Rather, the size of the ethnic group, how various ethnic 
groups within a state are distributed across its territory, and the political balancing by the 
state between ethnic groups, may better determine whether ethnic conflict and refugee 
movements occur (Brown, 1996, p. 15; Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, pp. 256-7). 
Given the lack of availability of data, this thesis compares only the size of the groups 
engaged in ethnic conflict in relation to the rest of the country’s population. The existence 
of a dominant ethnic group, comprising between 45 to 90 percent of the total population, 
within an ethnically heterogenous country indicates that at least one other minority ethnic 
group also exists (Sørli, Gleditsch and Strand, 2005, p. 150).  
 
Brown contends that ethnic groups can either be distributed along regional lines or they 
may be intermingled amongst other ethnic groups. States with highly intermingled 
populations are less likely to face secessionist demands, than those with groups 
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distributed along regional lines, which lend themselves more readily to partition. 
However, although groups distributed along regional lines may be more conducive to 
secessionist demands; if warfare develops it is more likely to be conventional in nature. 
This contrasts with trends in highly intermingled populations which suggest that if 
secessionist demands do develop, it is more probable that groups will attempt to assert 
their control over a specific territory, rendering it more likely that direct attacks on 
civilians ensue (Brown, 1996, p. 16). Provided this argument is correct, one could deduce 
that higher numbers of refugees are more likely to originate under these latter 
circumstances, compared to those situations where more conventional warfare prevails.   
 
Land Access  
The physical characteristics of a state, including its proximity to neighbouring states, are 
another important structural factor in considering why some ethnic conflicts create 
refugees. The geographical variables – the number of borders a state has and the degree 
of land access relative to the total kilometres of boundaries – are most important in the 
creation of external refugees.  
 
With regard to the first variable, Schmeidl (1997, p. 296) argues “that a country with 
more borders provides more opportunities for refugee flight, because there are more 
neighboring countries in which to seek asylum.”  In terms of the second variable, the 
percentage of land access relative to the total kilometres of boundaries (a given country’s 
coastline and land boundaries), land is defined by how much of the state’s land 
boundaries are solid land, as opposed to water: 
 
% land access    =  KM land boundaries______________ 
   (KM land boundaries + KM coastline)     ? 100 
 
 
In the above equation, a landlocked country would score 100 percent land access and an 
island zero percent. As refugees usually travel across land, and normally resort to sea 
travel as a last option, Schmeidl contends that higher land access should facilitate the 
creation of external refugees (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296). 
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Political Variables  
Brown’s (1996) categorisation of political factors is used as a basis from which to 
determine those political sub-factors most conducive to creating refugees in the context 
of ethnic conflict. This thesis argues that five major political sub-factors are most 
important to creating refugees in the context of ethnic conflict: state-building (including 
political transitions, political and social revolutions, genocide/politicide, and coups 
d’état); political regime; discriminatory political systems; exclusionary national 
ideologies; lack of human rights; and the role of external parties.  
 
State-Building 
Some scholars contend that refugees in the developing world are mostly a by-product of 
two major historical processes: the formation or state-building of new states and 
confrontations over the social order (Zolberg, 1981, p. 416; Zolberg et al, 1986, p. 153). 
These processes are analytically distinguishable but are often combined in reality to 
produce violent and complex conflicts. For example, from World War Two until the end 
of the Cold War, decolonisation and superpower conflict generated the largest number of 
refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 47; Gordenker, 1987; Zolberg et al, 1989). If a country 
experienced “colonialism” it is likely that the indigenous population was also 
marginalised. For example, colonisers often used divide-and-rule strategies to delineate 
colonial boundaries, partitioning existing culturally homogeneous nations into two or 
more states (Gordenker, 1987, p. 72). This practice often stimulated irredentism, whereby 
a minority ethnic group in one state seeks to be reunited with its majority ethnic group in 
another, encouraging tension and violence, and the possibility of refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 
48; Gordenker, 1987, p. 72).  
 
Refugees may also be generated from the conflict caused by the political dynamics of 
state-building, which enables aspiring nationalists to create their own exclusively defined 
nation-states, often leaving minority groups exposed. Therefore, the way in which the 
new state addresses questions of nationality, citizenship and minority rights will largely 
determine whether ethnic conflicts develop and whether refugees are produced (Newland, 
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1993, p. 150). If groups have “ambitious incompatible objectives, strong senses of 
identity and confrontational strategies,” conflict may be more likely, as will the 
production of refugees (Brown, 1996, p. 18). For example, Schmeidl (2001, p. 81; 1996, 
p.21) acknowledges that many African and Asian states have perceived minorities as 
obstacles to state-building and used them as scapegoats during critical phases of state 
formation, rendering it more easy to victimise, persecute, and push them out. 
- Regime Transitions 
A “regime transition” indicates a process when the country’s ruling regime alters, during 
which “new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect.” The Polity 
IV Project’s “transitional government” indicator (coded as -88) is used to operationally 
define a “regime transition.” Transition periods are only coded if the new regime is 
formally established in a different year than that of the previous regime's demise 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).  
  
If internal unrest causes the form of a state to alter and a political transition to occur, 
regardless of whether this change originated in rightist, leftist or other ideological 
factions, there is a potential for the creation of refugees (Keely, 1996, p. 1054). Political 
transitions brought about by the collapse of authoritarian rule, democratisation, political 
reforms, or social or political revolutions often provide a catalyst for such refugee 
movements (Brown, 1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055). 
 
- Political and Social Revolutions 
As well as governments enacting discriminatory ethnic policies, political and social 
revolutions can also generate refugees (Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; 
Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420). Both political and social revolutions are similar in that they 
can be conceptually defined as incidents of often violent conflict between governments 
and challengers that aim to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize 
power in one region. However, a “political revolution” is distinguishable from a “social 
revolution” in that the former aims to radically transform the political system of the state 
through revolutionary processes, whereas the latter seeks to drastically alter the nature of 
society through revolutionary means (State Failure Task Force, 2002).  
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Other common characteristics within such revolutions that are specifically conducive to 
creating refugees include intolerance of dissent and the drive for total consensus by the 
challengers (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Loescher, 1992, p. 29). This maybe 
achieved through re-education programmes, encouraging political dissidents and potential 
challengers to authority to flee (Koehn, 1991, p. 9; Loescher, 1992, p. 29; Gordenker, 
1987, p. 78).  
 
Interestingly, states which have acquired power through violent means, such as 
revolutions or coups d’état, often continue to rule through violence as they lack other 
measures, like majority representation or established political institutions, for successful 
governance. Therefore, heterogeneous and highly stratified states tend to be ruled by 
force, particularly if the group in power is itself a minority, which is perceived as easier 
than accommodating various ethnic demands (Gurr, 1986). 
- Genocides/Politicides 
Despite their revolutionary nature, “politicides” and “genocides” can be differentiated 
from “political” and “social” revolutions as both involve the mass murder of unarmed 
civilians who may or may not be supporting a revolutionary movement. The fundamental 
distinction between “politicide” and “genocide” is that the former defines the victimised 
groups primarily according to their political opposition to the regime and dominant 
groups, whereas the latter defines them in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, 
religious) characteristics (State Failure Task Force, 2002).  However, genocides and 
politicides are categorised together in this thesis and exist when the following criteria are 
met: “… the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by 
governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending 
authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or 
politicized non communal group” (State Failure Task Force, 2002). 
 
Schmeidl (2001, p. 81) finds that genocide/politicide is the strongest and most consistent 
predictor of refugee migration among all variables conducive to creating refugees that she 
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studied, as “on average, fifty-six thousand more refugees seek a safe haven elsewhere 
when genocide/politicide is present than when it is absent” (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 301). 
Interestingly, she also finds that genocide/politicide and civil war cause refugee flows 
regardless of a country’s level of development or population density. For example, from 
1969-1990 there were 12 cases of genocide and 22 politicides in 26 of 29 countries with 
ongoing refugee flows and all were associated with forced displacement (Schmeidl, 1997; 
2001). 
 
- Coups d’état 
Coups d’état are similar to political and social revolutions in that they seek the 
replacement of one ruling faction by another, but differ in that they seek replacement by 
members of the same ruling elite and do not advocate a complete reconstruction of 
society (Gordenker, 1987, p. 69). Due to only a relatively small sector of society being 
involved in a coup, any refugees that are created are therefore likely to include senior 
political figures and military officers who formed part of the replaced regime. However, 
Gordenker (1987, p. 70) acknowledges that to generalise that coups can not create large 
flows of refugees is misleading, as the aims of the new regime and its immediate 
repression or violence determine the initial flow of refugees following a coup.  
 
Political Regime Type  
The political regime type or “the institutions and structures of a state that allow its 
citizens to make, implement and change public policies” (Shafritz et al, 1993, p. 541), 
may have a profound effect on whether refugee flows occur within the context of an 
ethnic conflict.  
 
Political regimes are classified according to the Polity IV Project’s “annual polity score.” 
This is determined by firstly measuring the levels of autocratic and democratic 
characteristics separately within a country’s political system on an additive 11-point scale 
(0-10). Secondly, the overall polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score 
from the democracy score; giving a unified polity scale which ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). However, many political regimes can possess 
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mixed authority traits and therefore produce middling scores on both the autocracy and 
democracy scales. As a group, these regimes proved to less durable than coherent 
democracies and autocracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). 
 
Polity IV defines a “democracy” as having three essential, interdependent elements:  
 
1. The presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;   
2. The existence of institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive; and,   
3. The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of 
political participation. 
 
Comparatively, an “autocracy” is conceptually defined as including political systems 
which possess the commonalities of “a lack of regularised political competition and 
concern for political freedoms” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Both the operational 
indicators of “autocracy” and “democracy” are taken from a number of Polity IV’s 
codings. These include: the competitiveness and/or regulation of political participation, 
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief 
executive.  
 
 Gordenker (1987, pp. 176-8) contends that forced migrations usually result from 
governmental actions or inactions. The actions of governments undertaken of their own 
accord or in response to other governments’ policies will therefore be most influential in 
encouraging or dissuading refugee flows. However, even if governments manage to exert 
enough control to prevent an external refugee movement, it should not be assumed that 
the causes that might have otherwise induced the flight have been resolved. This only 
indicates that external refugees have not yet originated (Gordenker, 1987, pp. 180).    
 
Gurr (1993, p. 93) argues that democratic states are better at accommodating and 
deflecting protests of ethnic groups, thereby averting serious rebellions. By contrast, if 
the system is authoritarian and closed, or a repressive dictatorship, resentment will 
 52
accumulate over time, especially if only some ethnic groups’ interests are adequately 
represented within the state, calling into question the legitimacy of the system (Brown, 
1996, p. 16). Moreover, such closed political systems are more likely to use violence or 
oppression towards their citizens; a practice conducive to creating refugees (Loescher, 
1992; Weiner, 1996).  
 
Discriminatory Political Systems 
Loescher (1992, p. 28) and Schmeidl (2001, p.79) also highlight the importance that 
officially instigated or organised state actions can have in generating refugees. The 
existence of such discriminatory political institutions that make a distinction in favour or 
against a particular group within society can be operationally defined according to the 
“Minorities at Risk: Political Discrimination Index,” below (2004, p. 36) This uses three 
characteristics to determine whether political discrimination exists within a country: 
 
1. Historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions imposed on the ethnic group; 
2. Under-representation in political office and participation; and, 
3. The nature of the state’s political public policies towards the ethnic group.  
 
The extent to which the ethnic group suffers according to the above criteria is 
summarised into five categories of political discrimination in the table below: 
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Table 4: Political Discrimination Index  
 
Political Discrimination Index Characteristics of Political Discrimination 
No Discrimination - 
 
Neglect/Remedial Policies Substantial under representation in political office 
and/or participation due to historical neglect or 
restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to 
protect or improve the group’s political status. 
 
Neglect/No Remedial Policies Substantial under representation due to historical 
neglect or restrictions. No social practice of 
deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No 
evidence of protective or remedial public policies. 
 
Social Exclusion/Neutral Policy Substantial under representation due to prevailing 
social practice by dominant groups. Formal public 
policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, 
inadequate to offset discriminatory policies. 
 
Exclusion/Repressive Policy Public policies substantially restrict the group’s 
political participation by comparison with other 
groups. 
 
No Basis for Judgment - 
 
 
Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 36. 
 
 
State repression is defined by Stohl and Lopez (1986) as “the governments’ or its allies’ 
use of threat of coercion against political opponents in order to weaken resistance or 
opposition to government objectives,” and can range from an overt use of force or 
implementation of governmental sanctions, such as declarations of state emergency and 
restrictions on press freedom and civil actions. Or, it can include more covert measures of 
persecution, intimidation, discrimination and inducement of an unwanted group to leave, 
generating refugee flows (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Gordenker, 1987, p. 72). 
Both overt and covert forms of persecution are therefore interrelated, and one can 
actually encourage the other (Gordenker, 1987, p. 73). Mass expulsions of this kind have 
been used throughout history and usually occur when multinational governments seek 
cultural and political homogeneity in the form of a new national identity. Such 
governments therefore take measures to remove or reduce selected social classes and 
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ethnic groups from their territories in order to transform society and consolidate their 
political control (Loescher, 1992, p. 28).  
 
Schmeidl (2001, p. 79) argues that strong and weak states use different types of 
government repression. Strong states often rely on a “general aura of terror,” whereas 
weak states often resort to force to remain in control, because they often lack sufficient 
power and the general level of institutionalisation found in strong states necessary to 
instil a general fear in their population (Duvall and Stohl, 1988; Gurr, 1986). This may 
lead them to use varying degrees of human rights violations to stay in power, which 
combined with the general inability of weak states to fully control their borders can lead 
to large refugee flows. Schmeidl’s findings support this argument, and show that refugees 
are less likely to flee from states which infringe on their political and civil rights than 
from states that threaten their lives (Schmeidl, 2001, pp. 79-80). Refugee exodus can 
therefore be viewed as an alternative to political protest and rebellion, and as “voting with 
one’s feet,” implying that states experiencing refugee flows are also likely to experience 
some form of rebellion against an existing government (Hirschman, 1970).  
 
Exclusionary National Ideologies 
The relationship between a state and its ethnic groups is central in determining whether 
refugees will be created from ethnic conflicts, as refugees are defined by their 
relationship to the state they are citizens of. If the state possesses an “exclusionary 
national ideology,” (ethnic/religious nationalism), whereby the prevailing ideas and 
beliefs of the state are defined to exclude those belief systems that do not conform to its 
ideology, it is possible that refugees may be generated. Such a governmental practice 
maybe more common in multinational states to unite diverse peoples for the purpose of 
state-building (Keely, 1991).    
 
The prevailing national ideology of a state can be classified as either based on 
predominantly “civic” or “ethnic/religious” nationalism.  
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Table 5: Types of Nationalism 
 
Type of Nationalism 
 
Characteristics 
Civic Nationalism This stresses the importance of “civic institutions, public offices, 
public agencies and officials, churches in their secular activities, and 
common and authoritative rules with a territorial scope. These define a 
country and the nation that inhibits it” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 125) 
 
Ethnic/Religious Nationalism 
(Exclusionary National 
Ideology) 
This stresses the importance of a “common ethnicity and culture, a 
shared language perhaps, a shared history and common ancestral 
struggles. The nation is the community of fate, the community of 
ethnic bonds” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 126) 
 
 
If the state’s prevailing national ideology and its concept of nationalism and citizenship 
are based on ethnic distinctions or religious fundamentalism, rather than civic 
nationalism, then states will often deny protection to their minority groups. Even though 
the government may not be directly persecuting its minorities, the tense atmosphere may 
still encourage refugee flows (Gordenker, 1987, p. 83). Exclusionary national ideologies 
inspire secessionism among minority groups, to ensure they have rights in their own 
nation states, and can provoke ethnic conflict. The basis of state sovereignty, whereby the 
state is the protector of its citizens’ rights and that only citizens’ possess full rights within 
it, combined with its prevailing national ideology, is therefore important in determining 
the political stability of a country, and ultimately whether refugees are produced 
(Newland, 1993, pp.146-7). While civic nationalism does not always ensure stability, 
(like in Indonesia), Brown (1996, p. 17) argues that conflict is more likely when ethnic 
types of nationalism dominate. He asserts, as Snyder (1993) does, that such ethnic 
nationalism is a default option and therefore more probable when states are weak; their 
institutions are collapsing, or when existing institutions are not fulfilling society’s 
fundamental needs. Given the artificial creation and weak nature of many of the 
developing states, it is not surprising then to discover that ethnic nationalism widely 
exists there. 
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Lack of Human Rights 
Lack of respect for fundamental human rights, particularly when connected with 
oppressive governments, is continually recognised as a contributing factor in the creation 
of refugees (Gordenker, 1987, p. 170; Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 259, 264; Newland, 1993, 
p. 156; Loescher, 1992, pp. 57-59; Keely, 1996, p. 1060). While the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 has attempted to define the concept of 
“human rights,” it remains an ambivalent term. Burnell’s concept of “human rights” is 
perhaps one of the more clear definitions: “Human rights are a special sort of inalienable 
moral entitlement. They attach to all persons equally, by virtue of their humanity, 
irrespective of race, nationality, or membership of any particular social group. They 
specify the minimum conditions for human dignity and a tolerable life” (Burnell, 2003). 
 
Zolberg et al employ a more specific definition of “human rights” to specifically apply to 
refugees, whereby the principal basic human right includes: “Freedom from the most 
immediate forms of life-threatening violence: mass killings, torture, ‘disappearances’ at 
the hand of the state apparatus or ‘encounters’ with so-called security forces, exposure to 
mob attacks, and the danger of being caught in the cross fire” (1989, p. 264). 
 
A lack of human rights therefore is the antithesis of the above definitions, and can be 
conceptually defined as any act that threatens to override any of the fundamental rights 
that humanity possesses, including the right to food, shelter, health, and protection.  
 
The Political Terror Scale (PTS), originally developed by Michael Stohl and David 
Carlton which seeks to determine whether high levels of repression are connected to 
refugee outflows escaping from violence, is used to operationally define a “lack of human 
rights.” Under the PTS, countries are coded annually on a scale of one-five (listed below) 
according to their level of political violence that year based on information gathered from 
Amnesty International and US State Department Country Reports. Gibney and Dalton 
(1996, p. 60) define “gross levels of human rights abuses” or a “lack of human rights” if 
they meet the characteristics under level four or five of the PTS. Unsurprisingly, the 
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authors find that most of the refugees tend to be generated from countries classified as 
being on levels four or five. 
 
Table 6: Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
 
Level of Political Violence Characteristics of Political Violence 
Level 1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not 
imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or 
exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Level 2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for 
nonviolent political activity. However, few persons 
are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. 
Political murder is rare. 
 
Level 3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a 
recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or 
other political murders and brutality may be 
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a 
trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Level 4 The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger 
numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a 
common part of life. In spite of its generality, on 
this level terror affects those who interest 
themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Level 5 The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the 
whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
 
 
Source: Gibney and  Dalton, 1996, pp. 73 -4.  
 
There is wide support for the argument that human rights violations and refugee flows are 
interconnected (Gibney et al, 1996; Harkovirta, 1986), and that “refugees are human 
rights violations made visible” (Loescher, 1992, p. 42). However, it is important to 
acknowledge that human rights violations can be either institutionalised in the 
discriminatory nature of the political, economic, and social institutions of the state, or 
they can result from measures of overt generalised state violence (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 
284). Schmeidl finds that refugees are more likely to be created from some form of 
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generalised violence as opposed to being subjected to institutional human rights 
violations (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78).   
 
 Debate also centers over why governments resort to denying their citizens such basic 
human rights. Gordenker (1987, p. 74) rightly argues that governments may deny human 
rights to all as a means of consolidating their political control and keeping an elite group 
in power, or because they believe that gentler handling of the situation would encourage 
national disorder or chaos. 
 
Role of external parties  
Zolberg et al (1989, pp. 264-5, 275) reject the simplistic notion that refugees appear 
because they are merely persecuted or victimised by governments or brutalising rulers. 
Instead they maintain that such governments and states operate within a necessary 
structure of international support exacerbated by the highly interdependent nature of the 
world. They contend that refugees usually originate from regimes that have external 
parties supporting them. These external parties may include “…other states, non-state 
actors, or outside ethnic groups…” (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3). Three particular 
roles that external parties can play in creating refugees during ethnic conflicts are 
examined: 
 
- providing external support to the ethnic group during the ethnic conflict 
(diaspora/migration networks);  
- providing external support to the governing regime during the ethnic conflict; and, 
- external party intervention in the ethnic conflict. 
 
Such processes of diffusion occur through the more “traditional” means of other interstate 
conflicts, such as: “alliances between transnational kin groups as well as by intentional or 
unintentional spillovers, irredentist demands, attempts to divert attention from domestic 
problems, or by predatory states that seek to take advantage of the internal weaknesses of 
others” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4).  
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- External support received by the ethnic group (diaspora/migration networks) 
during the ethnic conflict 
 
Often the external party involved in an ethnic conflict involves a diaspora, which Cohen 
(1997, p. 180) says usually demonstrates several of the following features: 
 
a) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically; 
b) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade 
or to further colonial ambitions; 
c) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; 
d) an idealization of the supposed ancestral home; 
e) a return movement; 
f) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; 
g) a troubled relationship with host societies;  
h) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and 
i) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries. 
 
Unlike previous studies which have included diaspora or migration networks as an 
intervening factor conducive to creating external refugees (Massey, 1988; Schmeidl, 
2003, p. 137), this thesis incorporates diaspora as an independent variable. This is 
because a diaspora should be viewed as a timeless underlying political factor, rather than 
as a spontaneous catalyst in generating external refugee flows.  The role of diaspora in 
diffusing an ethnic conflict through encouraging external refugee flows should not be 
underestimated. Ethnic bonds and antagonisms often motivate external parties to become 
involved in ethnic conflicts as many ethnic identities rarely coincide completely with the 
territorial boundaries of modern nation states (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 29; Davis, 
Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Brown, 1996, p. 595; Vasquez, 1992; Zartman, 1992; 
Hein, 1993; Carment and James, 1997; Gurr, 1993, p. 133). For example, while most 
ethnic groups are concentrated in one of several adjacent regions, over one-third of these 
groups have kindred distributions across three or more countries (Gurr and Marshall, 
1990). 
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- External support received by the governing regime during the ethnic conflict 
 
Likewise, strong affective motivations between states with similar ethnic ties or between 
states with a specific cultural affinity to a disadvantaged communal group in another are 
likely to develop into deep partisan alignments which could provide support for those 
escaping the regime (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, 
p. 6). Following Siverson and Starr’s (1991) argument that states with similar geopolitical 
goals and interests form alliances, Moore and Davis (1998, pp. 29, 92-3) apply this to 
ethnic alliances. They reason that ethnic alliances, situations where a majority group in 
one state is a minority group in another or diaspora, should have similar consequences 
because minority groups will assume their ethnic kin share similar policy and geopolitical 
preferences. This is particularly so, if instrumental motivations, such as political, 
material, and ideological support are provided by the external party to the targeted ethnic 
group, which would enhance the group’s ability to wage war (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; 
Shiels, 1984; Brown, 1996, p. 592; Massey, 1988). Indeed, Davis, Jaggers and Moore 
prove that the existence of such ethnic ties has a positive impact upon warlike behaviour 
in bordering dyads (1997, p. 160).  Such affective and instrumental involvement across 
borders therefore increases partisan violence, can lead compatriots to become more 
radicalised generating further political instability, and encourages the possible occurrence 
of external refugee flows.  
 
Conversely, refugees themselves can be used by diaspora in neighbouring states as a 
vehicle for providing material support to domestic opposition groups of a similar ethnic 
group or political faction in their country of origin (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 
154). Elites therefore may perceive such ethnic affinities as an opportunity to be 
exploited and view refugees as international linkages with potential uses for their own 
welfare (Carment and James, 1997, p. 257), or they could play a pivotal role in 
mobilising political support by using ethnic appeals to rebuke a rival state for its 
treatment of its ethnic kin (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291).  
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Indeed, Lobell and Mauceri (2004, p. 8) contend that external parties become empowered 
when conflict occurs in a neighbouring country, where state sovereignty is reduced and 
borders are weakened,  and such external parties can threaten or destabilise the ruling 
ethnic regime in nearby states. They can do so, by supporting organised opposition or 
dissident groups of the current regime by localised popular support, questioning the 
legitimacy of the ruling regime, redrawing state boundaries, or overthrowing the ruling 
regime that opposes them (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 5). For example, such external 
support of opposition groups was common during the process of decolonisation, and was 
intended to promote political change, either of the regime or its policies. It was therefore 
likely to encourage internal chaos which could result in persecution or heavy pressure on 
those who favoured the foreign-supported movement. The subsequent stress caused could 
then motivate people to flee (Gordenker, 1987, p. 85).  
 
- External party intervention in the ethnic conflict 
Refugees can also emerge from conditions produced by external strategic and economic 
interests (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 275). Those refugees from geo-politically important 
regions experiencing ethnic conflict may encourage interventions by foreign powers, 
especially those involving the extensive use of military force (by proxy or directly). An 
“intervention” is defined as “…coercive action against a state, without its consent….” 
(Roberts, 1997, p. 118). For example, Gurr (1993, p. 91) argues that external parties have 
repeatedly intervened on behalf of communal rebels or the states they challenge and finds 
that approximately one-third of the overt military interventions in the Third World since 
1970 have occurred in conflicts with ethnopolitical cleavages. 
 
As well as complicating and prolonging ethnic conflicts, which might have otherwise 
ended for lack of resources, external interventions often generate complex refugee 
situations (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 284; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 251). For example, a study 
conducted by the UNHCR in the 1980s found a positive relationship between 
interventionist policies and large refugee flows in the then five most conflict-prone world 
areas (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 265; Loescher, 1992, p. 28). While Schmeidl (1997, p. 289) 
acknowledges that not all external intervention in domestic conflicts may directly 
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produce refugees, she argues that it should be viewed as an accelerating factor that 
“interacts with the conflicts, intensifies them, and consequently contributes to refugee 
exodus.”  
 
Economic/Social Variables 
A complex relationship exists between the characteristic imbalances of economic 
underdevelopment and violent political conflicts, which have historically generated large 
refugee flows (Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 262, 258-59; Brown, 1996, p. 18; Loescher, 1992, 
p. 28). The economic/social factors conducive to creating refugees are broken down into 
three major areas, based on Brown’s (1996, p. 18) categorisation of: economic problems; 
discriminatory economic systems; and the trials and tribulations of economic 
development and modernisation. However, these categories are modified and expanded to 
include: poverty and economic underdevelopment, discriminatory economic systems, and 
social change. The expansion of these categories reflects the importance that 
economic/social factors can play within an ethnic conflict in creating conditions 
conducive to generating refugees.  
 
Poverty  
 Some argue that economic imbalances and overall poverty in the developing world make 
it more conducive to political instability and recession - conditions which often lead to 
refugee movements (Edmonston, 1992; Wood, 1994). For example, during the 1980s 
“root cause” debate, the UN argued that economic factors lead to the underlying political 
causes of flight, and therefore could be considered the primary cause of refugees 
(Schmeidl, 2001, p. 82).  
 
“Poverty” is conceptually defined as occurring when a state lacks material or cultural 
resources (Marshall, 1998). An operational definition of “poverty” is more complex. 
Firstly, a distinction must be made between “absolute” as opposed to “relative” poverty. 
“Absolute poverty” occurs “where a population or section of a population is, at most, able 
to meet only its bare subsistence essentials of food, clothing, and shelter to maintain 
minimum levels of living” (Todaro and Smith, 2003, p. 787). By contrast, “relative 
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poverty” refers to the group’s lack of resources when compared to other groups in society 
(relative standard of living). This latter definition of “relative poverty” is used in this 
thesis, because it is the economic imbalances within a state that have been posited as 
generating refugees. High discrepancies in standards of living are indicators of poverty 
and when combined with political instability may instigate an environment under which 
refugee flows are more likely (Brown, 1996, p. 19; Richmond, 1993, p. 12). 
 
“Relative poverty” is measured using the United Nations Development Programme’s 
“Human Poverty Index for Developing Countries” (HPI-1), which measures deprivations 
in three fundamental areas:  
 
a) a long and healthy life - vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as 
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40; 
b) knowledge - exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as 
measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and,  
c) a decent standard of living - lack of access to overall economic provisioning, as 
measured by the unweighted average of two indicators, the percentage of the 
population without sustainable access to an improved water source and the 
percentage of children under weight for age (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Unlike other measures of poverty, the HPI-1 is formulated specifically for developing 
states and recognises that a large proportion of households in such countries derive most 
of their income from semi-subsistence production rather than from cash. Semi-
subsistence production is notoriously difficult to give a specific financial value, because it 
operates both in and out of the cash economy (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, March 
2004). Due to these difficulties, the Index provides a useful measure of determining 
relative poverty levels in states which do not strictly adhere to Western forms of 
production. This is because they incorporate health, education, access to services, and 
wealth indicators within their definitions of “poverty.” 
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Economic Underdevelopment 
The report of the Group of Experts appointed by the UN General Assembly in 1986 cites 
economic underdevelopment; “inherited from colonialism,” within the developing world 
and exacerbated by the erosion of traditional social support mechanisms by the 
modernisation of economic production as a major root cause of refugees. “Economic 
underdevelopment” is defined according to the factors that several leading refugee 
theorists identify as conducive to creating refugees. These are: “balance-of-payments 
problems, deteriorating terms of trade, indebtedness, and inflation” (Zolberg et al, 1989, 
pp. 258-260), as well as unemployment and resource competition, especially concerning 
land (Newman, 2003, p. 4; Brown, 1996, p. 19; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2004). These six 
factors, aggravated by economic stringencies and the environmentally related problems of 
deforestation and desertification, may contribute to societal tensions and provide the 
environment for conflict. Violent conflict can disrupt food production and distribution in 
subsistence economies, rendering disease, famine, and refugee movements more likely 
(Newland, 1993, pp. 151-2). Such conditions foster insecurity and threaten survival, 
encouraging people to flee (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 260).  
 
Others contend that economic underdevelopment by itself is not a major factor conducive 
to generating refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 260; Keely, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997; 2001). 
They argue that there is an inconsistency between the simplified idea that poverty causes 
refugees and the reality that situations of extreme economic deprivation have not usually 
generated external refugees and neither have all poor states. This finding therefore 
disqualifies the argument that poverty is a direct and necessary “push” factor of refugee 
migration. Schmeidl (1997, p. 299) also discovers that economic variables have little 
impact on predicting refugee flows which contradicts the argument that economic 
problems are a primary cause of refugee flows. In both her studies, Schmeidl (1997, p. 
299; 2001, p. 82) finds that political violence leads to less refugee migration in countries 
with higher levels of economic development and a higher population density. She argues 
that this implies that in areas with higher levels of economic development refugee exodus 
is less likely than in areas with lower levels of economic development. For example, on 
average Schmeidl finds that the number of refugees fleeing from genocide/politicide is 
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reduced by 20,000 in areas with higher levels of economic development. Therefore it is 
possible that the level of economic development or poverty may be an accelerator to 
refugee flight and that in conjunction with political conflict leads to forced migration 
(Schmeidl, 1997, p. 299; 2001, pp. 82-5).  
 
Economic development frequently creates rapid but uneven development, which often 
surpasses political development, failing to integrate large sectors of society in the 
process. This can lead to feelings of relative deprivation, particularly amongst traditional 
ethnic groups, which are less likely to benefit from modernisation and economic 
development and become apprehensive about their survival. They are therefore more 
likely to engage in ethnonationalism to undermine advanced groups and to strengthen 
their own sense of identity (Schmeidl, 1996, pp. 25-6). Such ethnic tensions can further 
be increased, if modernisation and economic change alters the division of labour, 
allowing formerly marginalised groups to compete in the same labour markets as more 
privileged ethnic groups. This can exacerbate ethnic tensions and the potential for 
refugees of ethnic conflict (Schmeidl, 1996, p. 26).  
 
It is not only important that large sectors of the population are politically integrated into 
the modernised society, but that they are also economically, socially, and culturally 
integrated within the regional or global system. Lack of integration may increase the 
likelihood that ethnic conflict becomes diffused, and that refugee flows occur (Lobell and 
Mauceri, 2004, pp. 7-8; Richmond, 1993, p. 14). Due to the modernisation of 
transportation and communication, such refugee movements maybe more easily 
facilitated, and encourage potential refugees from the developing world to seek asylum in 
the industrialised world. Given the wide discrepancies that exist about the importance of 
poverty and economic underdevelopment in creating refugees, this issue must be further 
addressed (Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 20).  
 
Discriminatory Economic Systems 
Discriminatory economic systems generating inequality between groups can foster 
feelings of resentment, which may lead to conflict and refugee movements. A 
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“discriminatory economic system,” is one that makes a distinction in favour or against a 
particular group within society and is operationally defined according to the “Minorities 
at Risk: Economic Discrimination Index” (2004, p. 39). This uses three characteristics to 
determine whether economic discrimination exists within a country: 
 
1. Historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions imposed on the ethnic group; 
2. Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations; and, 
3. The nature of the state’s economical public policies towards the ethnic group.  
 
The extent to which the ethnic group suffers according to the above criteria is 
summarised into five categories of economic discrimination in the table below: 
 
Table 7: Economic Discrimination Index 
 
Economic Discrimination Index Characteristics of Economic Discrimination 
 
No Discrimination 
 
- 
Historical Neglect/Remedial Policies Significant poverty and under representation in desirable 
occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or 
restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the 
group’s material well-being. 
 
Historical Neglect/No Remedial Policies Significant poverty and under representation in desirable 
occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or 
restrictions No social practice of deliberate exclusion. 
Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s 
material well-being. 
 
Social Exclusion/Neutral Policies Significant poverty and under representation due to 
prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal 
public policies toward the group are neutral or, if 
positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread 
discrimination. 
 
Restrictive Policies Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring 
repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic 
opportunities by contrast with other groups. 
 
No Basis for Judgment - 
 
 
Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 39. 
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Davis, Jaggers and Moore (1997, p. 155) agree with Gurr (1993) and find that the level of 
grievances experienced by the group helps to determine their potential for collective 
action against the state. They find to a limited degree that “the higher the level of 
discrimination or magnitude of grievances experienced by a minority group, the higher 
the level of international conflict, including war, between any two states.” The level of 
grievances experienced by the group therefore helps determine their potential for 
collective action against the state and for refugees to occur.  
 
Social change  
“Social change” is conceptually defined as “the impact of social and cultural factors on 
demographic features of society,” and encompasses the process through which these 
features alter over time (Marshall, 1998). The three main variables underlying social 
change are fertility, mortality, and migration (Marshall, 1998). Of these, three standard 
social factors are operationally defined as relevant to the creation of refugees:  
1. Annual population change (population growth rate); 
2. Population density; and 
3. Total fertility rate. 
 
The first of these factors, “annual population change/population growth rate” is defined 
as the “number of people added to (or subtracted from) a population in a year due to 
natural increase and net migration expressed as a percentage of the population at the 
beginning of the year” (ADB, 2005). The second factor, “population density” is the 
number of inhabitants per square kilometre of land, and finally the “total fertility rate” 
(births per woman) is defined as “the average number of children that would be born 
alive to a woman during her life-time, if she were to bear children at each age in accord 
with prevailing age-specific fertility rates” (UNDP, 2005). 
 
While policy makers have long argued that population growth contributes to refugee 
flows, some (Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996) suggest that when this is combined with 
very high population density, it is more likely that refugees will be generated. This 
explanation argues that increasing population density creates more people at risk of 
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becoming refugees, as competition for land grows (Weiner, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 
287). Therefore, high population density and growth rates in the developing world may 
threaten to override any progress achieved in economic development and human rights, 
meaning that more people will be inevitably displaced as a result of conflict than in 
previous times (Loescher, 1992, pp. 31, 68; Brown, 1996, p. 576). Zolberg et al (1989, p. 
231) support this, by finding that the world’s poorest countries today have a total fertility 
rate approximately three times higher than that of rich industrial market economies, 
meaning that as the world population grows, an increasing proportion of it is poor.  
 
Conversely, Schmeidl (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299) finds that political violence leads to less 
refugee movements in countries with a higher population density, therefore discrediting 
arguments that imminent population pressure is a direct cause of refugees. She explains 
this trend by acknowledging that in areas with a high population density, it is possible 
that people may value their land so much that they are reluctant to leave it even when 
confronted with overt violence. Another explanation is the argument that “population 
density measures social complexity, which can be associated with democracy and thus 
with lower levels of political violence” (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 83).  
 
Cultural/Perceptual Variables 
According to Brown (1996, p. 20), two major cultural/perceptual factors make some 
places more predisposed to violence than others: cultural discrimination against 
minorities; and group histories and perceptions of themselves and others. This thesis 
concentrates only on the former of these factors, which is regarded as particularly 
influential in the production of refugees and is also easier to measure (MAR, 2004, pp. 
40-1). 
 
Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups 
Cultural discrimination against ethnic groups involves a state differentiation of the ethnic 
group based on cultural grounds and is assessed according to a modified version of the 
“Minorities at Risk” (2004, pp. 40-1) criteria. This involves four indicators:  
1. Restrictions on religion; 
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2. Restrictions on the use of language; 
3. Restrictions on appearance; and, 
4. Restrictions on behaviour.  
 
As well as the above cultural restrictions that may be placed on ethnic groups by the state, 
in extreme cases, more drastic measures attempting to assimilate ethnic minorities maybe 
implemented. For example, such cultural restrictions may be combined with programmes 
designed to bring large numbers of ethnic groups into minority areas, constituting a form 
of cultural genocide, often inducing refugee flows. If discrimination against minorities 
intensifies or if politicians blame ethnic groups for society’s larger problems and have 
control over the national media, these campaigns are particularly effective in generating 
refugees, as ethnic propaganda can quickly distort views and radicalise ethnic groups 
along ethnic fault lines (Brown, 1996, p. 586).  
 
Intervening Variables 
An “intervening variable” is a variable stemming from the independent variables that 
interposes itself spontaneously within a situation, and acts as either a catalyst in 
facilitating or deterring some event (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 290). Lee (1966, p. 53) was 
among the first to recognise the importance of intervening variables in his study of 
migration, arguing that the number of migrants is relative to the difficulty of overcoming 
the intervening obstacles. Clark (1989) then applied this idea specifically to refugee 
migration, which Schmeidl (1997) subsequently simplified into categories outlining the 
facilitators and obstacles to refugee flight. However, these scholars fail to accurately 
determine what an intervening variable is, and incorrectly include the independent 
variables of structural, political and economic/social factors in their analyses. For 
example, Schmeidl (1997) mistakenly includes the structural factor of geographical 
location and the economic/social factor of modernisation through increased transportation 
and communication as intervening variables.  
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Facilitators of External Refugees 
Often the facilitators of external refugees are inhibitors to the creation of internal 
refugees, and vice versa. This demonstrates the interchangeable nature of such 
intervening variables – often the situation the intervening variable originates in 
determines whether it will be regarded as a facilitator or as an inhibitor to creating certain 
types of refugee flows. It should also be acknowledged that the above facilitators are not 
necessary pre-conditions for a certain type of refugee movement to occur, and that it is 
ultimately a person’s choice whether they decide to cross an international border and 
become an external refugee. The mere existence of the above facilitators does not 
necessarily mean that an external refugee will be produced. Furthermore, the existence of 
one type of refugee movement does not indicate that another different type of refugee 
movement will not occur. Often external and internal refugee movements occur 
concurrently within states, or one precipitates the other. For example, Schmeidl found 
that during the time period 1964-1996, only five countries out of 57 countries with 
internal refugees did not also produce external refugees (1998, p. 26).  
 
In this thesis, only those intervening variables that act as facilitators in creating external 
refugee movements are analysed. This is because although the four countries (Fiji, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands) examined in chapters 4 and 5 of this 
thesis each produced internal refugees, not all created external refugees during their 
ethnic conflicts. According to refugee theorists (Loescher, 1992, pp. 39 - 41; Gordenker, 
1987, p. 183; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 275; Wood, 1993, p. 17), five major facilitators are 
identified as conducive to the creation of external refugees and are explained in further 
detail in chapter 5.  These are: 
 
1. less fighting in border areas; 
2. relaxed land border controls;  
3. governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; 
4. non- governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; and, 
5. sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state,  
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Summary 
This chapter explained the complex nature of the structural, political, economic/social, 
and cultural/perceptual factors, as well as the intervening facilitators, most conducive to 
the creation of refugees within ethnic conflicts. The above causes of refugee movements 
are summarised in the model below, which provides a means from which to analyse 
variations in both external and internal refugee numbers, resulting from ethnic conflict in 
the Southeast Asia/Pacific region.  
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Figure 12: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees within an Ethnic Conflict  
 
 
Ethnic Conflict 
 
Independent Variables  
   
 Major Factors   Sub-Factors 
  
1. Structural Factors   A) Weak States 
    B) Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity 
                                            C) Land Access 
 
2. Political Factors   A) State-Building  
    B) Polit ical Reg ime  
    C) Discriminatory Po lit ical Systems 
    D) Exclusionary National Ideologies 
    E) Lack of Human Rights 
    F) Role of External Part ies 
 
3. Economic/Social Factors  A) Poverty  
   B) Economic Underdevelopment 
    C) Discriminatory Economic Systems 
    D) Social Change 
      
 
4. Cultural/Perceptual Factors  A) Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups 
 
 
 
Intervening Variables      Intervening Variables  
 
Facilitators:      Facilitators: 
    
i) Less Fighting in Border Areas     - Fighting in Border Areas 
ii) Relaxed Land Border Controls    - Strict Land Border Controls  
iii) Governmental Assistance to Refugees  - Governmental Assistance to Refugees  
iv) Non-governmental Assistance to Refugees   - Non-governmental Assistance to Refugees 
v) Sudden Outbreak of Disease in Refugee-Producing State - No Sudden Outbreak of Disease in Refugee-      
Producing State 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable        Dependent Variable 
External Refugees       Internal Refugees 
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The model above uses three main categories of variables: independent, intervening, and 
dependent. Of these, the four major independent variables conducive to creating refugees 
are identified as comprising structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual 
factors. These factors consist of more specific sub-factors, which are listed on the far 
right of the model and it will be shown that a combination of these sub-factors is 
necessary before refugees are created. However, it is the intervening variables that 
determine whether the dependent variable (refugee flows) will be either internal or 
external in nature. The intervening variables consist of ten facilitators specific to the 
creation of both internal and external refugee movements. This model is applied to four 
countries which have experienced ethnic conflict in the region (Fiji, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands), in the following chapters in order to answer the 
fundamental question posed by this thesis: why do some ethnic conflicts produce external 
refugees and others do not in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region? In addition, these 
chapters also answer the following supplementary questions: 
 
- What factors within ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region are most 
conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees? 
- Which ethnic conflicts produce more refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific 
region and why? 
- Are external or internal refugee movements more likely to occur first in the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region and does one encourage the other? 
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Chapter 4: Structural and Political Variables 
 
Overview of the Southeast Asia/Pacific Region 
The Southeast Asia/Pacific region is complex, diverse and dynamic. Southeast Asia 
includes the 10 member states of the main regional organisation the “Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations” (ASEAN).3 This region alone has a population of about 500 
million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres and a combined gross domestic 
product of US$737 billion (ASEAN, 2005b). Comparatively, the Pacific region includes 
the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC),4 which has a population of approximately 8.6 million over a total land area of 
551,483 square kilometres (SPC, 2005). The five largest island countries and territories in 
Melanesia5 account for the majority of the region’s population (86.4 percent), followed 
by Polynesia (7.4 percent) and Micronesia (6.2 percent) (SPC, 2005).  
 
Ethnic conflict is widespread within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. From 1995-2005, 
17 ethnic conflicts occurred within the 32 countries that comprise the region. At least 
twelve of these ethnic conflicts occurred in Southeast Asia, (five in Myanmar, four in the 
Philippines, two in Indonesia and one in Cambodia), and five in the Pacific (one each in 
Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji and the Solomon Islands) (Bercovitch 
et al, 2005; Henderson, 2005, pp. 6-7). At the same time, the UNHCR recorded the total 
external refugee population of Asia and the Pacific6 as increasing by 1.6 percent during 
 
3 The 10 member states of ASEAN are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (ASEAN, 2005). 
4 The 22 Pacific Island countries and territories of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community include: 
American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, 
Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, 
and Wallis and Futuna. The SPC also has four remaining founding countries: Australia, France, New 
Zealand and the United States of America, however they are not included in this analysis.  
5 These include: Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
6 The UNHCR defines “Asia and the Pacific” as including: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Fiij, French 
Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Macao Special Administrative Region of China, Malaysia, Marshall 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk 
Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Papua New Guinea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of 
Korea, American Samoa, Palau, Philippines, Pitcairn, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Taiwan 
Province of China, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, and Wallis and 
Futuna Islands (UNHCR, 2005).    
 75
2004 to 836,700. This is the highest rate of annual change of all the geographical regions 
listed under the “UNHCR Bureau,” and demonstrates the comparative severity of the 
refugee problem in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, Asia and the Pacific hosted nine 
percent of the global refugee population at the end of 2004 (UNHCR, 20 June 2005).  
 
Table 8: Refugee Population by UNHCR Bureau, 2004  
 
UNHCR Bureau Begin 2004 End 2004 Annual Change 
Central Africa and Great 
Lakes 
1,257,900 1,267,700 0.8% 
East and Horn of Africa 768,100 770,500 0.3% 
Southern Africa 306,200 245,100 -20.0% 
West Africa 531,200 465,100 -12.4% 
Total Africa* 2,863,400 2,748,400 -4.0% 
CASWANAME** 2,827,300 2,735,200 -3.3% 
Americas 623,900 598,400 -4.1% 
Asia and Pacific 823,600 836,700 1.6% 
Europe 2,454,800 2,317,800 -5.6% 
Total 9,593,000 9,236,500 -3.7% 
 
* Excluding North Africa. 
** Central Asia, South West Asia, North Africa and Middle East. 
Source: UNHCR, 20 June 2005, p. 2. 
 
Recent figures from the UNHCR for 2005 indicate there are 82,400 “persons of 
concern”7 in Oceania and 6,899,600 “persons of concern” in Asia. A breakdown of the 
numbers of external and internal refugees within the region is still unavailable, as are 
specific figures for the Southeast Asia/Pacific region (UNHCR, September 2005, p. 5).  
 
Table 9: Persons of Concern to UNHCR – By Region, 2005 
 
Region 1st Jan 2004* 1st Jan 2005 
Asia 6, 112, 500 6, 899, 600 
Africa 4, 285, 100 4, 861, 400 
Europe 4, 242, 800 4, 429, 900 
Northern America 978, 100 853, 300 
Latin America & Caribbean 1,316, 400 2, 070, 800 
Oceania 74, 400 82, 400 
Total 17, 009, 300 19, 197, 400 
*Revised year-end figures   
Source: UNHCR, September 2005, p. 5.  
 
7 “Persons of Concern” include: external refugees, internal refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, 
resettlement refugees, stateless persons and others “of concern” (UNHCR, September 2005).  
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However, the Global IDP Project (2005) provides these figures, although it differs from 
the UNHCR (2005) in its method of calculation. The Global IDP Project reports that by 
the end of 2004, about 3.3 million people were internally displaced in the Asia-Pacific 
region solely due to conflicts and not due to natural disasters or large-scale infrastructure 
projects. The number of conflict-induced internal refugees in Asia-Pacific8 roughly 
equals that of external refugees from the region. This is particularly significant because 
internal displacement is often an instigator of large external refugee flows. Despite the 
number of internal refugees decreasing in the Asia-Pacific by nearly thirty percent over 
the past two years, the region remains the third largest refugee-producing area in the 
world. 
 
Table 10: Origin of Internal and External Refugees by Region 
Region Internal refugees (millions) External refugees (millions) 
2003 
Africa 13.2 3.5 
Americas 3.7 0.1 
Asia-Pacific 3.3 3.2 
Europe 3.0 1.6 
Middle East 2.1 5.2 
 
Source: Global IDP Project, March 2005, p. 11.  
 
The model developed in Chapter 3 is applied to the Southeast Asia / Pacific region in an 
attempt to test whether it can explain the production of refugees within this region. Four 
states from the region that have experienced, or continue to experience, ethnic conflict are 
examined – two from Southeast Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines) and two from the 
Pacific (Fiji and the Solomon Islands). This thesis specifically concentrates on the ethnic 
conflicts between:  
 
1. the Dayak and the Madurese in the Indonesian province of Kalimantan; 
 
8 The Global IDP Project defines “Asia and the Pacific” as including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan (The Global IDP Project, March 2005). 
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2.  the Moro and the Republic of the Philippines’ government (Roman Catholics) in 
the Filipino province of Mindanao; 
3.  the Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians in Fiji; and, 
4.  the Guali and Malaitans on the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.  
 
These four ethnic conflicts are chosen because although each has created internal 
refugees, not all have produced external refugees, despite the countries’ similar structural 
characteristics. The ethnic conflicts analysed occurred in developing island states without 
land borders with neighbouring countries (except Kalimantan), which have at least two or 
more ethnic groups and possess similar colonial histories. This provides a good basis for 
comparative analysis. Furthermore, because external refugees were only created in some 
instances, the four conflicts serve to identify some general arguments about the 
relationship between ethnic conflict and refugee production in the region.    
 
This chapter firstly provides a brief overview of the country’s history and refugee 
movements associated with ethnic conflict, concentrating on a 10-year post-Cold War 
period from 1995 - 2005. The rationale for choosing this time period is because the post-
Cold War era saw an increase in the global number of internal ethnic conflicts, 
warranting that it be more closely examined (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004, p. 132). 
Furthermore, this time period was chosen as each of the ethnic conflicts studied in Fiji, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands reached its peak during 1995 - 2005. 
The second part of this chapter applies the structural and political variables of the model 
to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005. The 
remaining two independent variables of the model - social/economic and 
cultural/perceptual factors - and the intervening variables are applied to the countries in 
the following chapter.  
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Overview of Ethnic Conflicts and Refugee Movements in Fiji, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands 
  
 
 
 
Source: National Geographic Society, 1998. 
 
Fiji 
The foundations for a potential ethnic conflict were laid when the British colonised Fiji in 
1874 and brought 50,000 Indian labourers to work on the sugar plantations until 1916 
(Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 545). By the time Fiji became independent within the 
Commonwealth on 10 October 1970, Indo-Fijians comprised nearly half of the total 
population (Freedom House, 2005, p. 228). Although the Indian-led opposition party won 
the 1977 elections, it failed to form a government for fear of the reaction of indigenous 
Fijians to an Indian leader (MAR, 2004). Therefore, it was not until 1987, that the ruling 
Alliance Party (AP) was defeated by a coalition government containing a majority of 
Indo-Fijian Ministers. The new government was overthrown on 14 May 1987 and again 
on 25 September 1987 by military coups led by Sitiveni Rabuka (Europa, 2004, p. 1624). 
While no deaths occurred as a result of the ensuing conflict, large-scale emigration of 
skilled and professional workers occurred (Henderson, 2005, p. 6; Prasad and Snell, 
2004, p. 543). Rabuka portrayed his coups as necessary for indigenous Fijians to regain 
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control of their country and enacted a new Constitution in 1990 to formally safeguard 
their rights (Henderson, 2000, p. 17). However, he replaced this in 1997 with a more 
equitable Constitution, which ironically enabled Mahendra Chaudhry to become Fiji’s 
first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister in 1999. On 19 May 2000, a third coup was staged, led 
by indigenous Fijian businessman George Speight, who like Rabuka, justified his actions 
in terms of protecting indigenous Fijian interests. Eight deaths occurred during the coup 
and about 375 - 750 internal refugees were created (Henderson, 2005, p. 7; USCRI, 2004; 
Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 544). An interim administration of 19 indigenous Fijians led 
by Laisenia Qarase was sworn in as the national government by the military on 4 July 
2000, which was later declared illegitimate. Qarase eventually became Prime Minister in 
2001 through a legitimate election (Europa, 2004, pp. 1626-7). Ethnic tensions between 
Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijians still remain high. Over 120,000 Indo-Fijians have left 
Fiji in the aftermath of the 2000 coup, as anti-Indo-Fijian sentiment grows and crimes 
targeting Indo-Fijian homes and businesses have increased (Freedom House, 2005, pp. 
230-31). 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia  
Indonesia was ruled by the Dutch from the early seventeenth century until 1949. 
Although Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, it took four years of intermittent 
negotiations, recurring hostilities, and United Nations mediation before the Netherlands 
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formally transferred sovereignty in 1949, with Sukarno continuing as President (Europa, 
2004, p. 2116).  The Kalimantan province was formed by the fledgling Indonesian 
government in 1957 after a Dayak9 revolt demanded more autonomy (Friel, 2001). 
However, ethnic tensions on Kalimantan first began in 1904, when Malay, Bugis and 
Arab merchants brought Madurese unskilled labourers from the island of Madura, off the 
north-eastern coast of Java, to the province. This practice continued under the Dutch 
resettlement programme (Kolonisasi) and in 1971, under the government-initiated 
“transmigration” programme, to relieve overcrowding within Indonesia. Over 100,000 
transmigrants were moved into West and Central Kalimantan from 1980 - 85. In addition, 
voluntary migrants, including many from the island of Madura, also settled in 
Kalimantan. This influx threatened to turn the indigenous Dayak population of 
Kalimantan into a minority (Djalal, 2001; Bamba, 2004, pp. 400-1). Dayak resentment 
grew as the Madurese transmigrants began to economically and politically dominate 
Kalimantan by taking over their traditional lands (Chandrasekaran, 2001; Pereira, 2001). 
Since then, approximately eight conflicts have broken out between Dayak and Madurese 
and one between Madurese and ethnic Chinese. These ethnic tensions transformed into 
open conflict in December 1996 in Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan, following a Dayak 
massacre of Madurese transmigrants, with 3,054 houses destroyed by April 1997 and an 
estimated 20,000 Madurese internal refugees by the end of 1997. Despite a peace 
agreement in 1997, fighting resumed in Sambas, West Kalimantan in 1999 (killing 200 
and displacing 35,000 Madurese) and in 2001 in Sampit, Central Kalimantan (Europa, 
2004, p. 2118; Global IDP Database, 2004; Global IDP Database, 2005; Djalal, 2001; 
Bamba, 2004, p. 399). During the major 2001 conflict, a 10-day violent rampage ensued 
in which Dayak took control over a large area of Central Kalimantan and killed about 500 
Madurese, generating at least 130,000 Madurese internal refugees. These people 
composed 26 percent of Indonesia’s total internal refugee population of 500,000 at this 
time (International Crisis Group, 2001; USCRI, 2005). Although comparative stability 
has returned to the province in recent years, allowing the return of nearly 45,000 internal 
refugees to Central Kalimantan in 2004, since 1997 the conflict has caused 1,388 
 
9 It should be recognised that the term “Dayak” is actually an umbrella term covering over 200 indigenous 
groups in the Kalimantan province of Indonesia (Friel, 2001).  
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casualties, destroyed 9,649 houses and other properties and generated 167,201 Madurese 
internal refugees (US Department of State, 2005, p. 25; Global IDP Project, 2005; 
Bamba, 2004, p. 404).  
  
 
Source: National Geographic Society, 1998. 
 
Philippines  
The origin of ethnic conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (Moro) began under 
Spanish colonial rule during the 16th century. The conflict was exacerbated when the 
Philippines was ceded to the United States (US) in 1898 following its victory in the 
Spanish-American War. The signing of the Bates Treaty between the US and the Sultan 
of Sulu the following year was designed to allow the US further control over the territory. 
It stipulated that the Sultan relinquish his and his heirs’ rights to sovereignty over Sulu, 
but was abrogated to enable the creation of the southern Moro Province of the Philippines 
in 1906. In 1940, the US government abolished the Sultanate completely and the Moro 
territories were brought under one administrative system of the Philippines. The 
American colonialism therefore laid the impetus for the contemporary Muslim separatist 
movement in the Mindanao-Sulu region (Islam, 2003, pp. 198- 200; Europa, 2004, p. 
3408). 
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After the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the Jabaidah massacre occurred in 
1968, and involved the execution of Moro at the government’s request. This provided the 
catalyst for the creation of the Muslim (Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM), 
which later became the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF’s main goal 
was the complete independence of the Moros’ homeland. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement 
provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao, on the condition that the 
MNLF accept autonomy in favour of complete independence. However, the MNLF’s 
rejection of this facilitated the establishment of two breakaway groups, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and the more extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Islam, 2003, 
pp. 201-4). The ensuing violence caused at least 100,000 deaths and created 
approximately 189,000 internal refugees (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 484; Medina-Salgado, 
1998, p. 135). Despite government concessions under the 1987 Constitution and 1996 
Peace Agreement, the MNLF and the MILF continue to demand separatism for the 23 
provinces in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3415). Although the Arroyo government 
resumed peace talks with the MILF and held a referendum within Mindanao in 2001, the 
resumption of fighting in 2003 caused the deaths of at least 160 MILF rebels and eight 
Philippine soldiers, created over 420,000 internal refugees and approximately 57,000 
external refugees, most of which were Moro (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 488; Global IDP 
Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). Currently 60,000 internal refugees remain from the 2000 
and 2003 conflicts and another 158,375 were generated from January - September 2005 
alone. However, most of these latter refugees only experienced short-term displacement, 
often returning after a few days or weeks (Global IDP Project, 2005).  
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Source: National Geographic Society, 1998. 
 
Solomon Islands 
Britain gained full control over the Solomon Islands through Germany’s cessation of 
most of its territory there from 1898-99. The whole territory, known as the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate, was later placed under the jurisdiction of the Western 
Pacific High Commission, which continued to rule the country until independence in 
1978 when Peter Kenilorea became Prime Minister (Europa, 2004, p. 3810). 
 
Ethnic tensions have existed in the Solomon Islands since World War Two, when the 
United States brought labourers from the island of Malaita to work on the island of 
Guadalcanal. Guali resentment grew as the Malaitan transmigrants began to economically 
and politically dominate Guadalcanal and erupted into open conflict in 1998, when a 
small group of Guali youth initiated a series of attacks on Malaitan transmigrants. Two of 
the leaders formed a militant group in 1999 called the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army 
(GRA) and began widening their attacks on migrant communities throughout 
Guadalcanal. During the year approximately 20,000 – 30,000 people were displaced from 
rural Guadalcanal into Honiara, often continuing on to Malaita. By 2000, almost all 
migrants within rural Guadalcanal had moved and many had lost everything.  In response, 
a Malaitan militant group, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), began a campaign against the 
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Guali insurgency in late 1999. The MEF was largely supported by the police force, 75 
percent of whom were Malaitans.  
 
In June 2000, the MEF and the paramilitary police staged a coup, taking former Prime 
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, himself a Malaitan, hostage and seizing control of 
Honiara. This enabled the MEF to effectively gain control of Honiara as well as the bulk 
of military weaponry in the country. An internal split also occurred within the 
Guadalcanal militancy, leading to the creation of a new militia, the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement (IFM), separate from the GRA. The IFM claimed to represent the interests of 
indigenous Guali and initiated a campaign of threats and intimidation against Malaitans 
on Guadalcanal, demanding autonomy within the Solomon Islands and an end to new 
migration (Pollard and Wale, 2004, pp. 584-6). An estimated 100 - 1,000 people died 
during the conflict, which created an estimated 3,000 more internal refugees following 
the coup (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 582; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 
2002; Henderson, 2005, p. 7). In addition, a few families of mixed parentage fled to 
Australia as external refugees, but their numbers are too small to warrant any close 
examination that an external refugee movement occurred (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 
582).  
 
Following Ulufa’alu’s forced resignation; a new government was formed with Manasseh 
Sogavare as Prime Minister (USCR, 2002). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed in 
October 2000 between the warring factions was rejected by a group of Malaitan militants 
led by Harold Keke, which killed 50 people and created thousands of internal refugees on 
Guadalcanal’s Weather Coast region (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). Armed gangs 
terrorised other parts of the country, eventually forcing the government to leave Honiara. 
In the December 2001 parliamentary elections Sir Allan Kemakeza became Prime 
Minister and requested external assistance in 2003 to resolve the ethnic conflict (Europa, 
2004, p. 3814). The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
increased stability, allowing the 1,500 internal refugees from Guadalcanal’s Weather 
Coast to return in 2004 (Global IDP Project, November 2004).  
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Structural Variables 
 
If a country experiencing ethnic conflict is also identified under one or more of the 
operational definitions in Chapter 3 as a “weak state,” an ethnically diverse country with 
a dominant ethnic group, or as a country with a high percentage of land access relative to 
its total length of land boundaries, it should be more likely to create refugees (Gordenker, 
1987, pp. 76-7; Sørli et al, 2005, p. 150; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296).  
 
Weak States 
If a state is not fulfilling its functions in either one or two of the capability areas outlined 
in Chapter 3, (the security gap, the capacity gap, and the legitimacy gap), it is defined as a 
“weak state” according to Weinstein et al (2005, pp. 13-14). These three capability areas 
are applied to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands in the table below 
in order to assess whether they constitute “weak states.” 
 
Table 11: “The Security Gap” 
 
Major War Intermediate War 
 
Minor War 
- Indonesia 
 
Fiji 
- Philippines 
 
Solomon Islands 
 
Sources: Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 47; Henderson, 2005, p. 7; Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 582. 
 
The table above classifies countries into three categories according to the level of security 
within the state. Security is measured in terms of the government’s ability to protect 
people from internal and external threats, maintain a monopoly over the use of force, and 
to preserve effective sovereignty and order within its territory (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 
14). The ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines resulted in more battle-related 
deaths than those in Fiji and the Solomon Islands and fall under the category of 
“intermediate” rather than “minor” wars. This means that a greater “security gap” or 
weakness in security exists in Indonesia and the Philippines, which suggests that more 
refugees should be generated from these countries than from Fiji and the Solomon 
Islands.  
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Table 12: “The Capacity Gap” 
 
Top 20 percent 60 to 80 percent 40 to 60 percent 20 to 40 percent Bottom 20 
percent 
Fiji 
91 percent rate in 
2003 of one-year-
olds fully immunised 
against measles.  
 
Philippines 
80 percent rate in 
2003 of one-
year-olds fully 
immunised 
against measles.  
 
Solomon Islands 
78 percent rate in 
2003 of one-year-
olds fully 
immunised against 
measles.  
 
Indonesia 
72 percent rate in 
2003 of one-
year-olds fully 
immunised 
against measles.  
 
- 
 
Sources: Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 48; UNDP, 2005.  
 
This table ranks countries by the percentage to which their governments play a 
fundamental role in meeting the basic needs of its citizens, which is assessed according to 
the UNDP’s measles immunisation rate as measured by the Human Development Index, 
2005. A higher percentage to the left indicates that the government is more capable of 
meeting its citizens’ basic needs (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 48). Under these criteria, the 
Fijian government was best able to deliver basic health services and education to its 
citizens in 2003, followed by the Filipino, Solomon Islands, and the Indonesian 
governments. This indicates that Indonesia had a higher “capacity gap” and was therefore 
more likely than the other countries to produce refugees under this criteria. 
 
Table 13: “The Legitimacy Gap” 
 
Top 20 percent 60 to 80 percent 40 to 60 percent 20 to 40 percent Bottom 20 
percent 
Solomon Islands 
 
 Indonesia   
 
Source: Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 49. 
 
“Table 13” shows the comparative level of legitimacy within a state, which is measured 
according to a government’s commitment to a transparent and democratic government. 
Again, a higher percentage to the left indicates a greater governmental commitment to 
democracy. Unfortunately, Weinstein et al (2005) do not provide data for the Philippines 
and Fiji in this area. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the table is 
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that the Solomon Islands’ government has a higher percentage of legitimacy than the 
Indonesian government.  
 
Overall, Indonesia is the weakest of the four states analysed under the three capability 
areas, because it consistently has the largest gaps in security, capacity, and legitimacy 
compared to the other countries. Due to this, one would expect that during an ethnic 
conflict a higher number of refugees would emerge from Indonesia than from Fiji, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands.  
  
Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity  
Although geographically isolated, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Indonesia and the 
Philippines are heterogeneous states with a diverse range of ethnicities and cultures. The 
table below shows the ethnic composition of each country according to its last population 
census:  
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Table 14: Ethnic Composition of the Countries  
Country Major ethnic groups Percentage of total 
population 
Indigenous Fijians 51 
Indo-Fijians 44 
Fiji 
Europeans, other Pacific Islanders, overseas Chinese 
and Rotuman Islanders 
5 
Javanese 45 
Sudanese 14 
Madurese 7.5 
Coastal Malays 7.5 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 Other 26 
Kalimantan10 Dayak 
Madurese 
Other 
50 
8 
42 
Christian Malays 91.5 Philippines 
 
 
Muslim Malays (Moro) 5-9 
Muslims (Moro) 90 
Roman Catholic 5 
Episocal Church 1 
Autonomous 
Region of 
Muslim 
Mindanao 
(ARMM) 
 
Evangelicals 3 
Melanesian 94.5 
Polynesian 3 
Micronesian 1.2 
Other 1.1 
Solomon 
Islands11 
Unspecified 0.2 
 
Sources: Fiji: (1996 census) (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics; BBC News, 2005); Indonesia: (2000 census); 
Philippines: (2000 census); US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; Solomon Islands (1999 census) (Solomon 
Islands Population and Housing Census, 1999).  
 
This table demonstrates that a dominant ethnic group, which comprises 45 to 90 percent 
of the total population, as defined by Sørli et al (2005, p. 150), exists in each country. The 
 
10 Although Friel argues that no specific ethnic breakdown of Kalimantan’s population is available, Djalal 
(2001) states that of the four million people in the Kalimantan province of Indonesia, more than two million 
are ethnically Dayak, making them the dominant ethnic group. Pereira also cites that only eight percent in 
Kalimantan are ethnic Madurese (Friel, 2001; Pereira, 2001).  
 
11 The precise ethnic composition of the Solomon Islands is more difficult to ascertain, with no breakdown 
available for the percentage of Malaitans and Gualis within the total population. However, it is 
acknowledged that the Malaitans are the majority ethnic group in the country (Henderson, 2005). 
According to the 1999 census, Malaita had a total population of and Guadalcanal had a total population of 
60 275 (Population and Housing Census, 1999). 
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existence of these dominant ethnic groups, combined by their size, how they are 
distributed across a state’s territory, and the political balancing by the state between 
ethnic groups, could influence the creation of the classic type of “target minority” refugee 
(Brown, 1996, p. 15; Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, pp. 256-7; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 
238). This occurred during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji and in Kalimantan (Indonesia), 
when the minority, rather than the dominant ethnic group, produced refugees. However, 
refugees were produced by the dominant ethnic groups during the conflicts in Mindanao 
(Philippines) and in the Solomon Islands, which contradicts this theory.  
 
Land Access  
Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have no land borders. Therefore, the degree 
of land access relative to total kilometres of boundaries is zero percent, which should 
mean that fewer opportunities existed for the creation of external refugees during their 
ethnic conflicts (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296). According to this argument, comparatively 
more opportunities therefore existed for external refugees to be created from Indonesia’s 
Kalimantan province because it has a 1, 782 kilometre land border with Malaysia (CIA, 
2005).12 This gives potential external refugees 18.1 percent land access to Malaysia using 
Schmeidl’s formula below:  
 
Percent land access =  1,782 km land boundaries  
   (1, 782 km land boundaries + 8, 054 km coastline) x 100 
    
   = 18.1 percent 
 
Despite the existence of a land border in Kalimantan, no external refugees were created. 
Instead, external refugees were created from countries with no land access, Fiji and the 
Philippines. Therefore, Schmeidl’s (1997, p. 296) assumption that a higher percentage of 
land access should facilitate the creation of external refugees is incorrect. However, as 
18.1 percent is still a fairly low percentage of land access, this may have prevented 
external refugees being created from Kalimantan. 
 
12 The coastline of Kalimantan extends 8, 054 kilometres from the Sambas Peninsular in the west to the 
island of Nunakan on the Sabah border, much of which is covered by a dense belt of mangrove forest 
(Raines et al, 1998, p. 12). 
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Table 15: Summary of Structural Factors 
 
Evidence of Variable Variable 
Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Description 
 
Weak States 
 
 
? 
   
? 
   
? 
 
? 
All the states were weak in 
either one or two of the 
capability areas. A weak state 
is therefore a precondition for 
the creation of internal 
refugees. 
 
 
Ethnic 
composition 
and 
Heterogeneity 
  
 
 ? 
  
  
 ? 
  
  
 ? * 
  
  
  ? 
The countries are ethnically 
heterogeneous and a dominant 
ethnic group exists within each 
of the ethnic conflicts. 
 * Unlike the other countries, 
where the minority ethnic 
groups produced refugees, the 
dominant ethnic group in the 
ARMM of the Philippines 
produced refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
Land access 
 
 
 
? 
  
   
 
 ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
The likelihood of external 
refugees being created from 
Fiji, the Philippines and the 
Solomon Islands is limited as 
these countries have no land 
access. Despite this, both Fiji 
and the Philippines generated 
external refugees. 
 
 Indonesia has a low degree of 
land access and is therefore 
more likely than the other 
countries to produce external 
refugees. However, it did not 
create any external refugees.  
 
The table above shows that not many structural differences exist between Fiji, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. This is because all four countries are: “weak” 
under one or more of the capability areas, ethnically heterogeneous with a dominant 
ethnic group, and island states without land borders with neighbouring countries (except 
Kalimantan).  
 
Political Variables 
 
Six major political factors are commonly associated with creating conditions conducive 
to generating refugees within developing countries. These are: the processes of state-
building, the type of political regime, discriminatory political systems, exclusionary 
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national ideologies, a lack of human rights, and the role of external parties (Schmeidl, 
2003; 2001; Weiner, 1996; Keely, 1996; Newland, 1993; Loescher, 1992; Zolberg et al, 
1989; Gordenker, 1987).  
 
State-Building  
Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands share a number of 
commonalities in their state-building processes. Each has a history of colonialism, the 
acquisition of independence, ethnic conflict, and at least one attempted coup. These 
variables are all conducive to the production of refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 48; Gordenker, 
1987, pp. 70-2; Brown, 1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 301). 
Although Indonesia and the Philippines experienced a politicide/genocide from 1971 – 
1993 and in 1973 respectively, none of the countries have encountered a 
politicide/genocide from 1995 – 2005 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). In addition, all the 
countries, except Fiji, were occupied by Japan at some stage during World War Two. The 
Polity IV Project’s “transitional government” indicator is applied to the countries to 
determine whether a regime change occurred during 1995 – 2005 (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2005). Regime changes resulting from internal unrest increase the likelihood that 
refugees will be produced (Keely, 1996, p. 1054).  
 
Fiji: The Polity IV Project reports that Fiji encountered an adverse regime transition in 
1987, following two military coups staged by Sitiveni Rabuka. Rabuka revoked the 
Constitution and declared himself Head of State, thus deposing the Queen and severing 
Fiji’s ties with the Commonwealth (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005; Europa, 2004, p. 1624). 
A second period of transitional government occurred from 2000 – 2002 (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2005). This instability occurred as a result of a coup in May 2000 by indigenous 
businessman George Speight over the election of the first Indo-Fijian, Mahendra 
Chaudhry, as Prime Minister. Like Rabuka, Speight declared that he had dissolved the 
Constitution and reclaimed Fiji for indigenous Fijians (Europa, 2004, p. 1626). 
Eventually the Commander of the Armed Forces, Frank Bainimarama, announced the 
imposition of martial law and a curfew to try and restore order to Fiji (Europa, 2004, p. 
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1626). The interim administration of indigenous Fijians later sworn in as the national 
government by the military was declared “illegitimate” (Europa, 2004, p. 1627).  
 
As previously stated, coups often generate smaller numbers of refugees, because they 
usually involve a small sector of society. Those refugees that are created from a coup are 
therefore likely to include senior political figures and military officers who formed part of 
the replaced regime (Gordenker, 1987, p. 70). Following the 2000 coup, refugees were 
created from all sectors of society within Fiji, as the aims of the new regime and its 
immediate repression and violence determined these refugee flows. This indicates that 
coups were an important variable in Fiji in the creation of refugees during the ethnic 
conflict.  
 
Figure 13: Authority Trends, 1970 – 2003: Fiji 
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Source: Marshall and Jaggers, 2005. 
 
Indonesia: From 1995 – 2005, Indonesia experienced both ethnic and revolutionary 
warfare, both of which are conducive to the creation of refugees (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2005; Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420). Despite 
two attempted coups in Indonesia in 1965 and 1995, the Polity IV Project (2005) reports 
that Indonesia has not experienced any transitional governments in its history. However, 
the abortive military coup in 1965 against former Indonesian President Sukarno’s 
authoritarian regime signalled a succession of political transitions. These began in 1966, 
when Sukarno was forced to transfer emergency executive powers to military 
commanders. In 1967 Sukarno transferred full power to Suharto who became President in 
1968 (Freedom House, 2005, p. 293).  
 
Suharto ruled Indonesia under authoritarian rule for thirty-two years until an attempted 
coup in 1995, by members of an extreme conservative group, the Islamic State of 
Indonesia, destabilised the regime. In 1998 he was forced to resign, following what could 
be loosely termed as a “political revolution” and was succeeded by his Vice-President 
Habibie. Since Suharto’s demise from power, substantial democratic reforms have 
occurred in Indonesia’s political system, including an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, 
the formal separation of the police and armed forces, and a return to the armed forces 
original pre-Suharto name, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) (Europa, 2004, p. 2119). 
1999 marked a substantial turning-point in Indonesian politics, when Indonesia held its 
first free parliamentary elections since 1955. Further amendments to the Constitution 
included provisions for greater regional autonomy, direct presidential and vice-
 94
presidential elections and for the abolition of all seats held by non-elected representatives, 
effectively terminating military involvement in the legislature. A bicameral legislature 
was also introduced through the creation of the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD – House 
of Representatives of the Regions), which paved the way for Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s election as President in the 2004 elections (Freedom House, 2005, pp. 293-
4; Europa, 2004, p. 2121).  
 
The preceding political transitions resulting from internal unrest facilitated Indonesia’s 
substantial regime change from autocracy to democracy. Such regime changes caused by 
domestic instability increase the probability that refugees will be created (Keely, 1996, p. 
1054). Moreover, as this regime change was brought about by the collapse of 
authoritarian rule, it is even more likely to facilitate the creation of refugees (Brown, 
1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055). Indeed many internal refugees were created in 
Kalimantan following Indonesia’s regime change in 1998, during the midst of the ethnic 
conflict there. The ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan intensified in 1999, killing 200 and 
displacing 35,000 Madurese (Global IDP Database, 2004). However, it is difficult to 
determine whether Indonesia’s regime change was a factor in the conflict’s escalation and 
subsequent increased production of internal refugees. This is because the motivation for 
each individual refugee’s flight is unknown.  
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Figure 14: Authority Trends, 1946 – 2003: Indonesia 
 
 
Source: Marshall and Jaggers, 2005. 
 
Philippines: From 1995 – 2005, the Philippines suffered from ethnic conflict and also 
revolutionary warfare until 1997 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Again both conflicts are 
conducive to the creation of refugees (Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; 
Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420).  Furthermore, the Polity IV Project reports that a transitional 
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government occurred in the Philippines from 1986 – 1988; following former authoritarian 
leader Marcos’s forced resignation in 1986 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). The 
assassination of opposition leader, Benigno Aquino Jr, in 1983 precipitated this, turning 
Filipino society, and uniting opposition, towards Marcos’s authoritarian regime. During 
the Presidential elections in 1986, Fidel Ramos led the establishment of a rebel 
headquarters in Manila, asserting that Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, was the rightful 
President of the Philippines. Marcos forcibly resigned after mass demonstrations 
accompanied by allegations of electoral manipulation and pressure from the United 
States, forced him into exile (Europa, 2004, pp. 3408-9). 
 
At least eight attempted coups have also occurred in the Philippines, the majority during 
the period 1995 – 2005 when the Philippines was making its transition from an autocracy 
to a democracy. Former President Aquino faced seven coup attempts during her 
Presidency. President Arroyo also encountered a military coup in 2003, declaring a 
nationwide state of rebellion which was later lifted (Freedom House, 2005, p. 502; BBC 
News; Europa, 2004, pp. 3411-13). Despite occasional rumours of coup plotting, none 
have yet occurred since Arroyo narrowly won the 2004 presidential election (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 1). It is highly unlikely that refugee movements were 
generated solely as a result of past unsuccessful coup attempts. 
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Figure 15: Authority Trends, 1946 – 2003: Philippines 
 
 
 
 
Source: Marshall and Jaggers, 2005. 
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Solomon Islands: The Polity IV (2005) project does not provide data for the Solomon 
Islands regarding its state-building processes. Instead, it is rated as negative 77, which 
indicates cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy which reflect the instability caused by the 
Solomon Islands’ ethnic conflict from 1998 until 2003. The existence of an ethnic 
conflict makes it more likely that refugees will be created (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005; 
Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420).   
 
During the period 1995 – 2005, evidence exists that the country was undergoing state-
building processes. An attempted coup in 2000 led members of the rebel group the MEF 
to place former Prime Minister Ulufa’alu under house arrest, forcing his early 
resignation. The MEF claimed that Ulufa’alu had failed to compensate displaced 
Malaitans within an established deadline (Europa, 2004, p. 3812). Despite external 
assistance to facilitate peace negotiations between the warring MEF and IFM, through the 
Honiara Peace Accord, Panatina Agreement and Townsville Peace Agreement, the 
conflict continued (Europa, 2004, p. 3812). Eventually in 2003, Kemakeza visited 
Australia and requested direct foreign intervention into the Solomon Islands. The 
government passed the Facilitation of International Assistance Act to facilitate the 
deployment of foreign troops (Kabutaulaka, 2004, p. 398), and on 10 July 2003, 
unanimously agreed to allow the Australian-led intervention force (RAMSI) into the 
country (Europa, 2004, p. 3814). RAMSI substantially reconstructed the political, 
economic and social framework of the Solomon Islands, through providing assistance and 
aid to the country (Europa, 2004, p. 3814; Kabutaulaka, 2004, p. 398; US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 1).  
 
The majority of internal refugees (20,000 – 30,000) were created two years before the 
2000 coup and only another 3,000 more were created after the coup (US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 2002). This indicates that the coup was not a major factor in the 
creation of internal refugees in the Solomon Islands. The demise of the ethnic conflict 
since the RAMSI intervention means that refugees are also less likely to be generated 
from 2003 than if the conflict was still continuing. Indeed, no new refugees have been 
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created since 2003 and many internal refugees have returned to Guadalcanal (Freedom 
House, 2005, p. 573).  
 
 
Political Regime  
The Polity IV Project’s annual polity score is applied to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005, to determine the nature of the political regime 
during the ethnic conflict and whether it was inherently democratic or autocratic 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).  The annual polity score of Fiji, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines is shown above in Figures 13, 14, and 15. 
 
Fiji: Following the 1987 coups, Fiji’s annual polity score dropped dramatically from nine 
(nearly a full democracy) to negative three (nearly a full autocracy). From 1990 onwards, 
its annual polity score has steadily increased and levelled off so that it consistently scored 
five on the index until 1999. In 1999, Fiji’s annual polity score sharply increased to six 
but has reduced to five in 2003 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).  This means that during the 
peak of the ethnic conflict from 1995 – 2005, Fiji could still be considered as relatively 
democratic. Fiji’s democratic status means that refugees are less likely to be created 
during an ethnic conflict.  
 
Indonesia: From 1968 – 1998, Indonesia’s annual polity score consistently remained at 
negative seven, indicating that its political regime was almost a full autocracy under 
former authoritarian leader Suharto. Having only comparatively recently resorted to 
democracy, Indonesia still retains a mixture of autocratic and democratic features. 
Indonesia’s annual polity score increased sharply from a score of negative seven in 1998 
to a score of seven in 2000, reflecting Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998 and 
Indonesia’s transition to democratic governance.  From 2000 onwards, Indonesia’s 
annual polity score has remained constant at seven, indicating that it has remained more 
democratic than authoritarian (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).    
 
During Indonesia’s transitional period from autocracy to democracy, the ethnic conflict in 
Kalimantan intensified from 1996 – 2001. As earlier stated, autocracies are more likely to 
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generate refugees than democracies. This is because autocracies are more likely to use 
violence or oppression towards their citizens; a practice conducive to creating refugees 
(Loescher, 1992; Weiner, 1996). However, although many internal refugees were created 
in Kalimantan during Suharto’s authoritarian rule, many others also originated in 2003 
after Indonesia’s democratic reforms. This indicates that in Indonesia the nature of the 
political regime may not be overly important in determining whether refugees are 
produced or not.  
 
Philippines: The Philippines’ annual polity score has remained at a score of eight since 
1988, giving the country a high democratic score. Prior to this, the Philippines 
experienced a transitional government and so an annual polity score was unavailable. 
However, during the height of Marcos’s reign (1973 – 1981), the Philippines’ annual 
polity score was negative nine - almost a complete autocracy. Although its score sharply 
increased to a negative six in 1984, it was not until the change of political regime in 1988 
that the Philippines became more democratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).  
 
During the period of ethnic conflict in Mindanao from 1995 – 2005, the Philippines had a 
consistently high democratic annual polity score.  As the Philippines was technically a 
“democratic” state during this period, it should have been better at accommodating and 
deflecting protests of ethnic groups, thereby averting serious rebellions than if it was still 
an authoritarian state (Gurr, 1993, p. 93). However, evidence supporting this is limited. 
Although a new ceasefire agreement was implemented and renewed in 1999 and formal 
peace negotiations between the warring factions resumed in 2000, they failed to achieve 
substantial progress, due to the escalating violence in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3416).   
   
Therefore, the ethnic conflict in Mindanao still occurred during this “democratic” period 
and actually intensified as former President Estrada continued to vacillate between 
supporting the economic development of Mindanao, organising peace talks to eradicate 
insurrection and threatening to eliminate the rebels through military action. For example, 
in 1999 former President Estrada conducted successive offensives against the MILF, 
causing the collapse of the 1997 cease-fire agreement, following MILF’s statement 
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advocating Mindanao’s independence. Nearly 60 people were killed in the ensuing 
fighting and 90,000 refugees were created (Europa, 2004, p. 3416).   
 
Although a political change in 2001 brought about the resumption of peace negotiations 
and the governmental military campaign against the MILF ceased, the arrival of US 
troops threatened to undermine the peace process (Europa, 2004, p. 3415).  Peace 
negotiations broke down again in 2003 and the government renewed its military offensive 
against MILF, despite reconciliation efforts by external parties (Europa, 2004, p. 3417).  
This led to the creation of 420,000 internal refugees and approximately 57,000 external 
refugees, most of whom were Moro (Global IDP Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). Therefore 
it seems that the Philippines’ transition to democracy has not reduced the number of 
refugees created within Mindanao.  
 
Solomon Islands:  The Polity IV project does not provide a graph of regime trends for 
the Solomon Islands, so only the years 2002 and 2003 can be analysed. During these 
years, the Solomon Islands’ is rated as negative 77, which indicates cases of 
“interregnum,” or anarchy. Therefore, the Polity IV’s revised combined polity score is 
used to determine the country’s polity score. Under this measure negative 77 is converted 
to a “neutral” or polity score of “zero” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). This means that the 
Solomon Islands was neither autocratic nor democratic during 2002 – 2003. Countries 
experiencing anarchy could be viewed as middling on both the autocracy and democracy 
scales and are therefore less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2005). There is therefore probably a higher chance that refugees could result 
from the internal instability.  
 
 
Discriminatory Political Systems  
The “Political Discrimination Index” (below) provides six succinct levels from which to 
classify the level of political discrimination within a country. The Index ranges from “no 
political discrimination” to the highest level of political discrimination: 
“exclusion/repressive policy.” It assesses a government’s political discrimination of a 
group according to three major characteristics: historical marginality, under-
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representation in political office and participation, and the nature of the state’s political 
public policies towards the ethnic group. These characteristics are applied to the ethnic 
groups which produced refugees during the conflicts examined in Fiji, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The higher the level of political discrimination the 
groups experienced during the conflict, the higher the number of refugees likely to be 
produced.  
 
Table 16: Political Discrimination Index  
 
Political Discrimination Index 
Characteristics of Political 
Discrimination 
Examples 
No Discrimination - Malaitans in the Solomon 
Islands 
Neglect/Remedial Policies Substantial under representation in 
political office and/or participation 
due to historical neglect or 
restrictions. Explicit public policies 
are designed to protect or improve 
the group’s political status. 
- 
Neglect/No Remedial Policies Substantial under representation due 
to historical neglect or restrictions. 
No social practice of deliberate 
exclusion. No formal exclusion. No 
evidence of protective or remedial 
public policies. 
- 
Social Exclusion/Neutral Policy Substantial under representation due 
to prevailing social practice by 
dominant groups. Formal public 
policies toward the group are neutral 
or, if positive, inadequate to offset 
discriminatory policies. 
Madurese in Indonesia 
Moro in the Philippines 
Exclusion/Repressive Policy Public policies substantially restrict 
the group’s political participation by 
comparison with other groups. 
Indo-Fijians in Fiji 
No Basis for Judgment - - 
 
Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 36. 
 
 
Fiji (Historical marginality): The British ruled Fiji using divide and rule policies which 
favoured the indigenous Fijians to the disadvantage of Indo-Fijians. By cooperating with 
the British, traditional Fijian chiefs were able to maintain their political and economic 
advantages (MAR, 2004). Indo-Fijians have experienced further historical restrictions 
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due to colonial initiated land policies. The British gave preferential treatment to the 
indigenous Fijians and protected them from exploitation and their land from occupation. 
This means Indo-Fijians now lack access to land, of which 83 percent is owned by 
indigenous Fijians, eight percent is owned by the government, and the remainder is 
freehold. The 18,000 Indo-Fijian sugar cane growers are forced to lease their land from 
indigenous Fijians landowners through the Native Land Trust Board. The estimated 
expiration of 10,000 of these land leases from 1997-2024 and the non-renewal of many 
by landowners was a contributing factor behind the 2000 coup (MAR, 2004). Such 
actions have created refugee problems and insecurity, with several alleged illegal 
evictions of Indo-Fijians and reoccupations of land by native Fijian landowners. 
Furthermore, some Fijian landowners have extorted higher rents from their Indo-Fijian 
tenants and almost none of these violations were prosecuted (US Department of State, 
2005, p. 7). However, communal indigenous Fijian landowners argue that the rental 
formulas included in the Agricultural Land Tenure Agreement (ALTA) are not 
favourable to them (US Department of State, 2005, p. 7; USCRI, 2004). 
 
Fiji (Representation in political office): From 1990 – 1997, Fiji had a racially-biased 
Constitution which favoured indigenous Fijians. Throughout this period, Indo-Fijians 
were discriminated against and became isolated, with ethnonationalists declaring them as 
“visitors” rather than citizens (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 546-7).  
 
Although the Constitution was amended in 1997, it still remains oppressive for Indo-
Fijians, which is reflected in their substantial under-representation in political office and 
participation (CIA, 2005). Fiji’s 1997 Constitution still reserves the presidency, prime 
ministership and several key positions for indigenous Fijians. It also empowers the Great 
Council of Chiefs, consisting of the highest-ranking members of the traditional chief 
system, to appoint 14 of Parliament’s 32 Senators. Therefore, only the support of an 
additional two Senators is required to give indigenous Fijians effective control in the 
Senate (Anere et al, 2001, p. 45; US Department of State, 2005, p. 5).  Successive 
governments have employed this provision to appoint indigenous Fijians and Rotumans 
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to almost all chief executive positions in the public service and in nearly half of all 
public-sector jobs (Amnesty International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005, p. 229). 
 
Before being forced to resign, former Prime Minister Chaudhry made major concessions 
to appease indigenous Fijians and gave them a majority of seats in his cabinet (11 of 18 
full positions and two of five junior positions) (MAR, 2004). Current Prime Minister 
Qarase has continued this trend, forming a government which includes only one Indo-
Fijian and some nationalists who had supported Speight’s coup (Prasad and Snell, 2004, 
p. 549). Qarase has also refused to include any FLP members in his cabinet – a party 
which is predominantly composed of Indo-Fijians. A Supreme Court ruling in July 2004, 
found that the Constitution required a multi-party (effectively multi-ethnic) cabinet, 
which Fiji had not had since the 2000 coup. The dispute ended in November 2004, when 
Mr Chaudhry declared that the FLP no longer wished to join the coalition government 
(Amnesty International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005, p. 228; The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, December 2004, p. 5).  Indo-Fijians’ political participation and representation is 
therefore substantially restricted at all levels of government (Freedom House, 2005, p. 
229).  
 
Fiji (Public policies): The Constitution continues to cite “the ‘paramountcy’ of Fijian 
interests as a guiding principle for the protection of the rights of indigenous citizens.” It 
also provides for “affirmative action” and “social justice” programmes to ensure that 
indigenous Fijians, Rotumans and other disadvantaged citizens have equal access to 
opportunities, amenities and services (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5; Amnesty 
International, 2005). Some of these programmes include preference in recruitment into 
the police, military and the senior public service, among other benefits (Chand, 1997, pp. 
1-2; MAR, 2004, p. 2). Therefore, the majority of Indo-Fijians are seeking equal civil 
rights and status, as well as an increased role in political decision-making at all levels that 
is representative of their population within the country (MAR, 2004). Such public 
policies combined with substantial Indo-Fijian under representation in political office and 
participation means Indo-Fijians suffer from “exclusion/repressive policy” on the 
Political Discrimination Index. Such overt and covert measures of political discrimination 
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can generate refugee flows and are interrelated in that one can encourage the other 
(Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Gordenker, 1987, pp. 72-3). Both internal and 
external refugees were created from Fiji, as the government sought political homogeneity 
in the form of a new national identity (Loescher, 1992, p. 28).   
 
Indonesia (Historical marginality): The Dutch colonial administration of Indonesia was 
completely centralised in Jakarta and refused to take into account the ethnic diversity of 
the country. A distinction continued to be made under the Japanese occupation between 
Java, where administrative posts were given to local people, and the outer islands where 
this had not occurred. The committee which prepared for independence had 64 members 
– only four of whom came from outside Java. Although a more ethnically representative 
committee was later established, its work was disrupted by World War Two (Kooistra, 
2001, p. 9). The colonial government’s preference of people of Javanese ethnicity to 
represent Indonesia politically is inherent in all these policies. Even though Madurese 
comprise Indonesia’s third largest ethnic group, following Javanese and Sundanese, their 
views were not represented (Taylor, 2003, p. 173). Unfortunately, no census measured 
Indonesia’s ethnic composition from 1930 – 2000, so it is difficult to provide accurate 
statistics regarding the level of comparative marginality the Madurese experienced during 
this time. President Suharto’s “New Order” government had few explicit policies on 
ethnic groups, although it was keen to develop a modern, non-ethnic Indonesia (Van 
Klinken, 2003, p. 64). Part of this process of modernisation included government-
initiated transmigration programmes, which received funding from the World Bank. 
Under these programmes, the majority of the 335,000 people resettled in Sumatra and 
Kalimantan were Madurese, with many hired to build roads through Kalimantan in order 
to provide access to large areas of untapped rainforests to logging operations 
(Chandrasekaran, 2001).  
 
Indonesia (Representation in political office): Perhaps as a result of previous 
government policies, Madurese are not equally represented in political office and in 
political participation. Despite an amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 2002, which 
gave Indonesia a bicameral, all-elected legislature, this continues to be dominated by 
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Javanese. The highest authority of the state, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat -MPR), has 678 (previously 700) both elected and appointed 
members serving for five years. This includes the 550 members of the House of People’s 
Representatives (Dewan Perkwakilan Rakyat - DPR) and the 128 representatives of the 
newly formed House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – DPD). 
This latter body explicitly provides for the inclusion of four members from each of 
Indonesia’s 32 provinces (US Department of State, May 2005, p. 4; Europa, 2004, p. 
2128). Like former President Megawati’s 33-member cabinet, which included 12 
minority members, President Yudhoyono’s cabinet mainly consists of Javanese (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 17).  
 
Indonesia (Public policies): There are not any explicit government policies that 
substantially restrict Madurese political participation in comparison with other ethnic 
groups. However, the timing of the 2001 ethnic conflict in Kalimantan coincided with the 
implementation of new government laws designed to guarantee greater regional 
autonomy. The laws, which were introduced in 1999, affected the prosperity of district 
and provincial level business and political power brokers and were intended to cause 
significant changes to the regional administration (Van Klinken, 2003, pp. 78, 83). 
Reflecting these changes, local councils in Central Kalimantan have enacted 
discriminatory legislation since 2001 that prohibits the return of Madurese refugees, 
unless they can prove they have previously lived in the area and do not have a criminal 
record (US Department of State, 2005, p. 15). These overtly discriminatory policies 
indicate that the Madurese in Kalimantan currently suffer from an “exclusion/repressive 
policy,” whereas during the ethnic conflict they suffered from a “social exclusion/neutral 
policy,” under the Political Discrimination Index.  Madurese were substantially 
politically under-represented due to the prevailing social practice of the dominant Dayak 
groups in Kalimantan, which seems to be a factor in their creation of refugees.   
 
Philippines (Historical marginality): Historical neglect and restrictions account for the 
Moros’ disadvantaged political and economic status in the Philippines (MAR, 2004; 
Islam, 2003, p. 219). The Moro have experienced historical restrictions due to the 
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Spanish and American colonisers undermining the sultanate’s economic base through 
trade blockades and weakening Moro power through a policy of “Filipinisation” in the 
1920s (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 484; Islam, 2003, pp. 199-200). Under this policy, 
government sponsored migration programmes enabled northern Catholic administrators 
to settle in Mindanao to administer the Muslim areas in order to transfer control from the 
Americans to the Filipinos. However, in reality, most of the Muslim provinces had non-
Muslim Governors, so the Muslims were subjugated once again (Islam, 2003, pp. 199-
200). The “Filipinisation” policy also enabled Catholic Filipinos to acquire Moro land 
through colonially imposed land laws that did not recognise Moro customary law on land 
stewardship (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 485). This created deep-seated grievances within 
the Moro population, which were exacerbated by the government’s post-independence 
policy of inviting multinational corporations to establish industries in the region, mainly 
to develop an export market, rather than to provide for the locals (Islam, 2003, p. 219). 
This modernised production effectively limited the capacity of Moro to compete on an 
equal footing with other citizens, as they relied predominantly on subsistence farming.  
 
Philippines (Representation in political office): Moro are under-represented in the 
Filipino government and in senior civilian and military positions due to historical 
marginality and the prevailing social practices of the dominant Catholic group (Freedom 
House, 2005, p. 504; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8). There are no Moro senators or 
cabinet members and only 10 Moro members within the 236-seat House of 
Representatives. Such low political representation may partly be attributed to the nature 
of the selection process. The method of electing senators from a nationwide list tends to 
favour established political figures from the Manila region, to the disadvantage of Moro. 
To rectify this, many Moro favour a Constitutional amendment to provide for election of 
senators by region (US Department of State, 2005, p. 10).  
 
Philippines (Public policies): The Filipino government has initiated several policies to 
improve Moro political status, but these have been inadequate to offset social 
discriminatory policies. Efforts to improve Moro political status began in 1976, when the 
government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement which provided for the creation 
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of an autonomous region in Mindanao, on the condition that the MNLF accept autonomy 
in favour of complete independence. However, the MNLF rejected this proposal and was 
also dissatisfied with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which established the 
Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This granted autonomy to only 
four provinces, as opposed to the 13 provinces and nine cities, as indicated under the 
Tripoli Agreement (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). In 1996, a Peace Agreement provided for the 
implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in two phases; the establishment of the 
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPC), and the creation of a 
new Regional Autonomous Government (Islam, 2003, p. 219). After a period of three 
years a referendum was to be conducted in each of the 14 provinces and 10 cities in 
Mindanao, to determine whether they would join the existing ARMM. Although these 
policies were intended to benefit the Moro by giving them more political autonomy, in 
reality they largely failed. In 2001, only two provinces elected to join the ARMM in the 
referendum and in the 2005 ARMM elections, the first non-MNLF Governor of the 
region was elected (Europa, 2004, p. 3415; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 4). Given this, 
Moro fit under the category of “social exclusion” on the Political Discrimination Index, 
which indicates this may have been a contributing factor in the creation of Moro refugees. 
 
Solomon Islands (Historical marginality): Malaitans have experienced discrimination 
since they began immigrating to Guadalcanal in large numbers after World War Two as 
the Moro movement had long advocated the expulsion of non-Guali and a return to 
custom (Anere et al, 2001, p. 31). The Malaitans successful exploitation of the economic 
opportunities, made available from the many significant investments on Guadalcanal after 
1945, meant that they composed almost three-quarters of plantation labour on the island 
by the mid-twentieth century. While the Malaitan settlers originally obtained leases for 
land and resource use from the government or landowners, they often contravened agreed 
boundaries or extended beyond the original agreed basis for settlement, transforming the 
land into poor squatters (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 583). The government did not ensure 
that those transactions through them were protected or that other acquisition was strictly 
prohibited. Therefore, some Malaitans were accused of using land beyond which they had 
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bought and of depleting local supplies. This fostered further resentment among Guali 
towards Malaitans (Anere et al, 2001, p. 32).  
 
Solomon Islands (Representation in political office and public policies):  Despite this 
historical neglect of Malaitans on Guadalcanal, Malaitans are not under-represented in 
political office or in political participation. As the largest and dominant ethnic group in 
the Solomon Islands they are adequately represented in Prime Minister Kemakeza’s 
cabinet and hold the majority of the nineteen cabinet posts (Gegeo, 18 November 2005). 
Due to this, no public policies exist to improve the Malaitans’ political status. Therefore, 
the Malaitans do not currently suffer from political discrimination under the Political 
Discrimination Index, which indicates that this was not a factor in the creation of 
Malaitan refugees during the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands.  
 
Exclusionary National Ideologies  
 
The prevailing type of national ideology in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands is classified, according to the criteria in the table below, as either of a 
predominantly “civic” or “ethnic/religious” nature. An “exclusionary national ideology” 
exists when ethnic/religious nationalism dominates because not everyone can adhere to 
its strict criteria. This type of nationalism is conducive to the creation of refugees, as 
under it states will often deny protection to their minority groups (Gordenker, 1987, p. 
83). 
 
Table 17: Types of Nationalism 
Type of Nationalism Characteristics 
 
Civic Nationalism 
 
This stresses the importance of “civic institutions, public offices, 
public agencies and officials, churches in their secular activities, and 
common and authoritative rules with a territorial scope. These define a 
country and the nation that inhibits it” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 125) 
 
Ethnic/Religious 
Nationalism 
(Exclusionary National 
Ideology) 
 
This stresses the importance of a “common ethnicity and culture, a 
shared language perhaps, a shared history and common ancestral 
struggles. The nation is the community of fate, the community of 
ethnic bonds” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 126) 
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Although the Constitutions of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands 
embody the characteristics of civic nationalism, in reality this ideology has not infiltrated 
throughout all sectors of society. In practice, most citizens of these countries more readily 
identify with their regions, religion, or ethnicity than with the state’s officially 
promulgated “civic nationalism.” This may be because these states were not created 
through the development of a cohesive nationalist movement, but rather through the 
actions of their former colonisers. Their claim to statehood is therefore predominantly 
based on anti-colonial sentiment rather than on “natural” bonds, cemented through a 
common historical experience, consanguinity and identification with a common language 
or religion. In order to create such bonds and create national cohesion, the governments 
of these multinational states have often attempted to assimilate ethnic and religious 
differences through promoting a state-endorsed ethnicity, religion, or ideology. 
 
As demonstrated under the sections entitled “discriminatory political systems” (pp. 101-
109) and “economic underdevelopment,” (pp. 130-134) in practice, the Fijian and 
Solomon Islands’ governments tend to promote the indigenous Fijian and Guali 
ethnicities respectively as a form of exclusionary ethnic nationalism. Although the 
Indonesian government also engages in ethnic nationalism, by tending to favour the 
Javanese ethnic group, a more exclusionary ideology was constructed under the Suharto 
regime and embodied in the 1945 Constitution (US Department of State, 2005).  
 
“Pancasila” is a five-point state philosophy, including: belief in a supreme being; 
humanitarianism; national unity; democracy by consensus; and, social justice. The 
prevailing ideas and beliefs of “Pancasila” were defined to exclude those belief systems, 
such as Islam, that did not conform to its ideology in an attempt to unify the state. 
Although all political, social and religious organisations were required to adopt 
“Pancasila” in 1984, its ideology continues to be employed by the House of People’s 
Representatives today (Crouch, 1998, p. 102). 
 
Similarly, the Filipino government tends to encourage religious nationalism, preferring 
Roman Catholicism over Islam as the dominant state ideology (US Department of State, 
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2005, pp. 8-10; May, 1998, p. 71). Such an exclusionary approach can inspire 
secessionism among minority groups to ensure they have rights in their own nation states 
and can provoke ethnic conflict, increasing the possibility of refugee flows (Newland, 
1993, pp.146-7). Conflict is more likely when ethnic nationalism dominates and so the 
possibility of refugees emerging is increased (Brown, 1996, p. 17). Indeed, given the 
weak nature of these developing states, ethnic nationalism seems to have become a 
default option (Snyder, 1993) and has contributed to the creation of refugees in these 
three countries.   
 
 
Lack of Human Rights  
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) below is used to assess whether a government’s lack of 
respect for human rights during an ethnic conflict is conducive to creating refugees. The 
PTS categorises the degree of political violence within a country into five levels. Level 
one indicates that human rights are respected, whereas levels four and five indicate a 
severe lack of human rights (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, p. 60). 
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Table 18: Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
Level of Political Violence Characteristics of Political Violence 
Level 1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not 
imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or 
exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Level 2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for 
nonviolent political activity. However, few persons 
are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. 
Political murder is rare. 
 
Level 3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a 
recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or 
other political murders and brutality may be 
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a 
trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Level 4 The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger 
numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a 
common part of life. In spite of its generality, on 
this level terror affects those who interest 
themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Level 5 The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the 
whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
 
Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73 -4. 
 
 
Gibney and Dalton (1996) apply the PTS to a range of countries, including to Fiji, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005, based upon 
information from the US State Department and Amnesty International. Their results are 
illustrated the table below. The shaded areas indicate the peak of each ethnic conflict and 
the darker areas indicate when the majority of the refugees were produced in each 
country. 
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Table 19: Political Terror Scale: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands  
 
Country 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Level A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S 
 
Fiji 
 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
Philippines 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
Solomon 
Islands  
 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1996. 
 “A” indicates the rating that Gibney et al gave the country based on information from Amnesty 
International in the given year. 
“S” indicates the rating that Gibney et al gave the country based on information from the US State 
Department in the given year. 
“9” indicates that no data was available.  
 
Fiji: During the peak of its ethnic conflict in 2000, Fiji was a level four on the PTS, 
which indicates a lack of human rights (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, p. 60). Extensive 
political imprisonment occurred during 2000 and murders, disappearances, and torture 
were widespread. Furthermore, numerous human rights abuses were committed by both 
the police and by rebel groups against Indo-Fijians, including the looting and burning of 
their houses and businesses (Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, 
p. 1).  Terror during this period mostly affected people interested in politics or ideas.  
 
However, in 2001, Fiji moved to levels three and two on the PTS, reflecting its return to 
law and order and the government’s increased respect for human rights. As of 2004, Fiji 
remains at level two on the PTS which suggests that while a limited amount of 
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imprisonment for non-violent political activity still occurs, few people are affected and 
torture and beatings are exceptional. Indeed, the Fijian authorities intensified their 
investigations in 2004 into those who participated in the coup or who were involved in 
subsequent human rights abuses. Despite this, the most valid complaints to the Human 
Rights Commission continue to concern racial and ethnic equality problems (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 7). Gibney et al (1996, p. 60) speculate that most of the 
refugees created in Fiji tended to be generated in 2000, when human rights abuses were 
highest and Fiji was ranked as a level four on the PTS (USCRI, 2004). This suggests that 
a lack of human rights was associated with the creation of refugees in Fiji.   
 
Indonesia: Indonesia had a consistently high level of human rights abuses during 1995 – 
2005. Since 1997, when the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan intensified, Indonesia has 
remained fairly constant on level four of the PTS. However, in 2003, it reached level five 
when terrors expanded to include the whole population and leaders placed no limits on 
the means or thoroughness with which they pursued their personal or ideological goals. 
Indonesia has since dropped to a level four on the PTS, although the military and police 
routinely violate human rights and employ excessive use of force (Amnesty International, 
2005). As corruption is common, the overall professionalism of the forces remains low, 
as does its effectiveness at investigating human rights abuses (US Department of State, 
2005, p. 8). The weakness of the judiciary, combined with inadequate enforcement 
mechanisms, enables authorities to routinely violate human rights (US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 9; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 297-8).  
 
This indicates that extensive political imprisonment, execution and brutality and murders, 
disappearances and torture were common, but only affected those interested in politics or 
ideas. It also supports the argument that most refugees are generated from countries 
classified at levels four or five on the PTS and suggests that a lack of human rights was 
associated with the creation of refugees in Indonesia (Gibney et al, 1996, p. 60).  
Furthermore, this information adds weight to Schmeidl’s (2001, p. 78) finding that 
refugees are more likely to be created from some form of generalised violence rather than 
from institutionalised human rights violations.  
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Philippines: The Philippines has vacillated between levels three and four of the PTS 
during the last decade and has remained at level four since 2003, when the ethnic conflict 
intensified in Mindanao. Large internal and external refugee movements also occurred in 
Mindanao in 2003, when peace negotiations collapsed and the government renewed its 
military offensive against the MILF (Europa, 2004, p. 3417). In Mindanao, there were 
reports of breaches of international humanitarian law by both the government and the 
MILF, including apparently indiscriminate use of force by Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) units and the use of ‘human shields’ by MILF forces. Furthermore, 
under the name of militarisation or “development” projects, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial 
executions and “disappearances” still regularly occur (Amnesty International, 2005). 
Therefore overt generalised state violence exists in the Philippines which is more 
conducive to the creation of refugees than institutional human rights violations 
(Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78). 
 
However, human rights violations are also institutionalised within the Philippines. This 
lack of respect for fundamental human rights, particularly when connected with the often 
oppressive nature of the Filipino government towards the Moro, is a contributing factor in 
the creation of refugees in Mindanao (Gordenker, 1987, p. 170; Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 
259, 264; Newland, 1993, p. 156; Loescher, 1992, pp. 57-59; Keely, 1996, p. 1060). 
Despite the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights (CHR) providing the police with 
mandatory human rights training, the police are often described by this organisation as 
the country’s worst human rights abusers (Freedom House, 2005, p. 504; US Department 
of State, 2005, p. 1). This is due to a low level of professionalism among police, high 
levels of corruption, inadequate enforcement mechanisms and the weakness of the 
judiciary (US Department of State, 2005, pp. 8-9; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 297-8).  
 
Solomon Islands: Since 1999, the Solomon Islands’ rating on the PTS has varied from 
levels two to four. Its rating reached level four in 2000, indicating that the country 
suffered from a lack of human rights due to the MEF’s campaign against the Guali 
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insurgency and the chaos generated from the coup that year (Gibney et al, 1996, p. 60; 
US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 2002). During this time, numerous human 
rights abuses were committed by both the police and by rebel groups against Malaitans 
(Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). These included the 
looting and burning of Malaitan property, the abductions of over 100 people and 
widespread torture, mistreatment, assassinations, beheadings and hostage takings (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 2). Evidence also suggests that the Solomon Islands’ police 
force employed former militants within their forces as “special constables,” who further 
perpetuated human rights abuses by killing and torturing people in the operation against 
warlord Harold Keke in March 2003 (Europa, pp. 3812, 3814). Such generalised violence 
increases the likelihood of refugee movements and indeed approximately 15,000 internal 
refugees were created in 2000 (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78; USCR, 2002; US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 5). However, the majority of the Solomon Islands’ refugees were 
generated in 1998, when either no data was available or the US State Department rated 
the country at a level one on the PTS (USCR, 2002; Gibney and Dalton, 1996). Due to 
these discrepancies, the PTS for this year can not be analysed with any certainty. 
Notwithstanding, a lack of human rights in the Solomon Islands during the ethnic conflict 
appears to have facilitated the creation of refugees. 
 
Since 2003, the Solomon Islands’ has reduced from a level three to a level two on the 
PTS, reflecting the RAMSI intervention’s restoration of law and order in the country. In 
2003, more than 240 people, including approximately 40 police officers, Keke and other 
militants, were arrested in the Solomon Islands for offences committed during the ethnic 
conflict and over 600 charges were lodged against them (US Department of State, 2005, 
p. 2). The special constables were also demobilised and the police reorganised (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 1; Europa, p. 3814).  
 
 
Role of External Parties  
The role that external parties played during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and the Solomon Islands is analysed according to the three criteria in the table 
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below. This includes: the external support received by the ethnic group during the 
conflict, the external support received by the governing regime during the conflict, and 
whether any external intervention in the conflict occurred.  
 
Table 20: Role of External Parties in Creating Refugees  
Country External support 
received by ethnic 
group during the 
ethnic conflict 
External support 
received by the 
governing regime 
during the ethnic 
conflict 
External intervention 
in the ethnic conflict 
 
Fiji 
  
 ? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
Indonesia 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
Philippines 
  
 ? 
 
  
 ? 
  
 ? 
 
Solomon Islands 
 
? 
 
? 
  
? 
 
Table 20 shows that of the four countries, only the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups 
received some form of external support. The governing regime during the ethnic conflicts 
in the Philippines and the Solomon Islands also received external support, most 
noticeably in the form of an external intervention force in the conflict. 
 
Fiji: The Indo-Fijian diaspora harnessed considerable external support from their ethnic 
brethren overseas (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; Gurr, 2000, p. 7). The Indian government mainly 
gave political support to Indo-Fijians during the ethnic conflict, including closing its 
diplomatic mission in Fiji and imposing an eight-year trade embargo which lasted until 
1995 following the 1987 coups (Gurr, 2000, p. 7). India’s specific ethnic affinity to the 
disadvantaged Indo-Fijians therefore developed into a deep partisan alignment and 
provided political support for those escaping the regime (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 
1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 6).  
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The government during the ethnic conflict received extremely limited political support 
from some highly nationalistic indigenous communities overseas. This included political 
support from Māori activists representing the Tino Rangatiratanga movement, which 
advocates indigenous rights for Māori. Some members of the group travelled to Fiji to 
express sympathy with indigenous Fijians in taking action to secure their rights (Alley, 3 
June 2000). However this support was insufficient to be a factor in encouraging refugee 
flows.  
 
Indonesia: The Madurese diaspora in Kalimantan did not receive any external support 
during the ethnic conflict despite their adherence to Islam and that Indonesia is a member 
of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). This is surprising, as the OIC has 
provided much support to other Islamic groups (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; US Department of 
State, 2005). Apart from non-governmental assistance (outlined in Chapter 5) the 
governing regime of Indonesia during the ethnic conflict also did not receive external 
support (Bamba, 2004, pp. 405-7). External support was therefore not a factor in the 
creation of refugees in Kalimantan.  
 
Philippines: The Moro in Mindanao received much external political and financial 
support, which was provided to the MNLF by the OIC (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). The 
specific religious affinity between the OIC and the Moro created a strong partisan 
alignment and provided support for those escaping the conflict (Davis, Jaggers and 
Moore, 1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 6).  
 
During the ethnic conflict the Filipino government also received external support. In 
2002, the US signed a five-year military agreement with the Philippines and recently 
resumed joint military exercises in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3418). The US 
government also provides financial support to Mindanao, through large aid packages 
(Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 7). Malaysia and Brunei additionally provide political 
support to the Filipino government in overseeing ceasefire arrangements and in 
facilitating peace negotiations (Amnesty International, 2005; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 
4). Malaysia, Brunei, and the US share similar geopolitical goals and interests with the 
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Philippines, including maintaining the political stability of the region and employing anti-
terrorism initiatives (Amnesty International, 2005; Islam, 2003, p. 218).  
 
With the Arroyo government’s consent, the US intervened in the ethnic conflict in 
Mindanao in 2002 and hundreds of US troops were dispatched to Mindanao through the 
1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This occurred despite popular resistance, with 
some perceiving it as a foreign intervention (Islam, 2003, pp. 216-8). However, it can not 
be termed an “intervention” in the common sense of the word as it had the consent of the 
governing regime (Roberts, 1997, p. 118; Europa, 2004, pp. 3814, 3418). Despite this, the 
Philippines is a geo-politically important region for the US and its intervention in the 
country increases the chance that a complex refugee situation will arise (Schmeidl, 1997, 
p. 284; Zolberg et al, 1989). Although this intervention may not directly produce 
refugees, it should be viewed as an accelerating factor in their creation (Schmeidl, 1997, 
p. 289).  
 
Solomon Islands: Although the Malaitan diaspora on Guadalcanal did not receive any 
external support during the ethnic conflict, the Solomon Islands’ government did, despite 
the fact that numerous members of Parliament were involved or implicated in the 
conflict. Sitiveni Rabuka, former Prime Minister of Fiji and instigator of the 1987 coups 
in Fiji, was appointed a Commonwealth Special Envoy and facilitated peace agreements 
in neutral locations between the warring factions. A UN delegation and a multinational 
peace-monitoring group from Fiji and Vanuatu also implemented numerous peace 
agreements in the Solomon Islands from 1998 – 2000 (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; Europa, 
2004, p. 3811). However as these actions were designed to rebuild peace rather than to 
create further instability, it is unlikely that they facilitated the creation of refugees.  
 
The Solomon Island government’s requests for further external assistance were denied in 
2000 and 2002. The government finally received external support in 2003 when Prime 
Minister Kemakeza requested direct foreign intervention to address the ongoing 
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lawlessness in the country13 (Europa, 2004, pp. 3814). Although some studies have found 
a positive relationship between interventionist policies and large refugee flows (Zolberg 
et al, 1989, p. 265; Loescher, 1992, p. 28), this intervention was not an “intervention” in 
the common sense of the word, because it had the consent of the governing regime and 
the popular consent of Solomon Islanders (Roberts, 1997, p. 118; Europa, 2004, pp. 3814, 
3418). It therefore can not be seen as conducive to the creation of refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 The support provided by the RAMSI intervention force is not included in this section, because it did not 
aid the Ulufa’alu or Sogavare governments which had effective control of the state during the peak of the 
ethnic conflict from 1998 – 2001 (Europa, 2004, p. 3812). 
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Table 21: Summary of Political Variables within the Ethnic Groups 
 
Evidence of Variable Variable 
Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Description 
 
 
State-building 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
?* 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
Coups occurred in all the countries from 
1995 – 2005. However, they were only 
majorly significant in the creation of 
refugees in Fiji and were of a minor 
importance in the creation of internal 
refugees in the Solomon Islands. *The 
regime change in Indonesia may have 
contributed towards the creation of 
refugees in Kalimantan, but evidence 
remains unsubstantiated. 
 
Political Regime 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
Except for the Solomon Islands, (which 
was in anarchy during 1995 – 2005), the 
political regimes of the other countries 
did not seem to influence the creation of 
refugees. Fiji and the Philippines were 
democratic from 1995 – 2005, yet 
refugees were still produced. Although 
Indonesia’s political regime transferred 
from autocracy to democracy during this 
period, similar numbers of refugees were 
produced under both types of regimes.  
 
Discriminatory  
Political 
Systems 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
The Indo-Fijian, Madurese, and Moro 
ethnic groups are substantially under-
represented in political office and 
participation. The Fijian Constitution 
includes provisions designed to 
disadvantage Indo-Fijians. No political 
discrimination of Malaitans exists in the 
Solomon Islands, so is not a factor in the 
creation of refugees there. 
 
Exclusionary  
National 
Ideologies 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
Exclusionary national ideologies exist in 
practice in all four countries. Ethnic 
nationalism dominates in practice in Fiji, 
Indonesia and the Solomon Islands, 
whereas religious nationalism dominates 
in practice in the Philippines.  
 
Lack of Human 
Rights 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
During the ethnic conflicts, all countries 
were rated at a level four on the PTS in 
2000. Therefore, a lack of human rights 
seems to have contributed to the creation 
of refugees in these countries. 
 
Role of External 
Parties 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
The Malaitan and Madurese ethnic 
groups did not receive any external 
support and did not create external 
refugees. However, the Indo-Fijians and 
Moro ethnic groups received external 
support from ethnic brethren which may 
have encouraged their external refugees.  
 
 122
Table 21 (above) summarises those political variables analysed in this chapter and shows 
that relatively few differences exist between the political variables conducive to creating 
refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Exclusionary 
national ideologies and a lack of human rights were present during all of the ethnic 
conflicts and discriminatory political systems existed in three of the four conflicts. Higher 
discrepancies exist between the role of external parties and the processes of state-building 
within the countries as a factor in creating refugees. The type of political regime seems to 
have little impact on facilitating refugee flows.    
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Chapter 5: Economic/Social, Cultural/Perceptual and Intervening 
Variables 
 
Here other aspects of the framework outlined in Chapter 3 are applied to Fiji, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Ten different economic/social and 
cultural/perceptual characteristics are examined in an attempt to determine why some 
countries have created refugees during their ethnic conflicts, while others have not. The 
impact that five common intervening factors may have had in facilitating refugee flows 
during these conflicts are also discussed. 
 
Economic Variables 
 
Poverty, economic underdevelopment, and discriminatory economic systems are three 
major economic factors which are commonly associated with creating conditions 
conducive to generating refugees within developing countries. The existence of these 
factors within a developing state is believed to increase the likelihood of political 
instability and recession, which often lead to refugee flows (Edmonston, 1992; Wood, 
1994). 
 
Poverty  
 
The level of poverty that existed during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is measured using the “Human Poverty Index for 
Developing Countries” (HPI-1), produced by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). This Index can best determine levels of relative poverty between 
ethnic groups within states, through comparing their lack of resources with those of other 
groups in society. Such a measure should be useful in determining whether relative 
poverty has any impact on refugee production. The HPI-1 measures deprivations in three 
fundamental areas:  
 
1. long and healthy life - vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as 
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40; 
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2. knowledge - exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as 
measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and,  
3. a decent standard of living - lack of access to overall economic provisioning, 
as measured by the unweighted average of two indicators, the percentage of 
the population without sustainable access to an improved water source and 
the percentage of children under weight for age (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Table 22: Human and Income Poverty: Developing Countries (2005) 
 
Variable Fiji Indonesia Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Human Poverty Index 
(HPI-1) Rank 
 
49 
 
41 
 
35 
 
N/A 
Human Poverty Index 
(HPI-1) Value (%) 
 
21.3 
 
17.8 
 
16.3 
 
N/A 
Probability at birth of 
not surviving to age 40 
(% of cohort), 2000-05 
 
7.0 
 
11.2 
 
7.2 
 
14.1 
Adult illiteracy rate (% 
ages 15 and above), 2003 
 
7.114 
 
12.1b 
 
7.4 
 
N/A 
Population without 
sustainable access to an 
improved water source 
(%), 2002 
 
5315 
 
22 
 
15 
 
30 
Children underweight 
for age (% under age 5) 
(HPI..1), 1995-2003 
 
816 
 
26 
 
31 
 
21c 
Population living below 
$1 a day (%), 1990-2003 
 
N/A 
 
7.5 
 
14.6 
 
N/A 
Population living below 
$2 a day (%), 1990-2003 
 
N/A 
 
52.4 
 
46.4 
 
N/A 
Population living below 
the national poverty line 
(%), 1990-2002 
 
N/A 
 
27.1 
 
36.8 
 
N/A 
HPI-1 rank minus 
income poverty rank 
 
N/A 
 
10 
 
-4 
 
N/A 
Source: UNDP, 2005.  
 
14 Data refers to a year between 1995 and 1999. 
15 UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). 2003. The State of the World's Children 2004. New York: 
Oxford University Press. Data refers to 2000. 
16 UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). 2004. The State of the World's Children 2005. New York: 
Oxford University Press. Data refers to a year or period other than that specified, differ from the standard 
definition or refer to only part of a country. 
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The table above shows that Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines ranked above the halfway 
mark of the 117 developing countries analysed in the HPI-1. This indicates that their 
levels of poverty are not as serious compared to those of other developing countries. Fiji 
and the Solomon Islands have some missing data which indicates that either the statistical 
data is unavailable, out-dated, or of an unreliable quality. This makes it difficult to 
accurately quantify specify specific income poverty trends in these countries. This may 
indicate that the levels of poverty within Fiji and the Solomon Islands are so bad that data 
has not been collected, which, if true, suggests that these countries should produce more 
refugees than their Southeast Asian neighbours.  
 
Fiji: Fiji’s poverty levels grew substantially within all ethnic groups and rural and urban 
populations during the period 1995 – 2005. A 1997 UNDP study shows that although 
Fiji’s economy grew by 25 percent from 1977-91, the proportion of households living in 
poverty was estimated to have increased from about 25 percent in 1997 to about 40 
percent in 2000, with the most poor generally being indigenous-Fijian (Anere et al, 2001, 
pp. 44-5; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 543). The Task Force concluded that while the 
greatest amount of poverty is found in villages, the most intense poverty is found in urban 
squatter settlements (The World Bank Group, 2004). 
 
The most recent survey (the 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey) 
states that 29 percent of the indigenous Fijian population and 28 percent of the Indo-
Fijian population live below the poverty line. While slightly more indigenous Fijians than 
Indo-Fijians live under the poverty line in urban areas (27:24 percent), the situation is 
reversed in rural areas. 41 percent of Indo-Fijians compared to 30 percent of indigenous 
Fijians live below the poverty line in rural areas, which may be due to a lack of 
accessibility to resources (Fijilive, 24 November 2005). The Poverty Task Force supports 
this idea, stating that the majority of poverty experienced by Indo-Fijian landless cane-
cutters is caused by a lack of access to land or to regular employment, as they can only 
secure work during the cane-cutting season (The World Bank Group, 2004). According to 
the most recent 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, the variation in 
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poverty levels between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians is not overly significant. 
Poverty therefore may not have played a significant role in the creation of Indo-Fijian 
refugees. 
 
Indonesia: Indonesia also suffers from high economic imbalances and poverty levels 
(Freedom House, 2005, p. 293). Although the proportion of people living below the 
poverty line declined from 60 percent in 1970 to an estimated 17.5 percent in 2002, the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 sharply altered this trend (The World Bank Group, 2004; 
US Department of State, 2005). During that crisis, the real poverty incidence increased by 
about 15 million people. The recovery of the economy and the better political situation of 
1999 enabled a gradual deduction of the number of poor people – a trend which has 
continued until 2003 (the latest figures available). In 2003, about half of Indonesia’s 
approximately 37.3 million (17.4 percent) poor were situated in Java and Bali, with the 
remainder spread across Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other islands. 
Approximately 2.2 - 8.6 million people or 20-22 percent of the total population lived 
below the poverty line (Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 1999, p. 596; 
Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 2003, pp. 575-79). 
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Table 23: Population below the Poverty Line in Areas by Province, 
2002/03(Indonesia) 
 
Province Number of Population Below the 
Poverty Line (thousand) 
Percentage of Population Below 
the Poverty Line 
 2002 2003 2002 2003 
Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
1,199.9 1,254.2 29.83 29.76 
Sumatera Utara 1,883.9 1,883.6 15.84 15.89 
Sumatera Barat 496.4 501.1 11.57 11.24 
Riau 722.4 751.3 13.61 13.52 
Jambi 326.9 327.3 13.18 12.74 
Sumatera Selatan 1,600.6 1,397.1 22.32 21.54 
Bengkulu 372.4 344.2 22.70 22.69 
Lampung 1,650.7 1,568.0 24.05 22.63 
Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung 
106.2 98.2 11.62 10.06 
DKI Jakarta 286.9 294.1 3.42 3.42 
Jawa Barat 4,938.2 4,899.0 13.38 12.90 
Jawa Tengah 7,308.3 6,980.0 23.06 21.78 
Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta 
635.7 636.8 20.14 19.86 
Jawa Timur 7,701.2 7,578.4 21.91 20.94 
Banten 786.7 855.8 9.22 9.56 
Bali 221.8 246.1 6.89 7.34 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 1,145.8 1,054.8 27.76 26.34 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 1,206.5 1,166.0 30.74 28.63 
Kalimantan Barat 
(West) 
644.2 583.7 15.46 14.79 
Kalimantan Tengah 
(Central) 
231.4 207.7 11.88 11.37 
Kalimantan Selatan 
(South) 
259.8 259.0 8.51 8.16 
Kalimantan Timur 
(East) 
313.0 328.6 12.20 12.15 
Sulawesi Utara 229.3 191.6 11.22 9.01 
Sulawesi Tengah 564.6 509.1 24.89 23.04 
Sulawesi Selatan 1,309.2 1,301.8 15.88 15.85 
Sulawesi Tenggara 463.8 428.4 24.22 22.84 
Gorontalo 274.7 257.7 32.12 29.25 
Maluku 418.8 399.9 34.78 32.85 
Maluku Utara 110.1 118.8 14.03 13.92 
Papua 984.7 917.0 41.80 39.03 
Indonesia 38,394.0 37,339.4 18.20 17.42 
 
Source: Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 2003, p. 588. 
 
The table above breaks down the population of Indonesia that was below the poverty line 
in rural and urban areas in 2002 and 2003 by province. It shows that Kalimantan Tengah 
(Central), where ethnic conflict and refugee flows occurred in 2001, has a lower 
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percentage of people below the poverty line (11.88 percent in 2002) compared to the 
national average (18.20 percent in 2002). Observers have also agreed that little difference 
existed in relative poverty levels between Dayak and Madurese during the Kalimantan 
conflict, as both were similarly poor (Bertrand, 2004, p. 48). This suggests that poverty 
was not an overly significant factor in the creation of refugees during the ethnic conflict 
in Kalimantan. 
 
Philippines: Wide disparities in wealth exist both between regions and ethnic groups in 
the Philippines. A recent Household Income and Expenditure survey states that the 
richest 30 percent of families in the Philippines earned 66.3 percent of national income, 
whereas the poorest 30 percent received approximately eight percent (US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 1). Many of these poor are situated in the rural areas of Mindanao, where 
refugees fleeing the ethnic conflict are created. It is currently estimated that 49 percent of 
the rural population in Mindanao are unable to meet their basic needs (US Department of 
State, 2005, pp. 1, 12). This is because much of the wealth in Mindanao is 
disproportionately placed with most belonging to Catholics or to foreign investors (US 
Department of State, 2005, p. 16). It seems that a few dozen powerful families from the 
Suharto regime continue to exercise an overarching role in politics and hold an outsized 
share of land and corporate wealth (Freedom House, 2005, p. 503). 
 
The table below breaks the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP) for 2003 into 
regions, which is useful for analysing comparative poverty trends. It shows that in 2003 
the ARMM was the poorest region within the Philippines, earning just 0.9 percent of the 
country’s total GDP, compared to the richest region, the National Capital Region (NCR), 
which earned 35.7 percent of the country’s total GDP. 
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Table 24: Philippines: GDP by Region, 2003 
(At current prices unless otherwise indicated) 
 
Region Total (P bn) % of national 
total 
% of real change 
2003/1998 
GDP per head (P) 
Luzon 
National Capital 
Region 
 
1,536.6 
 
35.7 
 
21.2 
 
144,203 
Cordillera 
Administrative 
Region 
98.3 2.3 28.7 68, 100 
Ilocos 124.3 2.9 13.0 28,065 
Cagayan Valley 82.1 1.9 29.6 27,538 
Central Luzon 349.2 8.1 21.3 38,551 
Calabarzon17 506.4 11.8 N/A 44,683 
Mimaropaa 91.1 2.1 N/A 35,861 
Bicol 112.0 2.6 16.5 22,650 
Visayas 
Western Visayas 
 
283.7 
 
6.6 
 
24.8 
 
43,712 
Central Visayas 298.4 6.9 23.8 48,882 
Eastern Visayas 100.9 2.3 16.8 26,524 
Mindanao 
Zamboanga 
Peninsular 
 
97.6 
 
2.3 
 
12.0 
 
31,870 
Northern 
Mindanao 
196.5 4.6 52.8 51,858 
Davao Region 188.2 4.4 -11.5 47,348 
Soccsksargen18 142.0 3.3 63.6 40,784 
Caraga 55.4 1.3 13.9 25,039 
Autonomous 
Region of 
Muslim 
Mindanao 
(ARMM) 
 
37.2 
 
0.9 
 
13.3 
 
12,291 
 
Source: National Statistical Co-ordination Board in The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, p. 30.  
 
The statistics in the above table constitute part of a long history of poverty within the 
ARMM and wider Mindanao. From 1991-2000, the average percentage of families in 
poverty rose by 15 percent in the ARMM to reach 66 percent, whereas elsewhere in the 
Philippines it decreased from 40 to 34 percent (International Alert, December 2003, p. 
58). Given these appalling figures, poverty seems to be a major factor in the creation of 
refugees in the ARMM. 
 
 
17 The region of Southern Tagalog has been split into Calabarzon and Mimaropa. 
 
18 Previously known as Central Mindanao, Soccsksargen is an acronym for South Cotabato, Cotabato, 
Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General Santos City. 
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Solomon Islands: Anere et al (2001, p. 31) report that declining standards of living and 
increased poverty in both rural and urban areas contributed to the ethnic conflict in the 
Solomon Islands. In 1999, the Solomon Islands fell from its ranking of 123rd under the 
Human Development Index to 148th. Furthermore, in 2002 the capital of the Solomon 
Islands, Honiara, had the lowest ranking on the Human Poverty Index (Solomon Islands 
Government, 2002). During this period, 93 percent of families were classified by the 
government as in the “low-income” bracket, and over 50 percent of income in Honiara 
was owned by less than one percent of households, many of them non-Guali (Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, March 2004, p. 33). These statistics indicate that although 
poverty was significant within all sectors of society during the ethnic conflict, Malaitans 
were generally less poor than Guali in Guadalcanal. Therefore poverty was not a 
significant factor in the generation of Malaitan refugees during in the Solomon Islands. 
 
Economic Underdevelopment 
Economic underdevelopment is closely associated with poverty in the developing world 
and is assessed according to six key indicators derived from the ideas of some important 
refugee theorists (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 259; Newman, 2003, p. 4; Brown, 1996, p. 19). 
These include: balance-of-payment problems, deteriorating terms of trade, indebtedness, 
inflation, high unemployment levels and resource competition (especially concerning 
land). Of these variables, the first five are able to be measured quantitatively but the last; 
resource competition is more difficult to measure quantitatively, so a qualitative analysis 
is provided instead. The numbers in bold indicate the year that the majority of refugees 
were created from each ethnic conflict in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands. Due to the lack of data available for the Pacific states, the national 
figures for these countries should be treated with some caution (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 71). 
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Table 25: Economic Underdevelopment: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
the Solomon Islands 
 
Variable Country 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average  
Fiji 3.9 -0.6 -3.2 -5.5 -0.1 1.9 -0.6 
Indonesia 0.8 3.1 -0.8 2.0 1.8 -0.3 1.1 
Philippines 0.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.1 
Overall 
Balance of 
Payments 
(% of GDP) 
Solomon Is -0.2 -6.7 -4.0 1.9 8.7 N/A -0.06 
 (2003) 
Fiji 0.1 11.3 -13.9 -29.9 -24.1 -9.3 -10.96 
Indonesia -40.7 16.0 -11.4 2.3 9.9 -12.1 -6 
Philippines -20.6 73.0 -165.3 28.7 -66.6 -35.6 -31.06 
External Trade 
Balance 
(annual change 
%) 
Solomon Is 467.6 -343.1 -9.3 74.7 207.9 80.0 79.63 
Fiji 251.2 209.2 188.5 209.6 263.6 N/A 224.42 
(1995-2003) 
Indonesia 124398 144407 134045 131755 134389 N/A 133, 798.8 
(1995-2003) 
Philippines 39391 60850 58499 60090 62663 N/A 56, 298.6 (1995-
2003)  
External 
indebtedness 
(US dollars, as 
of end of year) 
in millions – 
total debt 
outstanding 
and disbursed 
Solomon Is 158.7 155.4 162.7 180.4 185.7 N/A 168.58 (1995-
2003) 
Fiji 0.2 
(1999) 
3.0 2.3 1.6 N/A N/A 3.04  
(1998-2002) 
Indonesia N/A 3.7 11.5 11.9 6.8 6.1 N/A 
Philippines 6.0 
(1999) 
4.0 6.8 3.0 3.5 6.0 5.8  
(1998-2002) 
Inflation 
(consumer 
price; average 
%) 
Solomon Is 8.0 
(1999) 
7.3 6.8 7.3 N/A N/A 8.36  
(1998-2002) 
Fiji 5.4 12.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Indonesia 7.2 6.1 8.1 9.1 9.9 N/A 8.08  
(1995-2003) 
Philippines 8.4 10.1 9.8 10.2 10.1 10.9 9.72 
(1995-2003) 
Unemployment  
Rate 
(% of labour 
force) 
Solomon 
Is 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Note: The variables measuring the overall balance of payments, external trade balance, external 
indebtedness and unemployment rates are taken from the Asian Development Bank statistics. The inflation 
rate is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit’s statistics. 
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The table above shows that Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have 
experienced more overall balance of payments deficits than surpluses within the last 
decade. Furthermore, despite the severe fluctuation of the external trade balance within 
all four countries from 1995 – 2004, their external indebtedness still remained high. This 
is because the financing requirements of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon 
Islands have traditionally been met through aid and by borrowing money from official 
and private sources.  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 particularly affected the Indonesian economy and to a 
lesser extent the Filipino economy, which was aided by the large inflow of remittances 
from Filipinos overseas, totalling US$8.5 billion in 2004 (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2005, pp. 23, 28). During the crisis, the Indonesian currency was devalued by over 
5000 percent over six months. In the following year, the Indonesian economy shrank by 
13.8 percent, which was the largest single-year contraction for any country since the 
Great Depression, and unemployment rose to 15-20 percent (Freedom House, 2005, p. 
293; US Department of State, 2005a). The IMF’s continued refusal to release funds in 
support of the government’s economic reforms, led to a rapid decline in Indonesian 
currency and markets. However, Indonesia’s levels of economic development improved 
following Megawati’s accession to presidency in 2001 and the release of an IMF US$395 
million loan to the country (which expired in 2003) combined with the CGI’s financial 
assistance and economic reforms (Europa, 2004, p. 2129; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 293-
4).  
 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess comparative trends regarding the inflation and 
unemployment rates between the four countries, due to a lack of data. Given this 
difficulty, it can not be deduced that the level of economic underdevelopment, as assessed 
by each country’s overall balance of payments, external trade balance, and external 
indebtedness was markedly and consistently greater during the years that it produced the 
majority of its refugees. This finding runs contrary to the UN “root cause” debate, but 
supports Zolberg et al’s conclusions (1989, p. 260). 
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However, the sixth economic underdevelopment indicator, resource competition 
concerning land (which could not be measured quantitatively), is perhaps a better 
indicator of refugee production in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands. This is because subsistence farming is widespread within these developing 
countries and not all sectors of society are benefiting equally from the process of 
modernisation. The variable, resource competition concerning land, is applied 
qualitatively to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands below, in order 
to assess whether it was a factor in creating refugees during their ethnic conflicts.  
 
Fiji:  Resource competition concerning land increased from 1995 – 2005, as many 
indigenous Fijians failed to become fully integrated in the modernisation of economic 
production in Fiji through cash crop farming. The sugarcane industry subsequently 
suffered from economic underdevelopment, as many indigenous Fijian landowners who 
leased land to Indo-Fijian cash crop farmers took back their land on the expiry of land 
leases, despite their lack of experience in sugarcane production (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2003, pp. 22-4; US Department of State, 2005, p. 7). This meant that 
many Indo-Fijian farmers were left landless, which exacerbated ethnic tensions and 
feelings of relative deprivation between indigenous and Indo-Fijians, providing an 
impetus for refugee movements. 
 
Indonesia: During the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, resource competition over land 
between ethnic groups was significant as multinational corporations’ modernised 
economic production by replacing subsistence production with export-oriented 
production. The New Order regime therefore created an environment of impunity for 
land-grabbing by plantations and timber concessions, with disputes often arising after 
Madurese farmers took possession of land previously owned by other ethnic groups (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, p. 30; Islam, 2003, p. 219; Bertrand, 2004, p. 57). 
This created an environment of ethnic conflict and the potential for refugee flows.  
 
Philippines: Resource competition concerning land between Moro and non-Moro was 
high during the ethnic conflict as multinational corporations, invited by the Filipino 
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Government, set up industries in Mindanao and modernised economic production in the 
area. This pattern of economic development worked against the Moro, because it replaced 
subsistence production with export-oriented production, increasing levels of poverty 
among the Moro community, providing a greater incentive to flee (Islam, 2003, p. 219).  
 
Solomon Islands: Resource competition concerning land was high during the ethnic 
conflict, as about 90 percent of the population relied on subsistence agriculture (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 70).  As violent conflict can disrupt food 
production and distribution in subsistence economies, this provides a strong influence in 
facilitating refugee movements, which seems to have occurred in Guadalcanal (Newland, 
1993, pp. 151-2).  
 
 
Discriminatory Economic Systems 
The level of economic discrimination experienced by the ethnic groups which produced 
refugees during the conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands 
is measured using the index below. The Index ranges from “no economic discrimination” 
to the highest level of economic discrimination: “restrictive policies.” It assesses 
economic discrimination according to three major characteristics: historical marginality, 
significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations, and the nature of 
the state’s public policies. As historical marginality was discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 102 -
109) and poverty was examined earlier in this chapter (pp. 123-130), the following 
section simply analyses whether the ethnic groups which created refugees were under-
represented in desirable occupations and the nature of the state’s public policies regarding 
them. The higher the level of economic discrimination the groups experienced during the 
conflict, the higher the number of refugees likely to be produced.  
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Table 26: Economic Discrimination Index 
 
Economic Discrimination 
Index 
 
Characteristics of Economic 
Discrimination 
 
Examples 
No Discrimination - Malaitans in the Solomon Islands  
Historical 
Neglect/Remedial Policies 
Significant poverty and under 
representation in desirable occupations 
due to historical marginality, neglect, 
or restrictions. Public policies are 
designed to improve the group’s 
material well-being.  
 
Historical Neglect/No 
Remedial Policies 
Significant poverty and under 
representation in desirable occupations 
due to historical marginality, neglect, 
or restrictions No social practice of 
deliberate exclusion. Few or no public 
policies aim at improving the group’s 
material well-being. 
Madurese in Kalimantan, Indonesia 
Social Exclusion/Neutral 
Policies 
Significant poverty and under 
representation due to prevailing social 
practice by dominant groups. Formal 
public policies toward the group are 
neutral or, if positive, inadequate to 
offset active and widespread 
discrimination. 
Moro in the Philippines 
Restrictive Policies Public policies (formal exclusion 
and/or recurring repression) 
substantially restrict the group’s 
economic opportunities by contrast 
with other groups. 
Indo-Fijians in Fiji 
No Basis for Judgment -  
 
Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 39. 
 
Fiji (Economic representation and public policies): As previously discussed, Indo-
Fijians are under-represented in desirable occupations due to historical marginality; but 
do not suffer from significant poverty compared to indigenous Fijians. In fact, Indo-
Fijians are economically advantaged compared to most urban indigenous Fijians but are 
subject to more formal economic restrictions which have existed since Fiji’s colonisation. 
“Affirmative action” programmes implemented by the Fijian government since its 
independence are designed to foster greater levels of economic equality between the 
races, but in practice economically favour a select minority of indigenous Fijians. It is the 
educated urban elite indigenous Fijians who are most able to take advantage of these 
programmes; who on equity considerations least deserve these entitlements. Furthermore, 
such programmes are aimed at increasing the number of indigenous Fijians in business 
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rather than reducing the number of unemployed and impoverished youth who are 
susceptible to political manipulation during upheavals.  These programmes can therefore 
actually exacerbate the income disparities within each group and heighten interethnic 
group tensions (Chand, 1997, p. 2; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 550).  Such public policies 
employ formal exclusion which may substantially restrict Indo-Fijians’ economic 
opportunities. Therefore, Indo-Fijians suffer from “restrictive policies” under the 
Economic Discrimination Index. Such policies can generate inequality, foster feelings of 
resentment and lead to conflict and refugee flows, which occurred in Fiji during 2000.  
 
Indonesia (Economic representation and public policies): The majority of Madurese in 
Kalimantan during the ethnic conflict were underrepresented in desirable occupations. 
However, this situation was not unique to just the Madurese, as many other ethnic groups, 
including the Dayak, held similarly less desirable occupations. Only the Chinese were 
relatively wealthier than other ethnic groups. Most Madurese were involved in 
transportation, labouring, trading, or farming (Bertrand, 2004, p. 48). Madurese have also 
not been subject to any less unfavourable state public policies than other ethnic groups in 
Kalimantan. Under the New Order regime, Madurese visibly progressed economically 
which increased Dayak resentment (Bertrand, 2004, pp. 51, 55). Madurese therefore 
suffered from “Historical Neglect/No Remedial Policies” under the Economic 
Discrimination Index.  
 
Philippines (Economic representation and public policies): During the period 1995 – 
2005, the Filipino government implemented several public policies aimed at improving 
the Moros’ material well-being. The 1996 Peace Agreement between the government and 
the MNLF granted the latter group the status of overseer of economic development 
projects in all provinces of Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council 
for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established and the leader of the MNLF (Nur 
Misuari) was made the region’s Governor. In 1997, former President Ramos publicly 
announced that “all legislative measures aiming to promote economic and social 
conditions of the Muslims and indigenous cultural groups in the country will be given 
priority.” Consequently, the government enacted various developmental projects, 
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including road and irrigation construction, with Muslim contractors in Mindanao (Islam, 
2003, pp. 206-7). However, despite such rhetoric, limited progress was made in greatly 
improving the Moros’ economic situation and the ARMM still remains the poorest 
province in the Philippines. This is partly because foreign investors have been detracted 
due to the continuing violence (MAR, 2004). Therefore despite the well-meaning policies 
the government initiated to improve the Moros’ economic status, these have been 
inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination caused by their historical 
marginality. This information indicates that the Moro fit under the category of “social 
exclusion” in the Economic Discrimination Index. The feelings of resentment Moro 
experience over their inequality, has led to conflict and refugee flows in Mindanao. 
 
Solomon Islands (Economic representation and public policies): During the period 
1995 – 2005, some argue that the government’s public policies have favoured the 
Malaitans, at the expense of other ethnic groups. In 2001, the Government paid SI$17.4 
million compensation to former members of the MEF for alleged property damage. 
Furthermore, in 2002 it paid a SI$26 million “allowance” to police officers – the majority 
of whom were Malaitans (Kabutaulaka, 2004, pp. 395). The creation of jobs in various 
sections of the police is also believed to have grossly favoured Malaitans, as the 
government paid unscheduled allowances to Special Constables (former militants from 
the ethnic conflict who were allowed to join the police force as part of the peace 
agreement) (Anere et al, 2001, p. 33; Europa, 2004, p. 3813). Malaitans therefore do not 
suffer from economic discrimination under the Index and this was not a factor in the 
creation of Malaitan refugees during the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands. 
 
Social Variables 
Three standard social factors are commonly associated with the production of refugees: 
population growth rate, population density, and the total fertility rate. The argument is 
that a higher population level, population density, and total fertility rate lead to more 
refugee flows (Marshall, 1998; Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996). These three factors are 
analysed in the context of the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
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Solomon Islands, to see whether they had any influence on the creation of refugees within 
those countries. 
 
Population Growth Rate and Population Density 
The table below shows the total population, annual population change, and the population 
density of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands from 1995 – 2004. 
The numbers in bold indicate the year (or the year closest) to when the majority of 
refugees were created from each ethnic conflict in these countries. If the above argument 
is true, then more refugees should be produced during the years with higher levels of 
population, population change, or population density.  
 
Table 27:  Population Variables: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands 
 
Variable Country 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
(1995-2004) 
Fiji 0.768 0.810 0.815 0.826 0.832 0.840 0.815 
Indonesia 194.8 205.8 208.4 211.1 213.7 216.4 208.4 
Philippines 68.4 76.9 78.5 80.2 81.8 83.5 78.2 
Population 
Total 
(million as of 
1 July) 
Solomon Is 0.382 0.459 0.476 0.490 0.508 0.521 0.473  
 
 
Fiji 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.7 1.0 0.9 
Indonesia N/A N/A 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 (2001-4) 
Philippines 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Annual 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
Solomon Is 3.8 3.8 3.7 2.9 3.6 2.6 3.4 
 
Fiji 42 44 45 45 45 46 44.5 
Indonesia 101 108 109 111 112 114 109.2 
Philippines 228 254 260 265 270 276 258.8 
Population 
Density 
(persons per 
square 
kilometre) 
Solomon Is 13 16 16 17 18 18 16.3 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2005.  
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Table 27 shows that a significant difference does not exist between the national 
population total, annual population change, or population density between the years of 
ethnic conflict that each country created the majority of its refugees. Furthermore, the 
years that each country experienced the highest period of growth in these three areas does 
not reflect the years when the majority of refugees were produced. This indicates that 
population total, annual population change, and population density were not important 
factors in the production of refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands. Therefore, imminent population pressure is not a direct cause of refugees, which 
supports Schmeidl’s argument (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299). 
 
A further breakdown of regional population statistics was available for Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Tables 28 – 30 (below) therefore provide a more 
accurate indicator of whether the population variables (population total, annual 
population change, and population density) within the regions that experienced ethnic 
conflict in Indonesia (Central Kalimantan), the Philippines (ARMM), and the Solomon 
Islands (Guadalcanal) had any influence on the creation of refugees.  
 
Indonesia: The table below shows the comparative levels of population density and the 
distribution of Indonesia’s population within Kalimantan by percentage in 2000 and 
2003. The ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan in 2001 produced the majority of the 
province’s refugees, but unfortunately no data was available for this year. Therefore, the 
numbers in bold indicate those population figures closest to 2001, when the majority of 
refugees were created during the ethnic conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 140
 
Table 28: Population and Population Density of Kalimantan’s Provinces, 2000 and 
2003 (Indonesia) 
 
Province of 
Kalimantan 
Percentage of 
total population 
(2000) 
Percentage of 
total population 
(2003) 
Population 
density per 
square kilometre 
(2000) 
Population 
density per 
square kilometre 
(2003) 
Kalimantan Barat 
(West 
Kalimantan) 
 
1.95 
 
1.84 
 
27 
 
27 
Kalimantan 
Tengah 
(Central 
Kalimantan) 
 
0.90 
 
0.85 
 
12 
 
12 
Kalimantan 
Selatah 
(South 
Kalimantan) 
 
1.45 
 
1.48 
 
69 
 
73 
Kalimantan 
Timur 
(East 
Kalimantan) 
 
1.19 
 
1.26 
 
11 
 
12 
 
Source: Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 2003, p. 65. 
 
The data above indicates that only 0.90 percent of Indonesia’s total population was 
situated in Central Kalimantan in 2000, which then had a population of 1,857,000. Of 
this, 50-75 percent was Dayak and 6-7 percent was Madurese (Bamba, 2004, p. 400). As 
the population density of Central Kalimantan in 2000 was only 12 people per square 
kilometre, this was not important in the creation of refugees in Central Kalimantan.  
 
Philippines: Table 29 shows the distribution of the Philippines’ total population, the 
annual growth rate, and the population density by region in 2000, according to the latest 
census. The ethnic conflict in the ARMM in 2003 produced the majority of the province’s 
refugees, but unfortunately no data was available for this year. However, the population 
data for 2000 should provide an indicator as to whether population growth and population 
density in the ARMM may have been conducive to creating greater numbers of refugees 
in 2003 (Marshall, 1998; Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996). The comparative figures for 
the ARMM are marked in bold. 
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Table 29: Philippines’ Population Distribution by Region, 2000 
 
Region Total Population Percent  Annual 
Growth Rate 
1995 – 2000 
Population 
Density  
Philippines 76,504,077 100.00 2.36 255 
National Capital 
Region (NCR) 
9,932,560 12.98 1.06 15,617 
Cordillera 
Administrative 
Region (CAR) 
1,365,412 1.78 1.82 95 
I) Ilocos 4,200,478 5.49 2.15 327 
II) Cagayan Valley 2,813,159 3.68 2.25 105 
III) Central Luzon 8,030,945 10.50 3.20 441 
IV) Southern Tagalog 11,793,655 15.42 3.72 251 
V) Bicol 4,686,669 6.13 1.68 265 
VI) Western Visayas 6,211,038 8.12 1.56 307 
VII) Central Visayas 5,706,953 7.46 2.79 381 
VIII) Eastern Visayas 3,610,355 4.72 1.51 173 
IX) Western 
Mindanao 
3,091,208 4.04 2.18 193 
X) Northern 
Mindanao 
2,747,585 3.59 2.19 196 
XI) Southern 
Mindanao 
5,189,335 6.78 2.60 263 
XII) Central 
Mindanao 
2,598,210 3.40 2.08 179 
XIII) Caraga 2,095,367 2.74 3.86 211 
ARMM 2,412,159 3.15 1.63 111 
 
Sources: NSO, Various Censuses of Population and Housing  
National Statistics Office, Databank and Information Services Division, 01 May 2000. 
 
 
The above table indicates that the ARMM had the third lowest population of the sixteen 
provinces within the Philippines in 2000. It also had the fourth lowest annual population 
growth rate from 1995 – 2000 and third lowest population density of the Filipino 
provinces in 2000. This shows that neither high population, population growth or 
population density were important in the creation of refugees in the ARMM, which 
discredits Edmonston’s (1992) and Weiner’s (1996) arguments, and adds weight to 
Schmeidl’s findings (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299). 
 
Solomon Islands: Table 30 provides a summary of population statistics for each of the 
Solomon Islands’ 10 provinces in 1999, the year when the majority of the country’s 
refugees were created during the ethnic conflict. The numbers in bold indicate the 
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population figures of Guadalcanal, where the ethnic conflict occurred, compared to the 
average population figures for all the provinces.  
 
 
Table 30: Solomon Islands’ Population Statistics by Region, 1999 
 
Province Total population Inter-censal 
annual growth 
rate (%) 
Total fertility rate Population 
displaced due to 
ethnic tension 
(1999) 
Choiseul 20,008 3.0 5.3 316 
Western 62,739 3.2 4.8 1,140 
Isabel 20,421 2.6 4.8 331 
Central 21,577 2.0 4.9 486 
Rennell-Bellona 2,377 2.2 4.9 32 
Guadalcanal 60,275 1.5 5 12,806 
Malaita 122,620 3.3 5.4 12,676 
Makira-Ulawa 31,006 2.7 5.1 584 
Temotu 18,912 1.9 4.1 599 
Honiara 49,107 3.8 3.4 6,339 
All provinces 409,042 2.8 4.8 35,309 
 
Source: 1999 Population and Housing Census/Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002. 
From: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, March 2004, pp. 66-7. 
 
 
According to the table above, Guadalcanal had the third highest population of the 10 
provinces in the Solomon Islands in 1999 (60,275) but had the lowest annual growth rate 
of the provinces (1.5 percent), which was also well below the national average. Turner 
(2005, p. 1464) states that the population density of Guadalcanal in 1999 was 14.4 people 
per square kilometre, which was also lower than the average population density in the 
Solomon Islands of 16.3 people per square kilometre. This indicates that high population 
density and growth rates were not important in the creation of refugees in Guadalcanal, 
which again supports Schmeidl’s arguments (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299). 
 
Total Fertility Rate 
The total fertility rate of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is 
compared in the table below between two periods, 1970 – 1975 and 2000 – 2005. A 
higher total fertility rate should provide an environment that is more conducive to the 
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creation of refugees, as competition for land grows (Weiner, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 
287). 
 
Table 31: Total Fertility Rate: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands  
 
Country Total Fertility Rate % 
(births per woman) 1970-
1975 
Total Fertility Rate % 
(births per woman) 2000-
2005 
Fiji 4.2 2.9 
Indonesia 5.2 2.4 
Philippines 6.0 3.2 
Solomon Islands 
Guadalcanal 
7.2 4.3 
5 (1999) 
East Asia and the Pacific 5.0 1.9 
 
Sources: UNDP, 2005; 1999 Population and Housing Census/Solomon Islands Human Development 
Report 2002 
 
Table 28 shows that the total fertility rate of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands has decreased since 1975. The total fertility rates were therefore 
comparatively lower within these countries during the years they produced the majority 
of their refugees (1999 – 2003). However, while these rates were comparatively lower 
within the countries, they were still higher than the average total fertility rate in East Asia 
and the Pacific from 2000 – 2005, which was 1.9 percent. In particular, the Philippines 
and Guadalcanal province in the Solomon Islands had the highest total fertility rates of 
the four countries within the last decade (3.2 percent and 5 percent respectively). 
However, these high total fertility rates were not matched by a high annual growth rate 
within these countries, which indicates that this was not a significant factor in the creation 
of refugees. For example, Guadalcanal had the lowest annual growth rate of the Solomon 
Islands’ provinces (1.5 percent) and the ARMM also had a comparatively low annual 
growth rate compared to the other Filipino provinces (1.63 percent) (tables 30 and 29).  
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Table 32: Summary of Social/Economic Variables  
 
Evidence of Variable Variable 
Fiji Indonesia Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Description 
 
 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
Poverty was evident in the creation 
of refugees in the ARMM. 
However, poverty was not 
significant in the creation of 
refugees in Fiji, Indonesia and the 
Solomon Islands.  This is because 
the Indo-Fijians, Madurese and 
Malaitans are relatively less poor 
than their indigenous counterparts. 
 
 
 
Economic 
Underdevelopment 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
Only one of the six variables could 
be attributed to providing an 
environment which facilitated 
refugee flows. The variable, 
“resource competition concerning 
land,” was significant in producing 
refugees within all four ethnic 
conflicts. 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
Economic Systems 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
The ethnic groups which produced 
refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines also experienced 
varying levels of economic 
discrimination. However, the 
Malaitans in the Solomon Islands 
suffered from no such 
discrimination. 
 
 
 
Social Change 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Population size, population density, 
and the total fertility rate had no 
impact on the creation of refugees 
within any of the four countries. 
 
 
 
Table 32 shows that resource competition concerning land was the most significant 
economic underdevelopment variable in providing an environment conducive to the 
creation of refugees within the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands. Economic discrimination was important in producing refugees in three 
out of the four ethnic conflicts, but was not a significant factor within the Solomon 
Islands’ conflict. This is because the Solomon Islands’ government made a conscious 
effort to provide economic support to Malaitans (Anere et al, 2001, p. 33; Europa, 2004, 
p. 3813). Significant levels of relative poverty only existed between Moro and non-Moro 
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in the Philippines, largely as a result of the legacy of the Suharto regime (Freedom 
House, 2005, p. 503). The population size, population density, and the total fertility rate 
of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands during their ethnic conflicts 
was not significant in providing an environment conducive to the creation of refugees. 
 
Cultural/Perceptual Variables  
 
Governments sometimes differentiate between ethnic groups based on cultural grounds 
(MAR, 2004, pp. 40-1). In this section, four major cultural discrimination indicators are 
applied to the ethnic groups which produced refugees during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. These include: restrictions on 
religion, restrictions on the use of language, restrictions on appearance, and restrictions 
on behaviour.  
 
Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups 
 
Fiji: The only cultural restriction Indo-Fijians faced during the ethnic conflict related to 
religion. Religious affiliation runs largely along ethnic lines, with indigenous Fijians 
being Christian (52 percent) and Indo-Fijians being mostly Hindu (38 percent). There is 
also a small Muslim population (eight percent). Although the Constitution provides for 
freedom of religion and the government generally respects this right in practice, some 
Indo-Fijians were concerned during the ethnic conflict about their ability to freely express 
their cultural and religious beliefs and to seek protection against attacks by the majority 
indigenous Fijian population (MAR, 2004; Freedom House, 2005, p. 230; CIA, 2005; US 
Department of State, 2005, pp. 4-5). During the 2000 conflict, Indo-Fijians faced 
considerable cultural discrimination as their places of worship were desecrated. Efforts to 
declare Fiji a Christian state only deepened Indo-Fijians’ feelings of discrimination 
(Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 545-7).  
 
Indonesia: The Madurese did not experience any overt cultural restrictions during the 
ethnic conflict in Kalimantan. This may be because Madurese are part of the 88 percent 
of Indonesia’s total population which are Muslim (Europa, 2004, p. 2141). The 
government also recognises Islam as one of the country’s five official faiths, which also 
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include: Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Adherents to these faiths 
have little difficulty in obtaining the compulsory National Identity Card (KTP), which 
identifies their religion and is required to register births, marriages, and divorces 
(Freedom House, 2005, p. 296). 
 
Philippines: During the ethnic conflict in the ARMM, Moro encountered some cultural 
restrictions, mainly relating to religion. While the majority of Filipinos are Roman 
Catholic, comprising 80.9 percent of the total population, Moro are Muslim, and 
comprise five percent of the total population (2000 census) (CIA, 2005; US Department 
of State, 2005, p. 8). Although the Filipino Constitution provides for freedom of religion 
and the government generally respects this right in practice, some Moro reported 
difficulty renting rooms in boarding houses or being hired for rental work if they used 
their real names or wore distinctive Muslim dress. As a result, some Muslims used 
Christian pseudonyms and did not wear distinctive dress when applying for housing or 
jobs (US Department of State, 2005, p. 8).  
 
Solomon Islands: Malaitans did not experience any cultural restrictions during the ethnic 
conflict, as the Solomon Islands is relatively culturally homogenous compared to Fiji, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. The religious composition of the Solomon Islands is also 
not defined according to ethnic group. Instead, over 90 percent of the population belong 
to one of the five established Christian dominations. These churches form the Solomon 
Islands Christian Association (SICA) (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 591).  
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Table 33: Summary of Cultural/Perceptual Variables 
 
Evidence of Variable Variable 
Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Description 
 
 
Restrictions on Religion 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
The Indo-Fijians and 
Moro experienced some 
restrictions on religion 
during the ethnic 
conflicts in Fiji and the 
Philippines. 
Restrictions on Use of 
Language 
? ? ? ? - 
Restrictions on 
Appearance 
? ? ? ? - 
Restrictions on 
Behaviour 
? ? ? ? - 
All other types of 
cultural restrictions 
? ? ? ? - 
 
 
The above table shows that not many cultural restrictions were imposed on the ethnic 
groups which produced refugees during the conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and the Solomon Islands. The only cultural restrictions imposed related to restrictions on 
religion and these were only evident in Fiji and the Philippines, perhaps because their 
belief systems did not conform to the state’s predominant religion. 
 
Intervening Variables  
 
Five major intervening variables, which act as facilitators, have been identified as most 
conducive to generating external refugee movements. These include:  
i) less fighting in border areas; 
ii)  relaxed land border controls;  
iii) governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; 
iv) non- governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; and, 
v) sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state. 
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Less fighting in border areas 
This variable is only applicable to the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, Indonesia, because 
Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have no land borders. Kalimantan has a 
land border with two Malaysian provinces, Sarawak and Sabah. During the intermittent 
ethnic conflict in Kalimantan from 1996-2001, fighting was limited to the main centres of 
Sanggau Ledo and Sambas (West Kalimantan in 1996 and 1999) and Sampit (Central 
Kalimantan in 2001) (Bamba, 2004, p. 399). There is no evidence to suggest that fighting 
occurred along the border areas during the ethnic conflict, which may act as a facilitator 
in encouraging potential external refugees to cross the border into Malaysia order to reach 
safety (Schmeidl, 1998, p. 26).  
 
Relaxed land border controls 
Relaxed border controls and more generous immigration policies of refugee-receiving 
states may act as facilitators in encouraging potential external refugee movements to 
occur (Loescher, 1992, p. 41; Gordenker, 1987, p. 183). However, such policies are likely 
to depend on whether the refugees are perceived as being beneficial in contributing to the 
receiving state’s power base. Again this intervening variable is only applicable to 
Indonesia because it is the only country examined with a land border. Information was 
unavailable regarding Indonesia’s border controls during the ethnic conflict. However, 
Malaysia employed strict border controls in preparation for a possible influx of 
Indonesian external refugees. For example, Malaysia’s Sarawak state increased the 
number of guards on its border with Kalimantan and more police and marine patrols were 
stationed in the waters around Sarawak and Sabah and in the Malacca Straits. Malaysian 
troops stationed along Sarawak’s border were reportedly ordered to ask any would-be 
illegal immigrants to return home or to detain them for future deportation. Perhaps as a 
result, no external refugees were generated from the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan.  
 
 
Governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict 
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Fiji: Fiji’s deposed coalition government provided limited assistance to Indo-Fijian 
refugees created by the ethnic conflict. Instead, it sought international help to grant 
refugee status to the thousands of Indo-Fijian refugees caused by violence after the 2000 
coup (BBC, 26 July 2001).  
Indonesia: The Indonesian government recognised internal refugees created by the ethnic 
conflict as citizens and provided some assistance. Although the Indonesian Security 
Force’s response to the conflict was initially slow, the government implemented several 
effective refugee policies. It arranged evacuations of Madurese by boat to Java, set up 
temporary and relocation housing for most internal refugees in 12 relocation sites, and 
allocated 11,000 families of agricultural background with two hectares of agricultural 
land per family. In total, 1,259 households chose the alternative option of a government 
local settlement “empowerment” package of IDR five million (US$600) per family to 
arrange their own accommodation and living (Global IDP Database, 2004). Additionally, 
the Indonesian government developed a national coordinating body, Bakornas PBP to 
formulate national policies on the accelerated handling of internal refugees in Indonesia. 
It was mandated to completely resolve all internal refugee problems by the end of 2002 
and indeed all of the internal refugee camps in Pontianak have since been cleared 
(Bambas, 2004, p. 405).  
 
The government also established the National Coordinating Board for Tackling Disasters 
and Refugees Management which formulated the “National Policies on Refugee 
Management in Indonesia,” which were agreed on by cabinet in September 2001 
(Bambas, 2004, p. 414). It has since applied a strategy consisting of three options: return, 
empowerment, and resettlement. Under its return policy, the government aims to 
peacefully return internal refugees to their normal livelihoods and prior living places. 
Under the empowerment policy, the government aims to provide facilities and job 
opportunities to the refugees to establish new lives in the communities to which they have 
fled. With its resettlement policy, the government hopes to resettle refugees in new 
locations through transmigration programmes (Bambas, 2004, p. 404). However, in 
January 2004 the government reclassified its internal refugees as “vulnerable people,” 
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shifting the responsibility for basic welfare and local integration from the central 
government to provincial authorities and causing regional discrepancies in assistance. 
 
Philippines: The government generally acknowledged its responsibilities concerning 
internal refugees created from the ethnic conflict in the ARMM and has assisted them 
through the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Office of Civil 
Defence, the National Red Cross, and local authorities (Global IDP Project, 2005, pp. 7-
8). In 2001, both MILF and the Filipino government formally agreed to ensure the safe 
return of internal refugees to their villages of origin. In May 2002, additional 
implementing guidelines were agreed upon (“Implementing Guidelines on the 
Rehabilitation aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001”), to provide for the safe 
return of refugees. The Agreement also provides technical and financial assistance to 
refugees to rebuild their houses and reparations were awarded by the government for the 
properties lost and/or destroyed by the fighting (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 6).  
 
Since October 2004, an 18-month government – United Nations programme has been 
conducting a rehabilitation and resettlement programme addressing the needs of the 
estimated 60,000 internal refugees unable to return home (Global IDP Project, 2005). A 
Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), involving all key stakeholders including the MILF, was 
also conducted during 2004 in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao and is due to be 
completed by the end of September 2005 (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). Under the 
programme, over 50 percent of the targeted 5,800 core shelter units were completed by 
early 2004 and another 241 core shelters built between October 2004 and March 2005. 
However, reported shortcomings exist between the positive intentions and statements 
made by the government and their practical implementation. For example, according to 
Mindanews, 94 people died in evacuation centres in North Cotabo province in Mindanao 
due to food shortages (Global IDP Project, 2005; USCRI, 2005). Such shortcomings may 
result from a lack of capacity of national and local institutions to effectively address the 
scale of displacement and from a lack of funding. As a result, governmental assistance is 
often short-term and inadequate to meet the needs of internal refugees (Global IDP 
Project, 2005, pp. 7-8).  
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Solomon Islands: The government was indecisive during the ethnic conflict and provided 
very little assistance to internal refugees, who generally relied on their extended families 
and subsistence farming for support (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 587; US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 5). Returnees were only provided with a three-month supply of 
supplementary food rations and it was assumed that other local community members 
would assist the returnees in obtaining their food requirements. Many requested 
additional food assistance but did not receive it (Global IDP Project, November 2004). 
 
The government also did not provide adequate and comprehensive compensation for 
damage or lost property to those citizens affected by the ethnic conflict, although 
payments were made to MEF members. By contrast, the Taiwanese government made the 
equivalent of US$6 million available for compensation to the Solomon Islands’ refugees 
(USCR, 2002). RAMSI, the National Disaster Management Office and the Guadalcanal 
Province Disaster Committee have since assisted the repatriation of refugees employing 
community development programmes to support their reintegration and military escorts 
to ensure their protection on return (Global IDP Project, November 2004).  
 
Non- governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict 
Fiji: During the ethnic conflict in Fiji, several coalition groupings of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) were formed in order to put greater pressure on the Fijian 
government to reduce ethnic tension and to provide assistance to the refugees created 
from the conflict. Other local NGOs and civil society organisations used their 
international networks to lobby European governments, Australia and New Zealand, and 
the UN and its Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination for support 
(Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 555-7).  
 
In 2004, there were several small, foreign-based organisations that concentrated on local 
human rights causes, including the Coalition for Democracy in Fiji and the International 
Fiji movement and the Movement for Democracy. The International Committee of the 
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Red Cross (ICRC) also continued to operate an office in Fiji (US Department of State, 
2005, p. 5). 
 
Indonesia: The majority of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community 
groups’ efforts in Kalimantan during the ethnic conflict focused on providing emergency 
support to the internal refugees. They were principally involved in the distribution of 
basic necessities, such as food, medicine and clothes and included local student and youth 
groups and Christian and Muslim religious organisations. Numerous international NGOs 
were also active in the region, including CARE, World Vision International, Catholic 
Relief Services, International Medical Corps, Red Cross, Mercy Corps, Save the 
Children, the British Council and Search for Common Ground. Other international 
organisations, like the International Organisation of Migration, World Health 
Organisation (WHO), UN OCHA, UN Children’s Fund and the UNHCR also provided 
varying levels of assistance (Bamba, 2004, pp. 405-7).  
 
Philippines: During 1995 – 2005, many NGOs and church groups participated in relief 
and rehabilitation efforts for the internal refugees created from the ethnic conflict in 
Mindanao (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). These included the Mindanao Emergency 
Response Network (MERN), a coalition of national and international NGOs, Bantay 
Ceasefire, a network of grass roots organisations, and the Red Cross (US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 9; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). Furthermore, at the end of 2004, the 
UNDP and the European Commission began implementing an 18-month rehabilitation 
project benefiting internal refugees within Mindanao, particularly in those areas most 
affected by violence and fighting. The project aims to address the rehabilitation and 
resettlement requirements of about 60,000 internal refugees in 35 selected conflict-
affected communities in Mindanao. By June 2005, 32 out of 35 selected areas had already 
benefited from some sort of rehabilitation assistance and 120,000 internal refugees had 
received relief assistance (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). 
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Solomon Islands: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the 
Solomon Islands Red Cross, funded by the European Union, provided assistance for 
internal refugees created from the conflict in Guadalcanal (US Department of State, 2005, 
p. 5). The ICRC also provided relief efforts to some of the more inaccessible parts of the 
Solomon Islands, including Sikaiana Island in Malaita province, which saw its population 
increase by 40 percent as Malaitans fled Guadalcanal (USCR, 2002). Aside from the 
structures of traditional society, churches and NGOs in the Solomon Islands have also 
assumed important roles in providing humanitarian assistance to internal refugees. In 
particular, the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA) which is identified with a 
number of churches, the Women for Peace NGO and the Honiara Civil Society Network 
(CSN) have been actively involved in such work (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 593).  The 
Melanesian Brotherhood, an organisation of mainly young itinerant evangelists also 
played an important role in reducing ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands (Anere et al, 
May 2001, p. 35).  
 
Sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state 
No sudden outbreaks of disease were reported in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands during the ethnic conflicts from 1995 – 2005. Despite the announcement 
of warnings concerning the potential for a disease outbreak in Kalimantan, this did not 
eventuate. Instead, only five deaths occurred as a result of diarrhoea in internal refugee 
camps in Kalimantan, with others contracting typhoid and many starving. Starvation was 
also a concern in Mindanao in 1997, following the refusal of about 30 000 internal 
refugees to return to the Mindanao province of Cotabato despite a ceasefire signed 
between the government and the MILF (Robles, 8 August 1997).  
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Table 34: Summary of Intervening Variables 
 
Evidence of Variable Variable 
Fiji Indonesia Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
Description 
 
Less fighting in 
border areas 
 
N/A 
 
? 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Only applicable to Indonesia. No 
fighting occurred on the Kalimantan-
Malaysia border, and external refugees 
were not produced.  
 
Relaxed land 
border controls 
 
N/A 
 
? 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Only applicable to Indonesia. 
Malaysia imposed strict border 
controls.  
 
Governmental 
assistance to 
refugees created 
from the ethnic 
conflict 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
The Fijian and Solomon Islands’ 
governments were unstable during the 
ethnic conflicts and therefore provided 
minor assistance to refugees created 
from the conflict. Although the 
Indonesian and Filipino governments 
were more stable during 1995 – 2005, 
they still provided limited assistance 
to refugees generated from their ethnic 
conflicts. 
 
 
Non-
governmental 
assistance to 
refugees created 
from the ethnic 
conflict 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
All four countries received much 
support from both local and 
international NGOs as well as from 
community groups. 
 
Sudden outbreak 
of disease in the 
refugee-producing 
state 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
No sudden outbreaks of disease were 
reported in any of the four countries, 
although intermittent periods of 
starvation and treatable diseases 
increased in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
 
 
Table 34 (above) shows that intervening variables have little influence in facilitating 
external refugee movements, as few differences exist between them when applied to the 
ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The most 
significant intervening variable is “non-governmental assistance to refugees created from 
 155
the ethnic conflict.” However, this appears to have acted as a deterrent to external refugee 
flows because the NGOs were located within the borders of the refugee-producing 
countries. This may have encouraged the refugees to remain within their state of origin in 
order to gain access to the resources provided by the agencies. NGO assistance therefore 
seems to have outweighed the limited governmental assistance that was provided to the 
refugees, encouraging them to remain internally, rather than externally, displaced. The 
least important variable is “sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state,” 
which did not exist in any of the countries, and therefore did not act as a facilitator in 
creating external refugees.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Successes and Shortcomings of the Model 
Ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region possess similar characteristics which 
are conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees. The theoretical model 
developed in Chapter 3 therefore provided a valuable means from which to answer the 
questions posed in Chapter 1. It identified those factors most closely associated with 
producing external and internal refugees, and discovered that internal refugee movements 
are more likely to occur first in this region and that they do not necessarily encourage 
external refugee flows. Furthermore, the multivariate approach of the model was 
successful in illustrating the interlinked nature of many of the variables, demonstrating 
that no single-factor explanation exists that can determine which ethnic conflicts produce 
internal and/or external refugees. 
 
The success of the model’s multivariate approach was also, however, to its detriment.   
Firstly, due to the interlinked nature of the variables, the information gathered was 
sometimes applicable to a range of variables, rather than just solely one. For example, as 
in the case of the Philippines, the government received external assistance from the 
United States during the ethnic conflict (political variable), which was intended to 
improve levels of economic development within Mindanao (economic variable). 
Likewise, information regarding the lack of human rights (political variable) within each 
country could also be included under other categories, such as “discriminatory political 
systems” and “discriminatory economic systems.” This demonstrates the close 
relationship between political and economic/social variables in creating refugees.  
 
Secondly, the model does not sufficiently take into account the role that an individual 
leader or governing regime can play in the creation of refugees during an ethnic conflict. 
This may be particularly important in assessing whether a country possesses an 
exclusionary national ideology or not. By simplifying “nationalism” into just two types 
(ethnic/religious nationalism and civic nationalism), there is a risk that other forms of 
nationalism, equally capable of producing refugees, are omitted. For example, a country’s 
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exclusionary national ideology may derive from its leader’s imposed personal ideology, 
as demonstrated during former President Suharto’s regime which imposed the 
“Pancasila” ideology on Indonesia. Likewise, the actions of individuals as an intervening 
factor in the creation of refugees, is also not provided in the model. Indeed, there may be 
many more salient intervening factors than just the five major ones outlined in the model. 
Other intervening factors may include: lack of housing, food scarcity, poor water and 
sanitation conditions, lack of access to health and education facilities and lack of sources 
of livelihood (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Thirdly, some specific issues which are particularly prevalent in the ethnic conflicts in the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region are perhaps not given sufficient attention in the model. 
Land is of fundamental importance within the ethnic conflicts studied in this region, but 
its relevance in the creation of refugees is perhaps overlooked. Additionally, political and 
economic corruption is endemic in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon 
Islands. However, the model does not include “corruption” under either its political or 
economic variables as a factor conducive to the creation of refugees. This is an important 
oversight, as corruption within the elite often leads to poverty amongst the masses, which 
is a contributing factor in the production of internal refugees.  
 
Summary of the Factors Conducive to External and Internal Refugee Movements 
 
External and internal refugees are created through a separate, yet interrelated, set of 
independent and intervening variables.  Four predominant political, economic, and 
cultural/perceptual factors are most conducive to the creation of external refugees in the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region. These include: discriminatory political systems, external 
support for a specific ethnic group, discriminatory economic systems, and cultural 
discrimination against ethnic groups. Of these four factors, three involve discrimination 
of some type. Interestingly, discrimination is not a major factor in producing internal 
refugees. Instead, a combination of five structural, political, and economic factors 
accompanied by the intervening factors of governmental and non-governmental 
assistance to refugees are important in encouraging refugees to remain within their 
country of origin. 
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Factors Conducive to External Refugee Movements 
Of the four major independent variables in the model, political factors are the strongest in 
creating external refugees. In particular, if political systems are discriminatory and 
external parties are involved in supporting a specific ethnic group during an ethnic 
conflict, there is a greater likelihood that external refugees will be produced. This is 
supported by evidence that the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups experienced 
especially high levels of political discrimination from 1995 – 2005, according to “The 
Minorities at Risk Political Discrimination Index,” and produced external refugees 
(MAR, 2004; Amnesty International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005). Comparatively, the 
Madurese and Malaitan ethnic groups did not experience similarly high levels of political 
discrimination during this time period and did not produce external refugees.  
 
 Both Indo-Fijians and Moro are substantially under-represented in political office and 
participation due to the prevailing social practice by dominant groups. This is exacerbated 
in Fiji by formal public policies which further restrict the ability of Indo-Fijians to 
participate in politics (Chand, 1997, pp. 1-2; MAR, 2004, p. 2). In addition, the formal 
public policies constructed to reduce such political discrimination in the Philippines are 
inadequate to offset social discriminatory policies by the dominant Catholic group 
(Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 4).  
 
The role that partisan external parties can play by providing political, financial or military 
support to an ethnic group with whom they have a special affinity with is another 
important factor in the creation of external refugees. Unlike the Malaitans and Madurese, 
the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups received external political support for those 
escaping persecution during the conflicts. While the Indian government provided mainly 
political support to Indo-Fijians by closing its diplomatic mission in Fiji and imposing an 
eight-year trade embargo after the 1987 coups (Gurr, 2000, p. 7), the OIC gave both 
political and financial support to the MNLF in the Philippines (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). 
Both actions seem to have facilitated the creation of external refugees.  
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Discriminatory economic systems are another major factor in the creation of external 
refugees. Under “The Minorities at Risk Economic Discrimination Index” (Davenport et 
al, 2004, p. 39), the Indo-Fijian, Malaitan, Moro, and Madurese ethnic groups either 
suffer from historical marginality and neglect and/or varying degrees of poverty – but not 
all suffer from high levels of economic discrimination. Therefore, the nature of the public 
policies in force during the ethnic conflict is most indicative as to whether these groups 
produced external refugees. If public policies substantially restricted the group’s 
economic opportunities compared to other ethnic groups, (as with the Indo-Fijians in 
Fiji), or if public policies designed to improve the group’s economic situation remained 
inadequate to offset active and widespread social discrimination, (as with the Moro in the 
Philippines), feelings of inequality and resentment led to conflict and external refugee 
flows.  
 
The final factor conducive to the creation of external refugees in the Southeast 
Asia/Pacific region is cultural discrimination against ethnic groups, particularly involving 
restrictions on religion. Both the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups faced such religious 
restrictions during their countries’ ethnic conflicts, as neither conformed to the dominant 
national religion of Christianity. Correspondingly, some Hindu places of worship were 
desecrated in Fiji and some Muslims in the Philippines experienced discrimination if they 
dressed in distinctive Muslim dress (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 545-7; US Department 
of State, 2005, p. 8). Such instances of cultural discrimination did not occur towards the 
Madurese or Malaitans, probably because they adhered to the dominant state religion.   
 
Factors Conducive to Internal Refugee Movements 
A set of preconditions is necessary in determining whether internal refugee movements 
result from ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. The state embroiled in 
an ethnic conflict must possess five specific independent variables if it is to produce 
internal refugees. These include: two structural factors (weak states and ethnic 
composition and heterogeneity), two political factors (exclusionary national ideologies 
and lack of human rights), and an economic factor (resource competition concerning 
land). In addition, two intervening variables, favourable governmental and non-
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governmental policies to refugees, are important in encouraging refugees to remain 
within their country of origin. 
 
A state needs to be sufficiently “weak” to generate internal refugees. It therefore must not 
be fulfilling its functions under either one or two of the following capability areas: the 
security gap, the capacity gap, and/or the legitimacy gap (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp.13-
14). Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands all suffered from a 
decreased level of security from 1995 – 2005, in that they were unable to effectively 
protect people from internal and external threats, maintain a monopoly over the use of 
force, and preserve effective sovereignty and order within their territories (Weinstein et 
al, 2005, p. 14). During this time, the governments’ of these countries were also unable to 
meet the basic needs of their citizens, and Indonesia, in particular, struggled to maintain 
legitimacy over its populace. Due to their unfulfilment of the above capability areas, Fiji, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands can be considered as “weak” states.  
 
The existence of a dominant ethnic group within an ethnically heterogeneous population 
is the second structural factor necessary for the creation of internal refugees within an 
ethnic conflict. In the majority of the countries (Fiji, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands) 
the minority ethnic group within each conflict produced refugees. However, the opposite 
was true in the Philippines. In the ARMM, the dominant Moro ethnic group produced the 
majority of the province’s refugees. This variance can perhaps be explained by the 
greater level of inequality in power between the two groups in conflict in the ARMM 
(Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 488; Global IDP Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). The non-
Muslims fighting the Moro in the ARMM included the Filipino government, which has 
far superior resources to draw upon than the Moro, perhaps making it inevitable that 
Moro refugees would be produced.  
 
The political characteristic of an exclusionary national ideology, either of an ethnic or 
religious nature which exists in practice within a state, was important in facilitating the 
generation of internal refugees. Ethnic nationalism dominated in practice from 1995 – 
2005 with the Fijian, Indonesian, and Solomon Island governments promoting the 
 161
indigenous Fijian, Javanese, and Guali ethnicities. Whereas religious nationalism 
dominated in practice in the Philippines during this same period, with the government 
tending to prefer Roman Catholicism over Islam as the dominant state ideology (US 
Department of State, 2005, pp. 8-10; May, 1998, p. 71; Gegeo, 18 November 2005). This 
meant that the Indo-Fijian, Madurese, Malaitan and Moro ethnic groups were often 
denied protection, encouraging them to flee within their states.  
 
A lack of human rights brought about by generalised violence was a fundamental factor 
in the creation of internal refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon 
Islands. These countries scored relatively highly on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
during the peak of their ethnic conflicts, when the majority of their refugees were 
produced (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73 -4). In 2000, each country experienced a 
severe level of human rights violations, reflected in its rating of level four on the PTS. 
Fiji generated the majority of its refugees in 2000, when ethnic conflict and human rights 
violations were at their highest (USCRI, 2004; USCR, 2002; US Department of State, 
2005, p. 5). Although the Philippines and the Solomon Islands also produced many 
refugees in 2000, the majority were created in the Philippines during the 2003 ethnic 
conflict, when it also had a rating of level four on the PTS (Europa, 2004, p. 3417). 
Likewise, the majority of refugees were created during the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan 
in 2001, when the country still ranked at level four on the PTS. Despite Indonesia 
reaching level five on the PTS in 2003, no refugees were generated from Kalimantan, as 
the ethnic conflict there had already stopped. This indicates that refugees are more likely 
to be created from some form of generalised violence rather than from institutionalised 
human rights violations (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78). Comparatively, most of the Solomon 
Islands’ refugees were generated during 1999, but unfortunately no accurate data was 
available to establish the PTS for that year (USCR, 2002; Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 
73-4). Notwithstanding, a lack of human rights in the Solomon Islands during the ethnic 
conflict appears to have facilitated the creation of refugees. 
 
Resource competition concerning land is the most significant economic 
underdevelopment indicator in each of the countries in facilitating the generation of 
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internal refugees from 1995 – 2005. Tensions over land in Fiji increased during this 
period, when many indigenous Fijian landowners refused to renew land leases to Indo-
Fijian farmers, which compromised the Indo-Fijians’ economic well-being, encouraging 
many to move (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, pp. 22-4; US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 7). Similarly, the economic well-being of many Moro, who largely relied 
on subsistence agriculture for survival, was threatened by the Filipino government’s 
emphasis to modernise economic production in Mindanao. The government’s selling of 
traditionally-held Moro land to multinational corporations to facilitate this objective 
increased competition over land, jeopardised the Moros’ livelihood, and created a further 
impetus for some to move (Islam, 2003, p. 219). Resource competition over land also 
increased in Kalimantan from the late 1980s with the rapid growth of the Madurese 
population and with many Madurese acquiring land previously owned by Dayak under 
the New Order’s political institutions (Bertrand, 2004, pp. 55-7). Dayak resentment over 
this facilitated an internal refugee movement of Madurese in Indonesia. An internal 
refugee movement of Malaitan settlers to Guadalcanal was similarly created in the 
Solomon Islands, when their numbers increased enough to place undue stress on the 
availability of land, of which approximately 90 percent of the population rely on for 
subsistence agriculture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 70).  
 
In addition to the previous independent variables mentioned, two intervening variables 
exist which are important in encouraging refugees to remain within their country of 
origin. Favourable governmental and non-governmental policies to refugees create a huge 
incentive for them not to cross an international border and become external refugees. The 
degree of emergency support and relief that governments and NGOs provide immediately 
following an ethnic conflict is therefore extremely influential in determining whether 
refugees remain internally displaced or not. The Fijian, Indonesian, Filipino, and 
Solomon Islands’ governments, as well as various local and international NGOs, each 
provided high levels of assistance to the refugees created from their ethnic conflicts. This 
perhaps helps to explain why higher numbers of internal refugees (rather than external 
refugees) were created from each conflict.  
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The Relationship between External and Internal Refugee Movements 
Internal refugee movements are often of a larger size and occur before external refugee 
movements during ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. However, the 
mere existence of internal refugees does not necessarily mean that external refugees will 
also be created. For example, only half of the countries examined produced both internal 
and external refugee flows. The larger size of internal refugee movements, relative to 
external refugee movements, comprises part of an international trend, whereby internal 
refugee flows are increasing in size and duration. For example, Schmeidl notes that prior 
to 1990, 25 percent of internal displacement lasted only one or two years and only eight 
populations were displaced for ten or more years. This trend changed markedly during 
the 1990s; with about 61 percent of internal displacement lasting five years or less and 21 
percent of these existing for ten or more years. The comparative figures for external 
displacement are 53 percent and 27 percent respectively (1998, p. 29). Possible reasons 
for the extended duration of internal refugee movements may include “lack of assistance 
and self-reliance opportunities, land and property disputes, continued hostility from local 
populations, and continued fighting,” meaning that many internal refugees prefer to wait 
before returning or instead choose to resettle elsewhere (Global IDP Project, 2005).  This 
shift towards greater numbers of internally displaced people indicates that refugees now 
appear to have fewer opportunities of escaping across international borders. Such 
containment of refugees within countries can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including: 
 
- The inhibitors (which the model does not discuss), may be of a greater magnitude 
than the facilitators in dissuading external refugee movements; and/or: 
- Extreme forms of any of the independent variables conducive to generating 
refugees can also have the effect of constraining refugee flight  
 
Possible inhibitors to external refugee movements can be of either a physical nature (such 
as inaccessible mountain ranges or water/sea), or of a human-made nature (such as strict 
border controls, unavailability of asylum in neighbouring countries, or fighting in 
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bordering areas that prevents mass overland exodus) (Schmeidl, 1997). It is interesting to 
note that land access was not a significant factor in facilitating the creation of external 
refugees in any of the ethnic conflicts examined. Instead, two island states produced 
external refugees (Fiji and the Philippines) and the only country with a land border 
(Indonesia) did not produce external refugees. However, other inhibitors to external 
refugee movements existed in Indonesia. A lack of geographical proximity to the border, 
combined with harsh terrain and especially strict border controls appear to have been 
significant in preventing external refugee flows from Kalimantan. Furthermore, many of 
the states in the region have not ratified the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. This 
unavailability of asylum may also act as a deterrent to flight and thus the creation of 
external refugees.  
 
Another reason why internal refugee movements are more prevalent than external refugee 
movements in this region may be associated with the nature of the independent variables 
involved. Extreme forms of any of the independent variables conducive to generating 
refugees can also have the effect of constraining refugee flight. For example, while the 
coercive policies of repressive authoritarian governments may encourage people to leave, 
those same repressive laws and totalitarian methods can act as a constraining force, by 
rendering actual flight more difficult (Richmond, 1993, p. 16). Likewise, refugee 
movements may favour young and healthy people as well as those with some material 
resources that can be traded or converted into foreign currency. It may also be gender 
discriminative, in that adult males may be more proactive in escaping than women and 
children, who often have fewer options and are therefore left behind (Richmond, 1993, p. 
17).    
 
Suggestions for Governments and Regional Organisations to Reduce Refugee Flows 
Although ethnic conflict is ultimately responsible for producing many of the refugees in 
the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, other important independent and intervening variables 
may strongly influence the nature and extent of refugee movements. If these variables can 
be minimised, there is a greater likelihood that refugee numbers will also decrease in the 
region. Firstly, it is important to minimise the independent variables most conducive to 
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creating refugees, as they provide the basic cause of the problem. However, the extent to 
which this can occur largely depends on their fundamental character. For example, 
political and economic factors are easier to alter than structural and cultural/perceptual 
factors due to their more transient nature. Having already identified which of these 
factors are most important in creating internal and external refugees, some preventative 
measures that governments or regional organisations could take to reduce refugee 
numbers are now considered.  
 
The major factors conducive to creating external refugees in the region - discriminatory 
political and economic systems, the involvement of external parties, and restrictions on 
religion - are of a political and economic nature, and therefore can be better manipulated, 
and thus prevented, than those factors likely to generate internal refugees. For example, 
public policies or social practices which substantially restrict an ethnic group’s political 
participation, representation, or economic opportunities in comparison to other ethnic 
groups, must be revised by governments to end political and economic discrimination. 
Such a revision can not merely occur on paper to be effective; it must also be 
implemented in practice, so that mechanisms are in place to offset any possible future 
discrimination. Regional organisations could support governments which have expressed 
interest in revising their public policies, by assisting them in the planning and 
implementation of such remedial programmes.  
 
Likewise, regional organisations could emphasise to member-states that external refugee 
flows are likely to result if they provide political, financial, or military support to a 
specific ethnic group involved in an ethnic conflict. Dissuading external parties from 
providing partisan support, unless they are capable, willing, and prepared to accept any 
resulting refugees, is therefore salient in preventing external refugee flows. Regional 
organisations should also emphasise the importance of religious tolerance as a vital step 
in contributing towards a country’s economic prosperity and political stability. Promoting 
the need for compulsory religious education programmes at primary school level in 
ethnically heterogeneous countries should encourage religious tolerance by teaching 
children of the equal validity of minority religions.   
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It is more difficult to employ preventative measures for internal refugee movements as 
two significant structural factors involved in their production – weak states and ethnic 
composition and heterogeneity – are much harder, if not impossible, to alter. Aside from 
these factors, there is also not much that regional organisations can do to change a 
country’s national ideology, which is a by-product of its past and deeply engrained within 
society. Therefore, the only factors conducive to creating internal refugees which regional 
organisations might be able to notably influence is by encouraging governments to 
respect fundamental human rights, including land ownership, and to provide assistance to 
internal refugees created from ethnic conflicts.  
 
Once the independent variables most conducive to creating refugees have been 
minimised, the monitoring of intervening variables by regional organisations and 
governments is important in preventing refugee flows (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 139). Given 
that many of the conflicts in this region are long-standing, it is important that a region-
wide strategy is developed and implemented to address ways of minimising those factors 
most conducive to creating refugees and to monitor any intervening factors. Such a 
strategy needs to focus on an early-warning prevention plan. However, this can only be as 
effective as the information that is available to it. Therefore, greater emphasis needs to be 
spent on data collection and analysis within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. 
Governmental, non-governmental, and regional organisations need to work together to 
collate and share such information, if this is to be successful. In particular, regional 
organisations need to invest more of their resources in areas of less geo-political 
importance, including in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. Some initiatives have been 
taken on this, including a report released by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in 
August 2000, which details the major deficiencies in the collection of economic statistics 
in the Pacific region (SPC, 10 August 2000).  
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 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Although refugees are created by a combination of structural, political, economic, 
cultural/perceptual and intervening variables, political factors rated twice as high 
compared to the other factors in generating both internal and external refugee 
movements. In particular, discriminatory political systems, external parties, exclusionary 
national ideologies, and a lack of human rights all contributed towards the production of 
refugees from the ethnic conflicts examined in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands. While various literature exists which analyses the role that 
discriminatory political systems and a lack of human rights play in creating refugees, less 
research has been undertaken in analysing the effect of external parties and exclusionary 
national ideologies on refugee movements. The findings of this thesis suggest that these 
factors deserve greater attention in future research in this field. Unlike much of the 
previous research, this study also found that the style of political regime had little 
significance in contributing towards the production of refugees. Similar numbers of 
refugees were created under both democratic and authoritarian regimes.    
 
Structural, economic, cultural/perceptual, and intervening variables were also prevalent in 
creating refugees within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region from 1995 – 2005. However, 
these factors (weak states, ethnic composition and heterogeneity, discriminatory 
economic systems, resource competition concerning land, restrictions on religion, and 
governmental and non-governmental assistance to refugees created from ethnic conflict), 
all played a less significant role than political factors in producing refugees. These 
findings contradict the argument that economic hardship is an important cause of refugee 
movements (the root cause debate), as not all the refugees that were created suffered from 
comparatively greater poverty levels than their indigenous counterparts. Indeed, the Indo-
Fijian and Madurese ethnic groups in Fiji and Indonesia were generally less poor than the 
indigenous Fijian and Dayak ethnic groups in these countries. Therefore evidence of a 
direct causal link between refugee flows and poverty is unfounded. Furthermore, 
Edmonston’s (1992) argument that higher levels of social change (population growth 
rate, population density, and fertility rate); produce greater numbers of refugees also 
remained unfounded. Schmeidl’s (2003, p. 304) finding that neither facilitators nor 
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inhibitors were significant in predicting refugees was not founded in this study. However, 
she correctly assumes that non-geographical facilitators and inhibitors are more important 
in creating refugees.  
 
If policymakers continue to view refugee movements as problems of “humanitarian 
relief,” they will only be able to react to the latest refugee crisis, rather than decipher the 
underlying factors that create them (Wood, 1994, p. 608). Until the root causes of refugee 
flows are addressed by governments, local ethnic hatred will continue to resurface and 
feelings of discrimination and marginalisation will continue to create refugees.   
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Table 35: Variations from Hypotheses: A Complete Summary of the Application of 
Variables to the Countries 
 
Evidence of Variable  
Variable Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
 
Description 
 
 
Weak States 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the 
Solomon Islands were weak under at 
least one of the capability areas. A 
weak state is a precondition for the 
creation of internal refugees. 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic 
composition and 
Heterogeneity 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
?* 
 
 
? 
The countries are ethnically 
heterogeneous and a dominant ethnic 
group exists within each of the ethnic 
conflicts.  
* Unlike the other countries, the 
dominant ethnic group in ARMM 
produced refugees in the Philippines.  
 
 
 
Land access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Kalimantan (Indonesia) is the only 
country with land access, but it did not 
produce external refugees. Whereas, 
Fiji and the Philippines produced 
external refugees despite having no 
land access. 
 
 
State-Building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
?* 
 
? 
 
? 
Coups only seemed to have a 
significant impact in the creation of 
refugees in Fiji and a marginal impact 
on the creation of refugees in the 
Solomon Islands.  
*The regime change in Indonesia may 
have contributed towards the creation 
of refugees in Kalimantan, but 
evidence remains unsubstantiated.  
 
 
Political Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Except for the Solomon Islands, the 
political regimes of the other countries 
did not seem to influence the creation 
of refugees. Fiji and the Philippines 
were democratic from 1995 – 2005, yet 
refugees were still produced. Although 
Indonesia’s political regime transferred 
from autocracy to democracy during 
this period, similar numbers of 
refugees were produced under both 
types of political regime. 
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Evidence of Variable  
Variable Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
 
Description 
 
Discriminatory  
Political Systems 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Discriminatory political systems exist 
in Fiji, Indonesia and the Philippines 
and are a factor in the creation of 
refugees in those countries. While the 
Filipino and Indonesian governments 
have not enacted formal public policies 
to disadvantage Moro and Madurese, 
the Fijian Constitution includes 
provisions designed to disadvantage 
Indo-Fijians. No political 
discrimination of Malaitans exists in 
the Solomon Islands, so is not a factor 
in the creation of refugees there. 
 
 
Exclusionary 
National 
Ideologies 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
Exclusionary national ideologies exist 
in practice in all four countries. Ethnic 
nationalism dominates in practice in 
Fiji, Indonesia and the Solomon 
Islands, whereas religious nationalism 
dominates in practice in the 
Philippines. 
 
 
Lack of Human 
Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
During the ethnic conflicts, all 
countries were rated at a level four on 
the PTS in 2000. Therefore, a lack of 
human rights seems to have 
contributed to the creation of refugees 
in these countries. 
 
 
Role of External 
Parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
The Malaitan and Madurese ethnic 
groups did not receive any external 
support and did not create external 
refugees. However, the Indo-Fijians 
and Moro ethnic groups received 
external support from ethnic brethren 
which may have encouraged their 
external refugee flows. 
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Evidence of Variable  
Variable Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
 
Description 
 
 
Poverty 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
Poverty was evident in the 
creation of refugees in the 
ARMM. However, it was not 
significant in the creation of 
refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, and 
the Solomon Islands.  This is 
because the Indo-Fijians, 
Madurese, and Malaitans are 
relatively less poor than their 
indigenous counterparts.   
 
 
 
Economic 
Underdevelopment 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
Only one of the six variables 
could be attributed to providing 
an environment which facilitated 
refugee flows.  The variable: 
“resource competition concerning 
land,” was significant in creating 
an environment conducive to 
refugees in the ethnic conflicts. 
 
 
Discriminatory 
Economic Systems 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
Economic discrimination towards 
the ethnic groups that produced 
refugees was only evident in Fiji, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
The Malaitans in the Solomon 
Islands did not suffer from 
economic discrimination. 
 
 
Social Change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
Population size, population 
density, and the total fertility rate 
had no impact on the creation of 
refugees within any of the four 
countries. 
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Evidence of Variable  
Variable Fiji Indonesia  Philippines Solomon 
Islands 
 
Description 
 
Restrictions on 
Religion 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
? 
The Indo-Fijians and Moro 
experienced some restrictions on 
religion during the ethnic conflicts 
in Fiji and the Philippines. 
 
Restrictions on Use of 
Language 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
- 
 
Restrictions on 
Appearance and 
Behaviour  
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
- 
 
All other types of 
cultural restrictions 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
- 
 
Less fighting in 
border areas 
 
N/A 
 
? 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
Only applicable to Indonesia. No 
fighting occurred on Kalimantan’s 
border and no external refugees 
were created. 
 
Relaxed land border 
controls 
 
N/A 
 
? 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
Only applicable to Indonesia. 
Malaysia imposed strict border 
controls.  
 
Governmental 
assistance to refugees 
created from the 
ethnic conflict 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
The Fijian, Indonesian, Filipino, 
and the Solomon Islands’ 
governments provided limited 
assistance to refugees generated 
from their ethnic conflicts.  
 
 
Non-governmental 
assistance to refugees 
created from the 
ethnic conflict 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
All four countries received much 
support from both local and 
international NGOs as well as 
from community groups. 
 
Sudden outbreak of 
disease in the 
refugee-producing 
state 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
No sudden outbreaks of disease 
were reported in any of the four 
countries, although intermittent 
periods of starvation and treatable 
diseases increased in Indonesia 
and the Philippines. 
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